


CHINA
PAKISTAN
AND
BANGLADESH

China Pakistan and Bangladesh

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Preface

China looked with suspicion at the emergence of Pakistan. The idea of a separate homeland had dangerous implications for the 50 million Chinese Muslims, particularly those in the adjoining region of Sinkiang. The Chinese central government had never been able to exercise firm control in that distant province. Its overwhelmingly Muslim population had revolted on many occasions for its emancipation from Han domination. The Mao regime, therefore, was quite apprehensive of Pakistan's ideology and its role as the watch-man, the guardian and the protector of Muslim interests in that remote and strategic part of China. It was precisely for this reason that Peking refused to entertain Pakistan's request about the stationing of its Consul-General in that sensitive area. The letters on the recognition of the Chinese Communist government addressed through the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow, the Chinese response and the delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries have been examined in depth on the basis of the material available only in the Chinese language and hitherto unutilized by scholars.

Peking's relations with the most allied ally of the Western Powers proceeded in an uneven fashion. Certain actions of Pakistan were considered positive by China, while others could not be assessed sympathetically. The two countries had different social and political systems, ideological moorings and objectives, but they came to share common hostility towards India and apprehensions about the USSR. Relations between them developed in depth after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 when a number of agreements on the boundary, trade, air service, radio-photo etc. were signed, friendly visits became frequent and Peking extended economic and military assistance

to Pakistan. Thus, a special relationship came to be forged between the two countries.

The growth of the Sino-Pakistan axis was watched with concern and anxiety in Moscow. In order to counter the Chinese influence in Pakistan, the USSR exerted itself to bring about reconciliation between India and Pakistan at Tashkent and extended large scale economic assistance and even some military aid to Pakistan. The rapid growth in the Soviet influence in Pakistan after Tashkent and the propounding of the policy of equi distance, i.e. normal bilateral relations with all the great Powers, by Ayub Khan was not to the liking of China. Pakistan seemed to be drifting away from China under the 'revisionist' influence of the Kremlin.

However, in the wake of the Bangladesh crisis the ties between China and Pakistan again became stronger. In order to preserve its hold in Pakistan, the self proclaimed champion of the national liberation movements, i.e. China, adopted quite an indifferent attitude towards the freedom struggle of the people of East Bengal against the ruthless and oppressive dictatorial regime of Yahya Khan. Even after the sovereign People's Republic of Bangladesh came into existence, China continued its hostile posture towards it by not recognizing Sheikh Mujib's government and vetoing Dacca's application for membership in the United Nations.

The twists and turns in the Sino-Pakistan relations, the Chinese attitude during the Indo-Pak conflicts of 1965 and 1971 and towards Bangladesh as also the present abnormal state of relations between Pakistan on the one hand and Bangladesh and India on the other and Peking's role therein are critically examined and analysed in depth in the present study.

The author has made extensive use of the material available in the Chinese language. About 150 basic documents on the subject, some of them translations from the Chinese language, have been collected, and these are being published separately as a companion volume of this study.

While I have benefitted from the comments of many friends and colleagues, the views expressed in the study are entirely my personal views. I am greatly indebted to Professor M. S. Venkataramani, Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Mr B. K. Basu, Director,

Historical, Division, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, for their encouragement and continuing interest in the publication of the present study. I thank my son Rajendra for his help in editing and reading the proofs and my wife, Sheila Devi Jain, who has rendered assistance of various kinds.

New Delhi

J. P. JAIN

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1 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

IN according recognition to the People's Republic of China, Pakistan was primarily moved by considerations of its ideological moorings and aspirations, the fact of its being geographically close to China, trade and British guidance. Pakistan, which set out to shape a pure if archaic Islamic State, felt attracted towards the large Muslim population in China. A study of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs asserted that there existed "historic bonds" between the Chinese and the Indian Muslims and that even after the establishment of British power in India the cultural and commercial intercourse between the two peoples continued. The study went on to remark, "With the ascendancy of Russia in Central Asia, Samarkand and Bokhara were cut off from Peshawar and Lahore but Kashgar and Khotan were not"¹ It might be recalled that Kashgar and Khotan are in Chinese Turkistan, known as Sinkiang.

Being the largest Muslim country in the world and claiming itself to be an ideological state, which was said to be created on the basis of Islam, Pakistan considered it its hounden duty to protect the interests of the Muslim World. This it attempted to do by expressing its sympathy and support for the rights and interests of the oppressed Muslim people or communities in various countries and for their demands of separate homeland and freedom from foreign rule. The principle of self-determination was pressed into service and all that served as an ideological camouflage for Pakistan's own expansionist tendencies in the world. It was, therefore, natural for Pakistan to project, soon after its coming into existence, its communal

approach in international relations and to express its serious concern for the sufferings and emancipation of the fifty million Chinese Muslims (The Chinese communists speak of only ten millions), as for Muslims in India and other parts of the world. A study of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs *Muslim China* by Ahmed Ali published in August 1949, estimated the strength of Muslims in some of the provinces of China in the following way

<i>Province</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Muslims</i>
Sinkiang	4.4 Million	94
Ninghsia	About 1 Million	75
Kansu	6.3 Million	69
Shensi	9.8 Million	41
Chinghai	1.5 Million	large

Estimates of Muslim population in other provinces were placed between 1 and 13 percent except for Yunnan where the Muslims accounted for 28 per cent of the total population of 11 million.

The study quoted above found the way of life and racial characteristics of the Chinese Muslims in the provinces, where they were in majority or in considerable number, as "quite distinct from the Hans or Chinese" and closely akin to other Muslim countries. The author of the study, therefore, asserted that the Pakistani Muslims shared with them the same culture, religion, outlook and language. The author recalled that the Chinese Muslims preferred to send their children for education to Muslim countries than to China where they disliked education being imparted through Chinese and found no separate facilities for their boarding and lodging. In China, the Muslim students "have either to de-Muslimise themselves or forego education." The Turkis preferred the latter, he added.

The author of *Muslim China* described vividly the "unspeakable sufferings," including the merciless persecution and massacre that the Chinese Muslims had to undergo under the Manchus (1644-1911). The terror of the Manchu dynasty was not confined to the breaking up of Muslim political power and the suppression of all their aspirations but also extended to the denial of the freedom of expression and belief to them. As a

result the Muslims rose in rebellion a number of times.

The policy of the Kuomintang, the successors of the Manchus, was not much different from that of their predecessor although the Kuomintang policy, as laid down by Sun Yat-sen in his *Three Principles*, was one of self-determination for the racial groups and minorities of the country. As late as 1928, the "Christian" General Fang Yu-hsiang, once a great friend and classmate of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, also a Christian, invaded Hochow in Kansu, and "liquidated" the Muslims of that place. "Even to this day," the author of *Muslim China* said in 1949, the Muslims still lived outside the city walls in Nanking, the capital of China, and other cities and had "no special protection." The phrase "special protection" reminds one of the Muslim League's demand under the British rule in India which subsequently sowed the seeds of a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims. Since the foundation of the Chinese Republic in 1911, Chinese Turkistan, "never really Chinese has been striving for independence," he said, but the Kuomintang never went beyond the promise of granting autonomy. This, he observed, was hardly sufficient to satisfy the "national aspirations" of the people who demanded "independence and freedom from foreign rule" and favoured the discontinuance of Chinese rule in the New Dominion, that is Sinkiang.

At one time, the author of *Muslim China* recalled the heroic figure of Yakoob Beg who, under the title of Ataliq Ghazi, founded an independent Kingdom in Sinkiang which was recognized by both Russia and Great Britain in 1872. The Sultan of Turkey conferred on him the title of Emir-ul-Momnin. Another personage under the title of Sultan Suleiman proclaimed himself ruler of one half of Yunnan. Thus during 1860 and 1873, the Muslims in China stood on the threshold of a great Muslim state in China that would have established their sway over large areas of the Middle Kingdom, i.e. China. The dream did not come true largely because of the disunity among the ranks of the Muslim leaders, he said.

Although the opportunity was lost in the middle of the nineteenth century, but that was no cause for despair. The circumstances in the middle of the present century were considered to be no less propitious for the realization of that dream. All the

five provinces of China where Muslims were estimated to be in majority or near majority, were contiguous and of these the provinces of Chinghai and Ninghsia are unique,' said the author of *Muslim China* in having two Muslims as their governors. The consciousness among the Chinese Muslims of the 'joys of freedom' the awakening in Asia that made possible the fight against 'the aggressors whether native and foreign,' and the birth of Pakistan that sent a wave of joy in the hearts of all Muslims in China—all these were expected to facilitate that dream.

In a telegram of condolence on the death of Jinnah sent by "Peiping Muslims on behalf of 50 million Chinese Muslims to the Government of Pakistan Jinnah was described as 'the beloved leader of Muslims all over the world and 'brotherly affection' was conveyed to the Pakistani people. Articles contributed on the occasion in *Yuch Hua* a Chinese bi weekly on 18 September 1948, spoke of the Chinese Muslims' determination to continue the great struggle which the Quid-i-Azam (Jinnah) had carried on, that is of creating a separate homeland for Muslims in China. One article asserted that the fire that burnt in the breast of a Chinese Muslim was the same as that in the breast of a Pakistani Muslim and that Muslims of China would try to fulfill Jinnah's mission in struggling for the welfare of Muslim masses by "emancipating our fifty million brethren". The author of *Muslim China* assured all possible help on behalf of the Pakistani Muslims when he concluded his book with expressions of friendship and understanding for the cause of the Chinese Muslims.

With a view to succeed in the civil war, the Chinese Communists made certain promises to the Muslims about protecting their Muslim culture, guaranteeing religious freedom, assisting them to form an autonomous Muslim State and even helping "to unite the Muslims of China, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and Soviet Russia".² These empty gestures of goodwill towards the Muslims were a tactical move to gain the goodwill of the majority community in the provinces. It emanated from the very weak position of the Chinese Communists in the area. For well over a decade, since the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the Communist Movement in Sinkiang could make little headway and whatever successes

it made during Sheng-Sbih-ts'ai's collaboration with the Soviet Union came to naught when Governor Sheng decided to break with Moscow with the result that the Communists came to be arrested and persecuted. When Mao's legions entered Sinkiang in October 1949, the Chinese Communists had no indigenous support in the area and it was not until early 1950 that the Chinese Communist forces reached Kashgar.

The show of palliative measures designed to humour the Muslims could hardly be expected to last long. Once the authority of the Chinese Communists had been firmly established, Mao could not be expected to discard either the general Communist attitude towards Islam and all other religions or to give up the belief in the cultural superiority of the Chinese over the Muslims. In fact, the sinification of Muslims in Sinkiang proceeded with greater pace than before under the slogans of raising the communist consciousness of the people and combatting "local nationalism," though occasionally lip service was also paid to fighting great Han Chauvinism. The consolidation of the Chinese Communist hold over this far distant area, inhabited by 94 per cent non-Chinese people, could not be an easy task. It might be recalled that when the tribal leaders of Ili and Ining areas in Sinkiang proceeded to establish the quasi-independent state of "East Turkestan Republic" in 1944, the leaflets that were distributed by them emphasized the freedom of national minorities in the USSR and contrasted the tragic situation in Sinkiang. One of them stated.

Our nearest blood relations are the Kuzakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tartars. In the Soviet Union each of these races has organized its own government and its members are living free and joyful lives.³

The other blood relations of the Muslims in China lived, among other places, in Pakistan and in case of their organizing themselves for emancipation, the Muslims in Sinkiang might work for their separation from China and linking their destiny with their co-religionists in the neighbourhood. The Chinese suspicions in this regard were revealed as early as 9 September 1947. On that day, the *China Digest*, a magazine devoted to reporting the Chinese peoples' activities, thoughts and

hopes, carried a report date-lined New Delhi 10 August 1947 from one Harin Shah in which it was stated that so long as the leadership of Pakistan had no time to think much of affairs beyond their borders but it was known that they looked upon Sinkiang "as a Muslim Nation, perfectly entitled to Sovereign Statehood, as much as the Pakistan has come to be". It would not be surprising the report added if close concert developed between Pakistan and Sinkiang and if the pace of events in Sinkiang was hastened China's diplomats must expect some hard work, it emphasized. These suspicions later found expression in the Chinese reply to Pakistan's note of recognition in which Peking refused to accede to Pakistan's request that Sinkiang concerned authorities consider their Consul-General stationed in Kashgar, Lt Col Mohammed Sadiq, as Pakistan's righteous and trusted representative in *Sinkiang*.

As for trade being a factor in Pakistan recognizing the Mao regime, it is to be noted that sizable Muslim business communities flourished in the Sinkiang province of China. Many of them came from Kashmir, Chitral and Baltistan. The reason why Pakistan wanted an early end of the Chinese civil war was its desire for trade relations with China. Soon after the return of peace to China, trade relations came to be established and China became one of Pakistan's principal customers. It might be recalled that before the sealing off of the border between Gilgit and Sinkiang in November 1959 traders from both sides used to exchange goods free of restrictions.⁴

Soon after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, told a press conference that the question of according recognition to the Communist regime "would have to be faced" and asked the Western powers to be realistic in the matter.⁵ *Dawn*, the influential Pakistani paper, reminded the Government of Pakistan of the large Muslim population and "geographical contiguity" of China with Pakistan which "has a special appeal to our people" and stressed that in recognizing the Peking regime, the primary consideration should be "our own national interest". Pakistan, the paper added, should not wait for any lead from any one else.⁶ The appeal to the Western powers and waiting for any lead from other quarters strongly

suggest the influence which the British, whom Pakistan regarded as their "best friends," exercised in the Pakistan Government. The simultaneous announcement of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime in London and Karachi was also sufficient proof of the fact that there existed close collaboration between the Pakistan and the British Governments in the matter and the delay could only be explained on the ground that the consultations between them could not be brought to a conclusion before 4 January 1950.

In according recognition to the Mao regime, Pakistan was not in any way inhibited as the United States was because of its involvement in the Chinese civil war and close association with Chiang Kai-shek. Pakistan had not taken sides in the Chinese civil war, had no past connections with Chiang Kai-shek and had hardly any cause for sympathy with him. In fact Marshal Chiang Kai-shek came to be regarded as a personal friend of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, and an admirer of the Indian National Congress. He disappointed Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, when he sought to put pressure on the British for the independence of India in order to win the war. In a statement issued in India during his visit in early 1942, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek advised the British to withdraw from the sub-continent immediately, that is, without waiting for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem or first acceding to the Muslim League demand for partition of India. Jinnah regretted that Marshal Chiang should have indulged in "generalities without understanding the political situation in India and the constitutional adjustments which are necessary." He also criticized Chiang for expressing views which "may be exploited to the detriment of Muslim India." Little did Jinnah realize that to endorse his views on this score would have been suicidal for the Chinese ruler especially when one took into account the continuous struggle of the Muslims in China for separation of the regions in which they were in a majority from the central Chinese authority. It is significant to note in this connection the observation contained in the study of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs referred to earlier. It said, "Little though was known in the sub-continent of the happenings in Central Asia, the Muslims in India could not but sympathise with the Muslim people in their struggle for

emancipation ' 7

The decision of the Pakistan Government to recognize the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Peking as the legal government of China was conveyed by Qureshi, Pakistan's Ambassador in Moscow, in a letter addressed to the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai on 5 January 1950. As that letter said nothing about Pakistan severing its relations with the "Kuomintang reactionaries," it evidently could not be said to meet the requirements contained in Mao's invitation to foreign powers to recognize the new regime and for that matter could hardly be described as the adoption on the part of Pakistan of a "friendly attitude towards the People's Republic of China." Moreover, the Chinese could not but have noticed that the letter was addressed not by Pakistan's Prime Minister or even Foreign Minister but merely an Ambassador who had the audacity to address Chou En-lai as simply Foreign Minister. The letter, therefore, remained unanswered and unacknowledged to this date. When no response was forthcoming for twenty days, the Pakistan Government hastened to repair the damage done by issuing an official communique on 24 January 1950 which stated that the 'Pakistan Government has withdrawn the recognition from the Chinese Kuomintang Government stationed in Taiwan."

On 29 January 1950, Qureshi was instructed to address another letter to his counterpart, Wang Chia-hsiang, the Chinese Ambassador in the Soviet Union. In that letter, written in continuation of the earlier official note of 5 January 1950, he requested his Chinese colleague to convey to the Government in Peking a cable from the Pakistan Government which referred to Pakistan's recognition of the Mao regime as the legal government of China, Mao's announcement of 1 October 1949 and expressed the wish to establish diplomatic relations with China as early as possible on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty. But "before the appointment of Ambassador" the Pakistan Government requested the Peking regime to ask the Sinkiang concerned authorities

- (a) to consider Pakistan's Consul General stationed in Kashgar Lt. Col Mohammed Sadiq as Pakistan's righteous and trusted representative in Sinkiang,

- (b) to allow him to manage the office in that capacity and give him all the necessary facilities ; and
- (c) to give Pakistan's special representative in Nanking Tajuddin and other personnel all the convenience to shift to Peking (to enable him to arrange the Pakistan Embassy accommodation) and allow him to take his followers and official documents. The Chinese Government was also asked to inform Tajuddin "immediately" about it.

In the second paragraph of that letter, attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to the official communique issued on 24 January 1950 and Peking was again informed that the Pakistan Government had "righteously" withdrawn the recognition from the Chinese Kuomintang Government stationed in Taiwan and accordingly instructed its all diplomatic representatives in foreign countries not to regard the Kuomintang representatives in foreign countries as its diplomatic representatives. In the last paragraph of the letter, hope was expressed that Wang Chia-hsiang would convey the contents of the letter to his government and inform Qureshi of the result "as early as possible " For an early reply, Qureshi wrote to Wang Chia-hsiang. "Our Government and myself will be grateful to you."⁸

The reply note of the Chinese Government was delivered by Wang Chia-hsiang to Qureshi on 4 February 1950 and was addressed by Li K'e-nung, Vice-Foreign Minister of the Peking Government, to the Pakistan Government. The note formally acknowledged the receipt of Qureshi's letter of 29 January 1950 (no mention was made of the earlier letter of 4 January 1950) and agreed in principle to the early establishment of diplomatic relations "on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty." In that note, the Chinese Government also promised that facilities would be provided to Tajuddin in shifting to Peking but Tajuddin was required "to carry on talks regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations" as "the first step" in the matter. Nothing was said in the note whether or not Tajuddin had been or would be informed about rendering facilities to him in his shifting to Peking.

The request of the Pakistan Government about Sadiq being treated as Pakistan's "righteous and trusted representative in

Sinkiang was brusquely set aside and Karachi was bluntly told that he would be treated "as a foreign national" in the Sinkiang Province of China till the formal exchange of diplomatic representatives between the two countries,⁹ which took place in their respective capitals more than a year and a half later.

The reasons for the Chinese coolness towards the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are not far to seek. Peking might have desired Karachi to explain its attitude towards Formosa, especially because of Pakistan's reference in its letter, to 'the Chinese Kuomintang Government stationed in Taiwan' and later the contention of Pakistan's representative at the United Nations that the status of the island of Formosa was yet to be determined. Peking must also have considered it extremely dangerous to allow the Pakistani diplomatic or consular representatives in the most sensitive area, that is Sinkiang. The record of Chinese rule there was not one of continuity. The Soviet influence was predominant, the geographical location of Sinkiang was such that it was easy for adjoining countries, especially Muslim Pakistan, to foment trouble inside and carry on "large scale subversive activities," the charge that was labelled by Peking against Moscow in 1963-64. Not only 94 per cent of the population of Sinkiang was Muslim but it was an area which had long traditions of independence and where the Chinese position was very precarious.

The very existence of Pakistan next door to China was a constant inspiration and reminder to the Muslim population of the adjoining Sinkiang to shake off the oppressive Han rule and, along with other Muslims in the contiguous areas of China, form a separate Muslim State just as Pakistan had done. If the Muslim majority regions in the north-west and north east could be separated from the rest of India and constituted into a separate Muslim homeland of Pakistan, there seemed no reason why the Muslim majority provinces of the north and north west, if not the south (Yunnan), in China could not be separated from the rest of China and made a separate Muslim State. While common experience of living for centuries under Muslim and later British rulers in India might be said to have resulted in forging many common links and characteristics among the Hindus and the Muslims of India,

there was no intermingling of races, cultures or language between the Muslims of China and the Han people. The concept of two nations based on religion had quite a relevance to China and all such factors as the peculiar geographic distribution of the Muslim population, its cohesiveness, and its fear of non-Muslim domination were all present in the case of Muslims in China. As such the demand for a separate Muslim state was no less justified in China than in India. What was required was the triumph of regional or local interests based on religion.

If the Kazakh language paper of 27 September 1963 charged that the leaders of Communist China were showing great power arrogance and chauvinism in systematically persecuting the minorities in Sinkiang suggesting thereby that Moscow was putting itself in the role of a sympathizer and protector of the subject peoples within the borders of China, the Pakistani author of *Muslim China* accused Peking in no less unmistakable and strong terms in 1949 when he criticized the Chinese rulers of Sinkiang for utter neglect and gross misrule. "Since its constitution into a 'province' in 1882," he observed, "there has been nothing but highhandedness or misgovernment in Turkestan." The Governor, and the other high officials and the army commanders, he stated, "are all Kuomintang men and not acceptable to the people of Turkestan."

What Khrushchov said in September 1964, in course of his talks with a Japanese delegation,—that the Chinese had not been living in Sinkiang from times immemorial, that the indigenous population there differed sharply from the Chinese ethnically, linguistically and in other respects and that the Chinese emperors deprived the Kazakh and other peoples of their independence—was all said in Pakistan in 1949 when the Chinese position in Sinkiang was all the more vulnerable and precarious. Thus, the study of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, published in 1949, related that it was only in the reign of Ch'ien Lung (1736-1796) that Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan were conquered by the Chinese (1759). Kuldja had been annexed in 1755 and the Tarim basin reduced. This territory was re-organized into the New Dominion (Sinkiang) and has been known in China by that name. The study further asserted that not only the Muslims in the whole of China—not

to speak of only Sinkiang as the Soviet Union did—had a different religion, a different language, a separate way of life and racial characteristics quite distinct from the Hans or Chinese but that ever since the people of Sinkiang came under the domination of China, they had been striving for their independence¹⁰ The exploits of the valiant Yaqoob Beg had been noted earlier The people of Sinkiang rose against the Han Rule in 1929, 1930 and 1933 and though suppressed did not give up their struggle "A bitter and bloody Muslim uprising, led by Ma Chung-ying, the redoubtable Big Horse from Kansu, lasted from 1931 until 1934 and nearly overturned the Chinese provincial administration of Chin Shu jen, the successor of Yang Tseung hsin"¹¹

In 1938 and 1940 their movement became so formidable that the Chinese Government had to promise them some measure of independence and Kuomintang made the first appointment of a Governor (Wu Chung hsin) in the region Under the agreement concluded in January 1946, the pro-Soviet tribal insurgents of Ili and Ining areas consented to relinquish the name of East Turkistan Republic, which could have implied the creation of a new state, and to recognize China's formal sovereignty, on the other hand, they were permitted to keep their own army of six regiments (11,000 to 12,000 men), while the Chinese armies were prohibited from entering their special areas, which were granted considerable measure of autonomy The most important achievement of the insurgents, observes David J Dallin, was the appointment of their leader, Ahmed Djan, as Deputy Governor of the Province of Sinkiang Ahmed Djan came from Soviet Uzbekistan and bore the Russian name of Kasimov He adds, "A sort of condominium of the Governor appointed by China and the Deputy Governor with pro Soviet leanings was established" The appointment of Mazud Sabri, a non-Chinese wealthy Turk, as Governor of the province represented a further "concession to the nationalist feelings of this non Chinese province of China Actually the East Turkestan Republic continued in existence"¹²

The Kuomintang made use of the opportunity presented by the Soviet Union's preoccupation with war in Europe to extend its military and political influence to Sinkiang In August

1942 Madame Chiang Kai-shek went to Sinkiang to celebrate "the re-unification of Sinkiang with China."¹³ This was followed by the arrival of Chinese troops and refugees into this far-off province.

In 1944, the Ili group (which was controlled by a pro-Russian Party) declared the Republic of East Turkistan, comprising the three richest districts of Ili, Chuguchak and Altai, which produce wolfram, gold, oil and surplus grain. At the time of the writing of *Muslim China* in August 1949, it was still a semi-independent State. That the author of *Muslim China* sympathized with the national aspirations of Muslims in China, especially in Turkistan, was clear when he accused China of perpetuating colonial rule in Asia. He said, "In a world from which the idea of imperialism has fled, one expects 'the most civilized' country in Asia to be progressive." He regretted that the national aspirations of the Muslims in China had remained unfulfilled.¹⁴

If the present Chinese reaction to any implied or expressed suggestion about Sinkiang not belonging to China had been sharp—Saifuddin spoke of cutting off the evil hands that attempted to undermine the great unity of nationalities in China or to occupy Sinkiang "an inseparable part of China" by force or any other means—Peking's reaction to Pakistan's outbursts of sympathy for the national aspirations of the Muslims in China was no less strong and the resentment was expressed in its refusal to give any status to Pakistan's consular representative in Sinkiang and the non-establishment of diplomatic relations for about two years.

The interregnum between the exchange of letters on recognition in January-February 1950 and the exchange of Ambassadors in September-November 1951 was utilized by Peking in consolidating the Chinese hold in Tibet and Sinkiang so that China could consider it safe to admit the presence of a Pakistani representative who might well pose as the protector and fosterer of Muslims in Sinkiang and the adjoining provinces of China and try to reactivate Islam as a political force and to ally it with Muslim Pakistan. The period of a year and a half was also meant to watch the attitude of Pakistan towards the People's Republic of China and its behaviour in international affairs.

The first opportunity to evaluate Pakistan's policies presented itself during the Korean conflict. When North Korea launched its attack in South Korea on 25 June 1950 the Premier of Pakistan was on a visit to the USA. Although in a statement issued in Pakistan, he promised his Government's support for the action taken by the Security Council in its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950, Karachi did not give any military assistance to the cause of resisting aggression. Pakistan, however, gave all the political support to the Western powers in the initial stages of the Korean crisis. Pakistan also backed its moral support by a contribution of 5,000 tons of foodgrain but did not join the 16 nations that participated in the fighting on behalf of the United Nations.

In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan described the North Korean attack as the gravest threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and observed

What has since transpired is clear proof of the fact that this campaign must have been preceded by long and careful preparation and was not the outcome of a chance or casual collision or conflict. In these circumstances, the duty of the Security Council was clear, and for the first time in its history the Council gave an immediate and a bold reply to the challenge so grave and imprudent, to the authority, nay, to the very existence of the United Nations. The Assembly will recall that the Government of Pakistan was among the very first to announce its support of the Security Council's action.¹⁵

Pakistan, thus, favoured the initial United Nations action in Korea. More significant was its powerful advocacy, or rather support, of the policy of bringing the whole of Korea under the occupation of the United Nations forces. Pakistan co-sponsored the 8 Power draft resolution which authorized the crossing of the 38th parallel and recommended a unified Korea through the holding of elections under United Nations auspices. Pakistan also became a member of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea which was set up by the same resolution. Even before Pakistan became a party to that resolution, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan issued a statement, released in Ottawa on 2 October 1950, in which he stated that there was nothing

sacrosanct about the 38th Parallel which had no significance and which was never recognized by the United Nations and that it was merely a convenient line of demarcation between the occupied territories. As the North Korean objective was to bring about the unification of Korea, he added, the United Nations was fully justified in crossing that parallel and bringing the whole of Korea under the occupation of the United Nations forces.¹⁶ In voicing these views, the Pakistani Foreign Minister might not have lost sight of the Kashmir question.

The Chinese entry in the Korean war must have been a cause of concern to Pakistan, as it was to many others, and gradually Karachi, like London, began to retract its steps and plead for the localization of fighting. Thus, as Chairman of the United Nations Commission, Pakistan tried to assure Peking as regards its security interests when it addressed an appeal to the Chinese to withdraw from Korea on 6 December 1950. He declared: "The Commission would assist in any way and was ready to take any steps likely to ensure conditions of stability in the frontier areas of an independent and unified Korea."¹⁷ Peking was no more expected to heed the advice from Karachi than from London. Two days later, the Premier of Pakistan deprecated the attitude of those who proceeded on the assumption that China did not want peace and urged the cessation of hostilities on the 38th Parallel. Pakistan also became one of the sponsors of the resolution creating a Good Offices Committee to bring about a cease-fire in Korea.

As diplomatic relations with China had yet to be established, Karachi was in no mood to antagonize Peking by declaring China as an aggressor in Korea. Accordingly, Pakistan not only refrained from condemning the Chinese action in Tibet but also abstained on the United States draft resolution branding China as an aggressor. Pakistan had been a beneficiary of the Korean War boom and a large revenue surplus accrued to it during 1950-1 and 1951-2. Trade with China was also progressing well and as Karachi did not want to prejudice either its trade or political relations with Peking, Pakistan again abstained on the US resolution in the General Assembly imposing an embargo on trade with China and North Korea. Within three days of the voting on the resolution, Peking announced the establishment of diplomatic relations

with Pakistan and Chinese imports from Pakistan reached its highest peak during next year. In 1953 Peking sought the inclusion of a number of neutral nations in addition to all the nations on the two belligerent sides in the proposed Korean Political Conference and suggested the name of Pakistan, along with that of the USSR, India, Indonesia and Burma, who should be invited to participate as members in that Conference.

Before the establishment of diplomatic relations, Pakistan's attitude on the question of representation of China in the United Nations, when it came before the General Assembly in September 1950, had been favourable to China. The representative of Pakistan, speaking in the General Debate on 25 September 1950, regarded as irrelevant the considerations bearing upon the character and composition of the Peking Government as put forward by those who opposed the seating of China. The Nationalist Government had ceased to exercise jurisdiction over any portion of the Chinese mainland and therefore could not be said to effectively represent China or the Chinese people. Zafrullah Khan went on to remark:

Article 4 of the Charter relates to the admission of new Members and not to the validity of representation, with which alone we are here concerned. China is not applying for admission to the United Nations. It is a Member State, a permanent member of the Security Council, one of the Big Five. I do venture to submit that whether it is peace loving or not peace loving, whether it is willing or not willing to discharge the obligations contained in the Charter, it is entitled as of right to be represented in the United Nations like every other Member State, until it is a contingency that might apply to every other State also—expelled in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Ability and willingness to discharge the obligations contained in the Charter are not a factor relevant to the issue before us. But assuming for a moment that it were, where would it lead us? It has been argued that there is an apprehension that the Peking Government would not be willing to discharge those obligations. Even if that were to be conceded and it is no more than an assumption—can it be denied that that government is certainly able to discharge those obligations were it so willing, and that its willingness is a matter of its own choice, which it is free at any time to make? Against this, however willing the Nationalist Government may be it must be admitted that it has lost

the ability to assume or discharge those obligations on behalf of and in respect of the people of China and that this lack of ability cannot be remedied at its own choice ..

He regretted that "the General Assembly is unwilling to concede the existence of a fact, not because the fact has not been established, but because the majority regard it as unpleasant" Pakistan voted for the Indian resolution of September 1950 challenging the credentials of the Nationalist Chinese representative and calling for the immediate seating of China.

While speaking on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, Zafrullah Khan also referred to the status of Formosa. "The struggle for supremacy in China" between the two contending Chinese Governments, he said, had come to an end. The status of the island of Formosa, where the Nationalist Government "is now based, is itself the subject matter of determination, as witness the question placed upon the agenda at the instance of the United States delegation"¹⁸ Thus, the representative of Pakistan supported the Western Powers in their argument that the future status of Formosa was undetermined.

Pakistan's attitude on Formosa was obviously not to the liking of Chinese leaders. This was reflected in the statement of Premier Chou En-lai, in his report commemorating the First Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China that he presented to the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference on 30 September 1950, in which he referred to the state of diplomatic relations of his country. With 17 countries, including the Soviet Union and India, he said, "formal diplomatic relations" had been established. Of the eight countries—Pakistan, Britain, Ceylon, Norway, Israel, Afghanistan, Finland and Netherlands—he continued, only four, that is Britain, Norway, the Netherlands and Finland, "are now conducting talks for establishing diplomatic relations with our country."¹⁹ The exclusion of Pakistan showed that by 30 September 1950 Pakistan had not agreed "to discuss" the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on Peking's terms and therefore the title of a "Negotiating Representative" of Pakistan for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was conferred on Tajuddin long after it had been done in the case of his British counterpart. In the

Handbook on People's China, published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, the date of the establishment of diplomatic relations at Ambassadorial level with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was given as 21 May 1951 while agreement on mutual establishment of Charge d'Affaires Office with the United Kingdom was reached on 17 June 1954

Even after the agreement to establish diplomatic relations, it took about six months to exchange ambassadors. The Chinese Ambassador presented his credentials to the Governor-General of Pakistan on 10 September 1951. Speaking on the occasion, the Chinese Ambassador recalled the "long and close relations in both culture and history among the peoples of China and Pakistan and expressed the hope that the establishment of diplomatic relations would help in the development of friendship between the "people of the two countries and in maintaining Asian and World peace—the cause for which he would do his best. Nazimuddin assured him all help in his "noble-task". The Pakistan Ambassador Raza presented his credentials to Chairman Mao Tse tung on 12 November 1951. While doing so, he spoke of further strengthening "the happily existing friendly relations" and recalled that "for several centuries" the two countries had maintained cultural and trade connections. Mao Tse-tung, in his reply, expressed his happiness to receive him "presenting the credentials of the Overseas Dominion of the King of Great Britain, Ireland and England" and spoke of the existence of "long friendship between the people of the two countries" and of their common wishes in promoting the development of economic and cultural relations and in the struggle for "the lasting peace in Asia and in the World" ²⁰

2 Sino-Pakistan Relations 1952-1960

AFTER Pakistan joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later named CENTO), relations with Communist China could hardly remain unaffected though Karachi took special care to cultivate relations with Peking even during the period 1952-60. As Pakistan became an enthusiastic partner in Western-sponsored alliances, it sought to establish identity of views with the Western Powers on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations and the problem of Formosa. It also took certain other steps which could hardly be considered friendly towards or palatable to China, such as welcoming a "Chinese Moslem Haj Mission" from Taiwan, adoption of a critical attitude on the Tibetan question in the UN and the proposal it made to India for joint defence of the sub-continent. All these were matters of vital concern to Peking. What was significant, however, was that even when the rulers of Pakistan declared alignment with the West as the sheet anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy, they sought to assure the Chinese leaders that the Western alliances were purely defensive in nature and were not in any way directed against China.

As a signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, which was signed in September 1951 but which came into force in April 1952, Pakistan accepted Japan's renunciation of sovereignty over Taiwan by Japan. Implied in it was the fact that the question in whom the sovereignty of the island was to be vested was a matter for future determination. However, Pakistan did not pronounce any opinion on the future status of Formosa till as late as the beginning of 1955, when the Prime Minister of Pakistan declared that Pakistan might recognize the

nationalist Government if it styled itself as the Government of Formosa¹ This was hardly a friendly gesture towards Peking and it reflected the changed posture of Pakistan in international affairs consequent upon its alliance with the Western Powers The author of a study published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs went a step further in this regard when he stated

Whatever the legal considerations involved in the dispute the people of Formosa may have a point of view of their own which cannot be ignored without doing violence to the principle of self determination professed by all the Great Powers and enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations²

Thus, Pakistan came to have identity of views with the Western Powers on the problem of Formosa

Pakistan's attitude towards the question of the representation of China in the United Nations also underwent change under the impact of its joining Western alliances Prior to the introduction of the Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean War, Pakistan had voted in favour of the Indian draft resolution in September 1950 which provided for the recognition of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and its being entitled to represent China in the United Nations The subsequent heavy Chinese involvement in Korea coincided with Premier Liaquat's attempt to woo the United States However, Pakistan did not immediately go to the extent of completely supporting Washington in the matter and abstained from the vote in 1952 on the resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee that the General Assembly postpone the consideration of the proposals to exclude the "Republic of China" from the United Nations During the years 1951 and 1953 the votes were taken by a show of hands and as such, it is difficult to say with certainty how Pakistan voted on this question when similar resolutions were adopted

Beginning from 1954 onwards until July 1961, when President Ayub declared that Pakistan would almost certainly vote for Chinese entry into the United Nations at future sessions, Pakistan voted in favour of the American draft resolutions which provided that the Assembly decide to postpone discussion of the question of the representation of

China in the United Nations. M.A.H. Ispahani, who served as Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States 1947-52, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom 1952-54 and Minister of Commerce and Industries 1954-55, revealed in 1964 that while speaking at the Imperial Defence College on 14 January 1954 he expressed the hope that the lessening of tension had not only made possible the solution of the remaining difficulties in Korea, thereby ushering in an era of peace in that area, but would also be followed "by admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the membership of the United Nations. To keep it out is to continue a totally unrealistic situation in the World Organization." For these remarks, he was warned by his Government. To quote him, "Much to my surprise, I was asked by Karaehi why I had referred to China's admission." He adds "The inference was obvious. There had been a shift in our policy regarding China. Bogra and his Government were abandoning it for certain obvious considerations."

The attitude of Pakistan on this question was not dissimilar to that of the United Kingdom and was described by Ispahani in 1964 in these words

Our attitude became thus We shall vote for the admission of China in the United Nations when the World body, by a majority, agrees to receive her in its midst To this puerile thinking our nation was committed for some years. The absurdity of their attitude apparently did not occur to the framers of this policy. They were satisfied that they were being guided correctly and that it was the only honourable course for a people to sing for their supper, however, ridiculous the words, music and rendition were.³

This attitude of Pakistan was obviously not to the liking of the Mao regime. The *Peking Review*, therefore, bracketed Pakistan's position with that of Britain and the Netherlands and termed it as "double dealing tactics of extending recognition to China while at the same time ignoring China at the United Nations," which could only be regarded by the Chinese people as "an unfriendly act."⁴

In spite of the shift in Pakistan's foreign policy, the trade between Pakistan and China continued to grow. Between 1953 and 1958 eight bilateral trade agreements were concluded—one each in 1953, 1954 and 1955, three in 1956 and two in 1958. The increase in trade between the two countries might

have been due to the fact that Pakistan was not a party to the embargo on trade with China. Between July and December 1952 Pakistan's exports to China amounted to Rs 97.3 million, out of which cotton exports accounted for Rs 97.2 million. The total exports to China in the whole year of 1952 were worth \$83.8 million. It was against the background of this considerable growth of Sino-Pakistan trade that Pakistan's attitude towards the unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek by President Eisenhower in February 1953 had to be viewed. It was generally feared that by that act the United States was giving a signal to Marshal Chiang for carrying out his oft-repeated threat to invade the mainland. Pakistan was naturally perturbed at this development as "the resumption of the Civil War would have directly interfered with its trade with China. In an exclusive interview with the UPA correspondent, Khwaja Nazimuddin observed, "The blockade would affect many friends of the United States who want to trade with China. In our case we want to sell our cotton. The blockade would create quite a serious problem."⁵

This attitude of Pakistan as also the growing trade between the two countries seemed to have created an impression upon the Peking Government. Consequently, Pakistan's name came to be included along with India, Burma and Indonesia in the list of participants to the Korean political conference as proposed by the communist countries. However, after Pakistan had voted against the Indian participation and signed a military agreement with the United States, Pakistan's name came to be excluded from the list.

Although Pakistan might be said to have cultural affinity with the Muslim countries of the Middle East, it had very little contact with Southeast Asian countries. Karachi made no pronouncements on the insurrection in Malaya and had "very little contact" with Thailand. In respect of Indo-China too, Pakistan hardly showed any concern or keen interest except that its Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, in an interview with Norman Cliff, made a statement critical of French policies. As a participant in the Colombo Conference of Five Asian Prime Ministers from 28 April to 2 May 1954 Pakistan supported the efforts, made at Geneva, which resulted in the cease fire in Indo-China but at the same time Mohammed Ali endorsed the

view of Sir John Kotelawala that international communism was a danger to South and Southeast Asia. Nehru of India and Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia did not agree to make a specific mention of only that danger in the joint statement.

Pakistan took active interest in the formation of the SEATO, desired a strong organization on the pattern of the NATO, and was even critical of the initial British hesitancy in that regard and also of Eden's Locarno idea. As early as June 1954, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan was in Washington to assure the United States of full cooperation on Pakistan's side in the project of establishing a defence organization in Southeast Asia. To highlight the threat of a communist attack on its territory and communist subversion in its eastern wing, Pakistan placed additional troops on its border with Burma as if to deal with the situation created by a possible communist drive through Burma and Thailand. In April 1954, Pakistan also permitted US planes carrying French troops for Indo-China to re-fuel in its territory. All this was designed to create an image among Western countries of an anti-communist Pakistan eager to join their military alliance, then in the offing. On 14 August 1954 Karachi announced its intention to attend the Manila Conference. It was stated

The Government of Pakistan has agreed with other like-minded governments that the situation in South-East Asia should be studied with a view to considering the fabric of peace, and, if necessary, to consider the establishment of a collective security arrangement in accordance with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.⁶

On the same day, the Ambassador of Pakistan in Peking tried to assuage the feelings of China about the projected military alliance and to assure Peking in so far as Pakistan was concerned by stating, at an official Chinese reception, that Pakistan desired to develop further the happy and harmonious relations subsisting between the two countries.⁷

China obviously did not like Pakistan's participation in Western alliances. Though China was against all Western alliances, it was especially concerned with the SEATO. Even before the Manila Treaty was initialled on 8 September 1954, Commentator Wu Chuan wrote an article in the *People's Daily*,

the central organ of the Chinese Communist Party, under the title "U S SEATO schemes must be smashed" The projected alliance was described as "an aggressive organisation directed against the Chinese people" and by joining it Pakistan would have been following "the U S hostile policy against the Chinese people"⁸ A subtle attempt to induce Pakistan not to join the projected Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was made by Chou En-lai while addressing Pakistan's Independence Day reception on 14 August 1954 in Peking He made a pointed reference to China and Pakistan not only enhancing their economic and cultural relations but also developing "relations of peaceful cooperation" in the political field by striving towards "the building up of collective peace in Asia and the further relaxation of international tension"⁹ These attempts did not succeed and Pakistan joined as a full member of the SEATO At the Manila Conference of the eight SEATO signatories, the Pakistani representative emphasized that the alliance should be concerned with resisting aggression of every description and from every quarter but that did not prevent the United States from making a unilateral declaration that so far as the United States was concerned the pact was directed only against communist aggression This must have caused disappointment to Pakistan but was hardly incompatible with the attitude taken by Pakistan at the Colombo Conference

China could hardly ignore the formation of the SEATO On 16 October 1954, the Observer in the *People's China* called the SEATO "an alliance for war" and "a typical colonialist military bloc" whose main target was "New China" The Observer praised India, "that great Asian power," for her "valuable contribution" towards bringing about the Korean and Indo China truce and for her attempts to establish "collective peace in Asia" and asked why Pakistan could not similarly strive to promote collective cooperation among Asian countries and "defend collective peace and security in Asia," thereby improving relations with China¹⁰ The Bangkok Conference of the SEATO powers in February 1955 was likewise the subject of the *People's Daily* criticism It spoke of "the aggressive, warlike and colonialist nature of the Manila Pact military alliance" and "the United States plans to subordinate the military strength of the SEATO countries to the United States

war machine."¹¹

At the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries in April 1955, Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali had "friendly and long talks" with Chou En-lai during which he tried to explain the purely defensive nature of the SEATO and assure him of Pakistan's intentions in joining that pact. In his statement before the Political Committee, Chou En-lai referred to these talks in the following words:

Although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear that China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding. The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the United States should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a global war Pakistan would not be involved in it. He said Pakistan would not be involved in it just as it was not involved in the Korean War. I am grateful to him for this explanation, because through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding. This creates agreement and harmony amongst us in understanding each other on collective peace and cooperation.¹²

In a long interview granted to the correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan, Chou En-lai revealed in 1963:

After the formation of SEATO in 1954, the Pakistan Government often declared to the Chinese Government that its participation in that organization was not for the purpose of being hostile to China and would not prejudice Pakistan's friendship for China.¹³

The assertion of the Pakistani Premier at Bandung that by joining the SEATO, Karachi had not allied itself with Western imperialism, rather it was contributing to its speedy liquidation, could hardly make any impression on Peking as China regarded the SEATO as a "colonialist bloc" meant to impose Western colonialism or neo-colonialism on Asian countries. Consequently, the assurances given by Pakistan did not prevent the Observer in the *People's Daily* to criticize Pakistan's "dangerous decision" in joining Western alliances and thereby placing itself in a position of being used "as a base for the United States to threaten China militarily." This, said the Observer, was true irrespective of Pakistan's "subjective desire" and could hardly be

reconciled with Pakistan's desire repeatedly expressed, to maintain friendship with China Peking therefore, advised Karachi to "carefully reconsider its dangerous decision"¹⁴

In his political report to the second session of the second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 30 January 1956 Chou En-lai spoke in terms critical of Pakistan's participation in the Western alliance system although he did not mention Pakistan by name. After referring to the establishment of friendly contacts with a number of countries of Africa and the Near and Middle East and expressing sympathy and support for all the peoples and countries of Asia, Africa and Central and South America in their struggle to achieve or safeguard their national independence, he stated

There are also certain countries in these areas that are under the illusion that they have something to gain from joining aggressive military blocs or following the U.S. policy of aggression. But the facts show that those joining aggressive military blocs and helping the imperialists to create division in these areas only make themselves in the end the victims of the imperialist policy of divide and rule. By hitching its own national interests to the war chariot of the U.S. aggressive circles and following the aggressive policy of the United States, no country can safeguard its national independence, but can only put itself in a more subordinate position politically and economically; nor can it grow strong and prosperous, but only weaker and poorer. The people and far-sighted statesmen in these countries are making ever stronger demands to take another road, that is, to extricate themselves from their present difficult and hamstrung position and, together with the other countries in these areas, make common efforts to win peace, safeguard national independence and develop friendly co-operation among all countries. We wish to maintain friendly relations with these countries. We are glad to see that resumption has begun recently of the once broken ties between the peoples of China and Thailand. We wish to make contact with the leaders and peoples of all these countries in pursuance of the spirit of Bandung, in order to dispel any estrangement that may exist.¹⁵

In spite of all these criticisms of Pakistan's alignment with the Western powers by Peking, it could be said that the assurances given by Pakistan to China in 1954-55 about Pakistan having no hostile intentions towards China had not gone in

vain for while the USSR delivered a number of protest notes against Pakistan's acceptance of United States military aid and participation in the SEATO and the CENTO, Peking sent none. This impressed Pakistan but what was more significant was that partly for these assurances and as an expression of Chinese friendship for Pakistan and partly for reasons of its own, Peking adopted "an attitude of non-involvement in the Kashmir issue."

This further encouraged Pakistan to seek the friendship of China. The year 1956 saw attempts on both sides to cement this friendship. Madame Soong Ching-ling, Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Karachi in January and two months later Marshal Ho Lung, Vice-Premier of China, attended the inauguration of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan "at such short notice" that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan later considered it as "a matter of special satisfaction to us, strengthening mutual respect for each other." Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, in his speech before the National Assembly on 25 March 1956, referred to these "several goodwill missions" and to "our friendly feelings for China" and observed that since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in May 1951, "in spite of some basic difference of approach our relations have steadily grown." He looked forward to "achieve new and better understandings and accords with that mighty country" during the forthcoming visit beginning 2 June of his Prime Minister and himself to China.¹⁶

In May 1956, Pakistan and China signed an agreement for the purchase of 300,000 tons of coal worth more than Rs. 30 million and the Sino-Pakistan Friendship Association came into existence in Peking in June 1956. Sixteen Pakistani editors were soon invited by the All China Journalists Federation and friendly relations between the two countries "entered a new stage."¹⁷ Mutual "friendly" visits made Mao happy which led him to present 4,000 metric tons of rice free of charge and promise another 60,000 metric tons at a fair and reasonable rate. In his address to the Third Session of the First National People's Congress on 28 June 1956, Chou En-lai not only avoided scrupulously any criticism of Asian countries joining Western

military alliances which was in marked contrast to what he said in the beginning of that year, but also spoke in softer terms while referring about China's attitude towards Pakistan. He spoke of the great efforts made by his country in developing and consolidating friendly relations with the countries which had established diplomatic relations with China, and observed

The frank conversations between the Prime Ministers of China and Pakistan during the same [Bandung] Conference also played an important part in increasing mutual understanding and improving relations between the two countries. China attaches great importance to contacts between the leaders of different countries, and we intend to make such contacts more extensively in the future.¹⁸

In September 1956 an exhibition of Chinese arts and crafts was opened in Dacca. In that year China was Pakistan's fifth biggest customer, while Pakistan ranked sixth in China's foreign trade. It was, therefore, not surprising that Pakistan desired to continue its economic and trade relations with China which it believed were in mutual interests. While speaking in the National Assembly on 22 February 1957, Prime Minister Suhrawardy observed

A Chinese trade delegation is expected to visit Pakistan shortly and I am sure, this will not only lead to a further increase in trade between the two countries but will also forge another link of friendship.

Later on 3 September 1958, Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon declared in the Pakistan National Assembly

So far as the Communist countries are concerned, we are in commercial relations with all of them and we buy from all and sell to them. We buy coal from China and they buy our cotton. We buy machinery from Communist countries in return for cotton, which now we cannot sell in Europe because Americans are lending money to the European countries with which they buy the American cotton.¹⁹

Mustafa Ali Khan observed that commodity exchange arrangements had been concluded with many socialist countries, including China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, for the import of cement and fine cotton yarn, radios etc. in return for Pakistani exports to those countries of

cotton, jute, tea, leather goods etc.²⁰ A leading capitalist and former Minister of Commerce, M.A.H. Ispahani, visited China and on his return wrote a book favourable to the Mao regime. In that book he stated that the economic development in China on a scale and at a pace unprecedented in history was "a factor of world wide significance, of which an account should be taken by the statesmen of all countries, particularly those that are China's neighbours."²¹

The important events of the year 1956 in the political field were the visits of the Pakistani Premier to China in October and the return visit of Chou En-lai to Pakistan in December. Although the visit of the Pakistani Premier was already twice postponed in April and June, there was an internal compulsion to his visit in October. H.S. Suhrawardy came to power in September 1956 as the Chief of the Awami League whose leaders, while the party was in opposition, had often attacked the pro-West policy of the Government in office.²² At the conclusion of a 12 day visit of Prime Minister Suhrawardy a joint statement was issued stating that their talks "covered a wide range of subjects" and "contributed greatly to the strengthening of friendly relations already existing between the two countries." It was also stated that the two Prime Ministers recognized "the need for the development of commercial and cultural relations as well as friendly contacts" and reached "a further appreciation of their respective problems and are prepared to do their best on the basis of peace and justice to facilitate their settlement."²³

While in China, Suhrawardy presented five sets of medical instruments to a newly built hospital in Peking and a baby elephant as a gift from Pakistani children to the children of China. The Chinese gave him a warm welcome. Welcoming him on behalf of the ten million Muslims of China, Burhan Shaheedy, the Chairman of the Islamic Association, expressed happiness that relations between the two neighbouring countries had become very friendly specially after the Bandung conference. *Suhrawardy said he was very glad to see that "our Muslim brethren are here in such a large number and have their own place of worship and are enjoying religious freedom."* The theme constantly stressed by Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking, and Chou En-lai in their welcome speeches was that there was

no conflict of interests and there could not be any, between the two countries. Chou En lai repeated it again in his talk with Pakistani newsmen on 23 October 1956 when he said that although Pakistan was a member of the SEATO, (the omission of the Baghdad Pact was significant and showed that Peking was not concerned about it) "there was no reason why China could not be friends with Pakistan." China and Pakistan, he said, had no conflict of interests and there were many points in common though they differed on some. Such differences of views, he added, were no obstacles to friendly relations.²¹ The joint statement was welcomed not only in the Pakistani papers but also in the *People's Daily* and the *Kuangming Daily*.

In the course of his visit to Pakistan, when Chou En lai at a press conference in Karachi was asked to comment on the right of self determination of the Kashmir people, he thought for a moment and replied that he had yet to make a full study of the question—of all its important details—but before that he could only advise Pakistan and India 'to settle this question directly between themselves.' The joint statement of 24 December 1956 issued on Chou En lai's visit to Pakistan reiterated all those points that were mentioned in the earlier statement of the two Premiers. The only point of substance inserted in this statement, as compared to the earlier joint statement, was the declaration of the two Premiers that there was "no real conflict of interest between the two countries."²²

In neither of the two joint statements issued by the Prime Ministers of China and Pakistan during 1956 was there any mention of the Kashmir question. But that did not mean the question was not discussed or that the Premiers, especially Suhrawardy of Pakistan, was not concerned about it. One Pakistani writer considered "neutralisation" of China "vis a-vis the Kashmir dispute," as the major achievement of Suhrawardys visit to China.²³ Although the exclusion of China from the United Nations prevented it from helping Pakistan directly in the Security Council on the Kashmir question, Peking, it was thought, might well try to persuade its ally, the USSR, to adopt a favourable attitude towards Karachi. This factor was undoubtedly present in the minds of Pakistani leaders in cultivating relations with Peking. Pakistan took special care to improve its relations with the People's Republic

of China. Thus, the Governor of Pakistan M. A. Gurmiani during 1955-57, when he held that office, instructed his frontier police quietly to withdraw from the border between Hunza and Sinkiang and thereby avoid a clash with the Chinese.²⁷

Pakistan's attitude in the Hungarian and Suez crises convinced the Western powers, especially Britain, of the bonafides of Pakistan about its firm commitment towards alliances. The hint that it was the right time for Pakistan to raise the Kashmir issue before the United Nations Security Council and also the assurance of full support of the Western powers, particularly Britain, was given by the correspondent of the London *Times* in its despatch of 16 December 1956 from Karachi. The official spokesman of Pakistan, the correspondent hinted, "can fairly claim that this action has been forced on Pakistan by the pretension of the Indian-sponsored Constituent Assembly in Srinagar to impose a 'final decision' on Kashmir's future," and added "the prospects of a successful appeal to the United Nations are more hopeful today than for a long time past."²⁸ The Soviet support or at least neutrality on Kashmir was especially important for Pakistan in view of the ensuing debate, after a lapse of five years, over the question in the Security Council. Pakistan's representative Noon put before the Council a proposal for the introduction of a United Nations Force in Kashmir for "protecting the State and ensuring internal security."²⁹ If Pakistan had succeeded in getting that proposal through the Security Council, with the Soviet Union adopting a neutral policy (that is, not using its veto), it would have been a great victory for Pakistan over India. Although two other resolutions were adopted by the Council, this proposal of Pakistan was defeated because of the Soviet veto. Pakistan's allies the USA and the UK had sponsored a draft resolution to that effect.

In his speech before the National Assembly on 25 February 1957, Premier Suhrawardy showered praises on the US "for its friendship, for its alliance, for the assistance which it has given to us, for the support that it is continuing to give us," defended the UK against attacks made upon the "British action" in the Suez crisis by the members of the National Assembly and indeed praised Britain for supporting Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute even at the cost of jeopardizing "their position in the

commonwealth," justified the Baghdad Pact and expressed the desire to see it further strengthened and declared that to reach an agreement on the *modus operandi* with India was "impossible." He lamented that because of the Soviet veto the United Nations Expeditionary Force would not be sent "at this stage" but consoled himself that the resolution of 24 January 1957 adopted by the Security Council contained both plebiscite and demilitarization. Although he stated "it may be possible that Russia itself may support us in our Kashmir issue" he knew that he was hoping against hope for he said "perhaps this one voice may have its effect. Perhaps, Russia, thereafter, will also conform to the general world opinion." In the earlier part of that speech he strongly denounced the "Warsaw Pact between Russia and its satellite countries, a pact so closely knit that no one dares to get out of it, and if any one like Hungary thinks of it, it is crushed, because Russia is determined to keep its imperialism there intact." Suhrawardy also expressed his disappointment with Premier Chou En lai not throwing his influence in support of Pakistan when he observed

Have we not seen that when recently the Prime Minister of China went to Ceylon after their conversations, the Prime Minister of Ceylon addressed a message to the Afro-Asian countries that they should all use their influence to get Pakistan and India to settle this matter among themselves without the intervention of foreigners. We have tried to counteract it. We have informed the Afro-Asian countries what the true situation is.

Suhrawardy later said that Pakistan was not "so isolated" as Mian Iftikharuddin believed for he added

One of the first steps which I took on assuming office was to go on a goodwill mission to China, because I wanted to make it clear that they and we, belonging though we may to separate world camps, are by no means enemies, and that I seek the friendship of China. I am not isolated. I feel perfectly certain that when the crucial time comes, China will come to our assistance. It has already done so.

In regard to Russia also, Suhrawardy noticed some change from "the very positive statements made by its two leaders when on Indian soil." It was quite clear from this as also from his earlier statement in National Assembly on 22 February 1957 that when Suhrawardy placed relations with

China before that with the Soviet Union, Pakistan made an emphatic and unambiguous distinction between the policies of the two communist countries vis-a-vis Pakistan. While addressing a public meeting in Jessore on 16 September 1957, Suhrawardy warned Russia that by going against Pakistan, as it had done by vetoing the United Nations resolution in 1957, it would be losing the friendship of Muslims throughout the world.³⁰

Premier Feroz Khan Noon, while initiating the foreign policy debate in the National Assembly on 3 September 1958 referred in the most unambiguous and emphatic terms to the approaches made by Pakistan both of their own and through China to dissuade the Soviet Union from exercising veto on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council. Referring to Pakistan's efforts to prevent Russia from exercising the veto, he said, "Time and again we have made representations to them through their Ambassadors here, through our Ambassador in Moscow, not to use the veto." He regretted China's indifference in the matter and remarked

We have even gone to the extent of approaching Mr. Chou En-lai. I have approached him personally and told him that if you have any influence on Russia, please ask them not to take a partisan attitude in Kashmir case so that the two Asiatic countries—and they are always speaking for Asia and their people—should not fight each other over the right of self-determination being granted to the people of Kashmir. And yet these two great Asiatic powers, Russia and China, have taken no interest at all to bring about a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem between the two Asiatic countries, namely India and Pakistan. It is not that we have failed to make approaches. It is actually the higher politics of the cold war which prevents, I suppose, the Russians and the Chinese in taking any interest.³¹

It seems that the question of Peking exerting pressure on or rather attempting to persuade Moscow did not arise as China itself did not like Pakistan's initiative in going to the United Nations, the organization dominated by the Western Powers, or asking for the stationing of United Nations forces, composed as it would have been of "imperialist" Western Powers or their supporters, in Kashmir. Neither the solution of the Kashmir dispute with the help of the Western Powers

in the United Nations nor the presence of "imperialist" forces near the borders of China were considered to be in the interests of Peking. In the joint statement, issued by Chou En lai with the Ceylonese Prime Minister on 5 February 1957, the two Prime Ministers appealed to India and Pakistan "to strive further for a peaceful settlement" of the Kashmir problem through direct negotiations. In so far as the reference in that statement to the 'dispute between Pakistan and India in regard to Kashmir'³⁰ gave the impression of Kashmir being a disputed territory, it could hardly be to the liking of India while the suggestion for direct talks ran counter to Pakistan's attempt to take the matter to the United Nations. Suhrawardy expressed his inability to accept that suggestion and termed it as the communist and neutralist line.³¹ Speaking at a press conference in Ceylon, Chou En-lai expressed his misgiving about any good result coming out of the Pakistani attempt and emphatically stated that China was "not in favour of sending United Nations troops to Kashmir."³² He also accused the Western Powers of exploiting the Kashmir question in order to disrupt Asian unity. This was, indeed, a veiled criticism levelled against Pakistan for falling into the Western trap by taking the matter to the United Nations.

In a report on his visits to 11 countries in Asia and Europe, submitted to the Third Plenary Session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 5 March 1957, Chou En-lai elaborated this theme in these words

To have referred this [Kashmir] question to the United Nations which, in the circumstances today, is under the control of the United States, can only give rise to the danger of foreign interference

It was quite obvious from what had been stated above and from the subsequent events that China was not an indifferent neutral in the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan but an interested party which desired the continuance of Indo-Pak differences over Kashmir so as to allow Peking to fish in troubled waters. Peking had never before advocated direct talks between India and Pakistan and had maintained a studied silence over Kashmir question. The timing of the suggestion of direct negotiations and the hint of Afro-Asian

assistance or mediation contained in the phrase "the broader interests of the solidarity of the Asian and African countries"³⁵ in the context of the Kashmir question was a subtle attempt on the part of China to substitute Chinese interference for Western interference in Kashmir.

The Pakistani paper *Dawn* criticized Chou En-lai for standing "to gain by the prolongation of the conflict over Kashmir between Pakistan and Bharat," although it sought to broaden this criticism so as to include Russia when it spoke in that connection of "the Communist world and its leaders among whom Mr. Chou of China occupies so eminent a position."³⁶ It might be mentioned that this description about the unity of the Communist world was not quite correct as there was no identity of views between China and the Soviet Union on the Kashmir question. In July 1957 the reported statement by Mao Tse-tung about Peking's modification of its attitude on Kashmir was greeted by Pakistan's Foreign Minister who said, "If that information is correct I welcome the change at least to Communist China's policy."³⁷ It was probably this reason that led the representative of Pakistan to abstain on the United States proposal to postpone the consideration of the question of the representation of China in the United Nations at its 1957 session and to announce the next day the change in its vote from an abstention to a vote in favour of the United States resolution, thereby making it fall in the pattern of Pakistani voting on the question from the year 1954 to 1960.

Pakistan's performance at the time of the Hungarian crisis and the Anglo-French attack on Egypt were not to the liking of either Moscow or Peking. Pakistan was a co-sponsor of the five-power draft resolution, adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1005 (ES-II), which condemned the violent Soviet repression in Hungary, describing it as foreign intervention and called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces and for free elections under UN auspices to enable the people of Hungary to determine their own form of government.³⁸ The attitude adopted by Pakistan at the time of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt was similarly more favourably inclined towards the British and French partners in military alliance, than with its fellow Muslim countries or the line taken by non-aligned and

communist nations. The attitude of Pakistan was reflected in the non attendance of its Prime Minister in the meeting of the Colombo Powers held in Delhi in November 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis. It was not surprising, therefore, to see Pakistan's role and utterances at the London deliberations on the Suez Canal being lauded by the *New York Times*, in its editorial of 7 October 1956, and by Rushbrook Williams in the *Eastern World* as proving Pakistan's loyalty and devotion to the Western alliance system and "that country's international significance". Commenting on Pakistan's performance during the Suez Crisis, the Foreign Minister of Syria was constrained to remark that "Islam was not the basic factor," in the making of Pakistan's policies as Karachi worked hand in hand with the West.³⁹ One Pakistani writer later described Pakistan's attitude during the Suez crisis in these words:

To our allies our approach to the Suez problem seemed indecisive and foolish. To the neutralists and to those who wanted our support, it seemed very deceitful and fraudulent. In fact our entire approach toward international affairs was amateurish.⁴⁰

The statement of Premier Suhrawardy at Islamia College Lahore on 2 December 1956 was very equivocal on the Suez issue and sounded quite apologetic for the UK. He condemned British action against Egypt but at the same time justified it when he called it an attack to see that the Suez Canal remained free, absolved Britain for not wanting to reoccupy Egypt and declared Nasser's action as not being the right method. As a result of the closure of the canal, he said, all commodities in Pakistan now cost 30 per cent more because goods came via the Cape. He defended both the Baghdad Pact and British membership therein. Pakistan, he observed, had chosen the British system of democracy because in that pattern there was scope for individuality and freedom of thought, action and speech, and a legislature based on law. As Pakistan was afraid of being engulfed by a rival system of politics, it would endeavour to maintain the present system as long as it could, he declared.⁴¹ It was not without significance that Nasser rejected Pakistan's offer about troops and invited India to police UAR's borders with Israel.

China was critical about the establishment of Western

military bases in Pakistan although, unlike the USSR, Peking delivered no official protests to Pakistan. In a statement issued on the SEATO Council session on 10 March 1958, the Chinese Government reminded the "Asian member states of the Manila bloc," of the "obligations they 'undertook at the Bandung Asian-African Conference" and advised them not to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the United States. The setting up of US bases for rockets and nuclear weapons in Asian countries, the statement said, would not only tighten US control over those countries and increase the danger of war but would bring incalculable disaster upon those very countries. It added:

The Chinese Government and people are firmly opposed to the deployment by the United States of nuclear and rocket weapons in any part of Asia, and are all out for the establishment throughout Asia of an area of peace free from atomic weapons and the conclusion of a treaty of collective peace ... But in the Asian member states of the Manila bloc there are actually certain leaders who .. have openly welcomed the setting up of bases for nuclear and rocket weapons... As a neighbour of these countries, the Chinese Government cannot but express serious concern over the establishment of U.S. bases for nuclear and rocket weapons on their territories.⁴²

Commenting on the press reports that the United States was going to station the "Fifth Fleet," in the Indian Ocean, the Commentator in *People's Daily* wrote that "in Pakistan the Karachi Naval base and the Chittagong base are being expanded and built with US help for US use."⁴³ Later the *Peking Review* commented upon Washington's "tightening direct control over CENTO," and stated that "there is no secret about the motive behind US interest in the regions bordering the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and its arrangements for setting up with great speed a network of missile bases here around the socialist countries." In that connection, it quoted the *Dawn* of Pakistan as boasting "about the Soviet Union being the possible target of attack from bases and missile firing grounds now under construction in Pakistan" and described the CENTO as an "attempt to suppress the Arab people's national independence movement" and "to exert pressure on certain South Asian countries in the hope

of changing their neutral policy and later dragging them into the western military bloc'.⁴¹ The whole tenor of these statements showed that Peking was not the least worried about the CENTO which it thought was directed against others and not China.

The communiques issued at the end of the CENTO Ministerial Council meetings gave enough credence to that view. Thus, the CENTO members, in its Karachi session held in January 1959, asserted that

The threat of direct and indirect aggression had not diminished and should be combated by all possible legitimate means. The Council noted with concern that international communism continued its efforts to dominate the Pact area. These efforts, the Council concluded, meant that the necessity to strengthen collective security was as great as ever.

The Eighth Ministerial Council of the CENTO, held in Tehran a year later, more specifically condemned the Soviet Union for 'subversive and hostile propaganda' against Iran. They expressed concern that questions between neighbouring countries were 'sometimes used by outside Powers as a means of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and increasing international tension and subversion as for example, recent Soviet statements on Pukhtoonistan'.⁴² The Soviet Union protested against these insinuations and condemnatory remarks, but China kept silent. Along with Turkey, Pakistan rejected the Soviet protest note and asserted, 'there was nothing to prevent Pakistan from inviting any friendly powers including the United States, to use such bases in order to help defend the region'.

Pakistan's economic policy of dependence on the United States also came to be criticized in the Chinese press. Thus, an article in the *People's Daily* in June 1958 wrote

Pakistan, already chronically beset by financial and economic difficulties, is now being seriously affected by the deepening US economic crisis. The voices of those in Pakistan who favour self-reliance and oppose dependence on US 'aid' have become more numerous than ever.⁴³

In 1958 revolutions took place in Iraq and Pakistan, but while Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which thereupon was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the

new regime in Pakistan headed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan made no such change in Pakistan's foreign policy. The President's proclamation of 7 October 1958 spoke of Pakistan's desire "to have friendly relations with all nations," particularly of removing misunderstanding between Pakistan and the USSR, UAR and China and categorically declared in favour of following a policy "which our interests and geography demand," yet no visible change in Pakistan's foreign relations seemed in sight in the immediate future. Pakistan's alignment with the west was continued and in fact enhanced by the conclusion of the Pakistan-United States Bilateral Agreement on Co-operation, signed at Ankara on 5 March 1959. According to Article 1 of that agreement, the US government agreed to take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, in the event of aggression against Pakistan. Significantly the US undertaking in this case was not limited to communist aggression. By Article II of that agreement, Washington reaffirmed that it would continue to furnish, on an agreed basis, military and economic assistance to Pakistan with a view to helping in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and the promotion of its economic development.

Commenting on the novel idea of not specifying "communist aggression" in the bilateral military agreement between Pakistan and the USA, the *People's Daily*, in its editorial dated 7 March 1959, observed:

The United States and its followers have also put forward a new idea that "resistance to any direct or indirect aggression includes non-Communist aggression." This clearly shows that these new pacts are directed not only against the socialist countries but are, in the first place, also a threat to such nationally independent neighbouring countries as India, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These new military pacts will enable the United States to intensify its suppression of the national liberation movements and threaten peace and security in Asia.⁴⁷

According to the *Hsinhua* comment of 6 March 1959, "the hostile provisions" of the US-Pakistan bilateral agreement were "aimed against India and Afghanistan" and the large-scale military bases built under the military agreements were considered as enabling the United States to use them against neighbouring, peace-loving countries. It charged the ruling

eliques of Pakistan, as also of Iran and Turkey, of attempting "to rely upon American power to maintain their unstable control and to suppress the struggle waged by the people at home"⁴⁸ In this connection, it was worth recalling that the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Chinese Journalist Association demanded from the "anti-people" and the "pro-US Ayub military administration the unconditional release of the imprisoned leaders like Maulana Bhasani and others"⁴⁹

On 4 July 1959 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan received the "Chinese Moslem Haj Mission" from Taiwan. This was the subject of a strong protest note from China in which the Pakistan Government was accused of "connivance" with the activities of the "Chiang Kai-shek clique" and of following the US plot to create "two Chinas". The official reception accorded to that Mission was labelled as "a serious provocation" against the Chinese people and Government. The protest note also referred to the Pakistani note of 7 October 1958, addressed to Peking, in which the Pakistan Government was said to have "even put forward an official opinion attempting to deny the People's Republic of China's sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands".

The Chinese protest note of 21 July 1959 further referred to the repeated utterances of the Pakistani Foreign Minister and other responsible officials from 7 April to 12 May 1959 on the question of Tibet and characterized them as slander against China, flagrant interference in "China's internal affairs" and waging of "cold war in the footsteps of the United States". The note concluded with these words:

Should the Pakistani side continue to issue statements and commit acts injurious to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity as it has done repeatedly of late, the Pakistani Government must bear full responsibility for all damage thus done to Sino-Pakistani relations.⁵⁰

The *People's Daily* observer went further. He referred to the statements of the Foreign Minister and other responsible officials of Pakistan in April and May as not only slandering the Chinese people, interfering in China's internal affairs and agitating for the cold war but also "sowing discord in the relations between China and India". Pakistan's attitude on

the question of Tibet was described as "very unfriendly" while Ayuh's proposal to India about forming a "joint defence alliance" with Pakistan against China, at the behest of the "US imperialists," was viewed with suspicion. Though the move regarding joint defence had failed, one could see "what a vicious role the Pakistani ruling clique" had been playing, the Observer pointed out. He added:

Since the Ayuh government came to power last year, the Pakistani Government has been following a policy of increased dependence on the U.S. In March this year, Pakistan signed a bilateral military agreement with the U.S. under which the United States is allowed to use armed forces and establish missile bases in Pakistan, thus taking a step further in turning Pakistan in a U.S. military spring-board in Southeast Asia. The agreement seriously threatens the security of the Soviet Union, China, India, Afghanistan, and other Asian countries and strengthens U.S. control over Pakistan. This policy of the Pakistani ruling clique is diametrically opposed to the interests of peace in Asia and is also opposed to national interests of Pakistan.⁵¹

The Chinese attempt to change the traditional way of life of the Tibetan people and the ruthless suppression of their fundamental human rights was the subject of discussion in the United Nations in 1959. Pakistan not only voted for the inscription of the item "Question of Tibet" on the agenda of the General Assembly but also supported the draft resolution jointly put forward by the Federation of Malaya and Ireland. The representative of Pakistan made a strong statement in support of the resolution in which he upheld the authority of the UN to discuss the matter and criticized Peking for creating "tension" and violating "human rights and fundamental freedoms."⁵² By that resolution the Assembly expressed grave concern at reports, including the official statements of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet "have been forcibly denied them"; deplored the effect of these events in increasing international tension and in embittering the relations between peoples at a time when earnest and positive efforts "are being made by responsible leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations"; affirmed its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "is essential for

the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law"; and called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life

The economic dependence of Pakistan on the United States was very great throughout this period. A treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was signed on 12 November 1959, in which the Government of Pakistan guaranteed against nationalization and for the "prompt" payment of "just compensation" when taking property of nationals and companies of the United States "for a public purpose." Article 1 of the Treaty stated "Each Party shall at all times accord equitable treatment to the persons, property, enterprises and other interests of nationals and companies of the other party." In an address on 9 December 1960, M Shoab, the Finance Minister of Pakistan, disclosed that the Second Five-Year Plan envisaged an investment of Rs 1,900 crores, of which Rs. 900 crores were required in external finance⁵³. This could have come primarily from the United States. Consequently, Pakistan continued to give its active support to the USA in international affairs. Thus, on 7 December 1960, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan criticized the Soviet refusal to contribute to the costs of the United Nations force in the Congo. On 13 December 1960 the President of Pakistan indicated in Tokyo that his country would send an armed contingent to Laos if the SEATO Council decided to intervene there⁵⁴.

3 Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement

FOR about two years before the question of boundary negotiations between China and Pakistan became the subject of formal diplomatic notes, the problem was approached in informal soundings and the initiative in the sense of some informal feeler in that regard seemed to have emanated from the Chinese side. The continuous deterioration in relations with India, as a result of the Chinese suppression of the Tibetan autonomy, the assertion of Peking's territorial claims against India and the Kongka pass incident of August 1959 in which a few Indians lost their lives, and the growing Sino-Soviet rift accounting for Soviet neutrality or rather disapproval of Mao for the Sino-Indian border clashes and later the promise to supply MIG-21 jet planes to India led Peking to think about ensuring its security on its periphery by concluding boundary agreements, non-aggression or friendship treaties with as many neighbouring countries as possible. Guided by these considerations, China appeared to have set the ball rolling sometime in 1959 concerning border talks with Pakistan by handing over a Chinese Government map, most probably on its own and possibly at the request of Islamabad—either of which signified *willingness or intention on the part of Peking to have talks with Pakistan.*

Peking made that overture partly to probe the Pakistani intentions and inclinations, with a view to derive benefits for China, and partly to utilize that move as a bargaining counter and pressure tactics against India, particularly in the forthcoming border talks between Chinese and Indian officials in 1960, and at the same time as a kite flying to test the reactions

of the USA, the USSR etc. It was also in line with Peking's desire to exploit contradictions in the enemy camp and to avoid war on two fronts. Moscow's neutrality in the Sino-Indian border incidents and clashes was evidently resented in Peking as a complicating factor and induced China to seek an early settlement of the border problem with India. It was for these reasons that even after its informal soundings or feeler to Islamabad, China continued to assure India that it had discussed nothing with Pakistan "so far" and deliberately delayed or avoided commitments or coming out openly in favour of conducting boundary negotiations with Pakistan. It was only after Peking found India not accommodating or reluctant to make concessions that China refused to discuss with India the area west of the Karakorum Pass in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which was tantamount to questioning the legality of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Even then it seemed that Peking had not lost all hopes of bending New Delhi to come to some satisfactory arrangement or agreement with China because it proceeded thereafter gradually to make adjustments with Pakistan. In that process, China endeavoured to exacerbate relations between India and Pakistan and to create misunderstandings and contradictions in Pakistan's relations with the United States, but seemed to have overlooked the firmness in the Indian attitude and the possibility of cementing further the ties of friendship between India and the Soviet Union.

The general feeling about Pakistan taking the initiative in informal soundings or contacts of 1959 does not appear to be convincing for a number of reasons, even though Islamabad was first to formally approach Peking for boundary demarcation in its diplomatic note of 28 March 1961. The Pakistani posture in international affairs in 1959 was such that it could not have taken the initiative in informal contacts with Peking in that year regarding boundary demarcation with China, whose antipathy towards Pakistan before 1962 was deeprooted and fundamental. Although Islamabad avoided taking sides in the Sino-Indian border controversy and clashes, Pakistan signed with the United States a bilateral agreement on cooperation in 1959, accorded welcome to the "Chinese Moslem Hajj Mission" from Taiwan, voted against China's representation in the

United Nations and took an attitude in the discussions on the Tibet question in the UN which was quite critical of Chinese policies and actions. Again, it was in that year that Ayub was putting forward his joint defence proposal to India, the nightmare of Peking, and Washington continued to count upon Pakistan as a dependable bulwark against communism.

It was in these circumstances that the President of the so-called "Azad Kashmir" K.H. Khurshid, in a statement on 17 August 1959 viewed with "considerable alarm and concern" the news of the occupation of a part of Ladakh, the eastern province of Jammu and Kashmir state by China, carried by the *Manchester Guardian* and uncontradicted by New Delhi. From this he concluded that the Indian Government was "incapable of guaranteeing, maintaining and defending international frontiers—a responsibility that was entrusted to India in respect of Kashmir by the UNCIP and the Security Council resolutions." He called China as "a mighty intruder" and considered the Indian inability "to defend the frontiers" of Kashmir as having put "the security of the entire state in jeopardy." Khurshid, therefore, thought that the time had come for the UN Security Council "to take over the responsibility for the defence and guaranteeing of Kashmir's international frontiers,"¹ a proposal which could hardly be pleasing to the Peking leaders. Referring to the events brought about by Peking's occupation of a part of Ladakh, the Pakistani letter to the President of the Security Council dated 3 December 1959 likewise asserted that "the preservation of the international frontiers" of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a matter which "falls directly between the primary responsibilities of the Security Council and no government can take any action with regard to these frontiers save in consonance with the decisions of the Security Council."² The latter phrase was written as much to challenge the right of India to arrive at any settlement of the frontiers of Kashmir with China as also in criticism of Chinese incursions and occupation of part of Ladakh.

Commenting on the "aggressive activities" of the Chinese on the Ladakh border, the Karachi paper *Jang* of 27 October 1959 observed that the President of Pakistan had made it clear that Pakistan could not remain indifferent to "the threat to the peace and security of the sub-continent" for a conflict between

China and India could endanger the security of Pakistan itself. The situation in Ladakh particularly, it said, had a bearing on Pakistan and obviously if Ladakh was threatened Pakistan could not remain unaffected. That fresh trouble was fraught with all sorts of danger. Ladakh was part of Kashmir and since the Karachi paper considered Kashmir "fundamentally a part of Pakistan although Bharat today forcibly occupies the area," it warned "an attack on Ladakh can have far greater repercussions than the conflict on the borders of Tibet and Bharat. We do not believe that China will make the mistake of aggravating the crisis." Ayub criticized Peking for its expansionist intentions and Pakistani papers wanted India to fully realize the significance of Chinese encroachments and not submit to Peking's bullying tactics. *Dawn* of 3 October 1959 declared that the "sanctity of McMahon Line must be preserved."³

Ayub, in his political autobiography, admitted having received reports from time to time about Chinese patrols coming up to Shamshal and the Chinese having driven away some cattle in certain areas.⁴ Therefore, realizing the danger implicit in Chinese encroachments in Ladakh, Pakistan was constrained to strengthen its scout garrisons in Hunza and Baltistan and to completely seal the Gilgit border with China—for the first time since the Chinese communists came to power. Trade with China through the silk route was stopped and a Chinese caravan was turned back by Pakistanis who feared communist infiltration. When some patrols were sighted at the land grazed by Pakistani hillsmen, Pakistan strengthened its security measures and took some precautionary military steps along the border.⁵ On 2 October 1959 the Governor of West Pakistan reached Gilgit, in the first ever visit of a provincial Governor to that area, "for a personal survey" and made "an aerial survey of the proposed route—an all weather road along the River Indus which will connect Gilgit with West Pakistan."⁶ The Chinese maps, according to one Pakistani writer, showed 4,000 square miles of territory, controlled by Pakistan, as part of the Chinese territory. Certain strategically important passes such as Kilik and Shimshal, which control access to routes between Sinkiang and the Pakistani administered territories of the Gilgit agency and Baltistan were in-

cluded in the Chinese territory while in Pakistani maps those important passes, he stated, were shown well below the undefined border.⁷

The *New York Times* correspondent writing from Pakistan on 6 October 1959 reported that "a frontier dispute" appeared to be building between Pakistan and China and that was said to have been precipitated by the same Chinese maps that India had disputed. The maps showing parts of Pakistan and Pakistan-held Kashmir as part of China were said to have caused "considerable concern" in Pakistan "particularly in view of recent border violations by unidentified foreign military jet aircraft."⁸ Pakistan was so much concerned about Chinese incursions into Ladakh that Manzur Qadir, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, deemed it necessary to fly to Gilgit for talks with the military authorities there on the border situation soon after his return from the United Nations. The Chinese were also reported to have sponsored a "Muslim Liberation Movement" among the Afghan and Kirghiz tribal people on the Sinkiang side of the frontier which had links with the Pathan tribe in the Chitral and Swat areas.⁹

In order not to create a panicky situation within Pakistan and not to jeopardize the chances of informal contacts with China being successful, the Pakistani Foreign Minister often denied or played down reports of Chinese intrusions and/or infiltration into Pakistani territory though he admitted having received information from the Government of India that "Chinese infiltration did take place in Ladakh."¹⁰ President Ayub was more forthright when he declared, at a press conference on 23 October 1959, that the meaning of what had happened in Tibet and of the roads being built in Afghanistan was that in five years time the sub-continent would be "militarily vulnerable and facilities will have been provided whereby a major invasion can take place and armies from Central Asia can march to the sub-continent." He stated that Pakistan would "in due course approach China for a peaceful settlement of the border question by demarcating the northern frontiers" and expressed the hope that the two countries would get together and define "the border" in that region. "The Chinese Government has not made any claim on Pakistan territory, though the Foreign Office has received a map which

shows certain areas of Pakistan as part of China," he added ¹¹

Although Ayub spoke of approaching China "in due course" for demarcation of the border in October 1959, his Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir emphatically denied next month that any talks had been initiated on border demarcation between Pakistan and China ¹² In fact, the words "in due course," considered against the background of Ayub's concern for the security of the sub-continent, signified that some sort of feeble overtures or informal soundings on the part of Peking were responsible for Ayub to speak with confidence about approaching China in the matter This assessment is corroborated by Manzur Qadir's statement, in an interview with an Indian correspondent, that Pakistan would not take cognizance of the Chinese map showing some areas of Pakistan with China, for no *official* communication on that subject had been received from Peking and that if China made an *official* claim on Pakistan's territory, Pakistan would take an emphatic and clear stand ¹³ The use of the word "official" indicated that informal soundings had been made and that Peking had unofficially provided a Chinese Government map for the scrutiny of the Pakistan Government It was only on that basis that press reports of 15 October 1959, based on Foreign Office sources, about the Government of Pakistan collecting internationally accepted material to have a clear border line demarcated between China and Pakistan ¹⁴ and the setting up of a cell, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to study the available data and examine the Chinese map with a view to evolve a satisfactory alignment of the border could make any sense or have some meaning Pakistan would have proceeded only on the assumption that Peking was willing or had given some indication about its preparedness to discuss the matter with Pakistan

However, while Peking allowed Pakistan to announce the news or rumours about informal contacts taking place between China and Pakistan about border demarcation, it remained completely silent or rather maintained a discreet or studied silence in the matter Peking neither confirmed nor denied such reports The Chinese objectives were to create dissensions among its outer neighbours, to ward off their combining against Peking and that was in line with its traditional diplomacy The immediate purpose in raking up the dormant dispute between

India and Pakistan over Kashmir was to wear out both and make them both to look towards China. And if New Delhi continued to be intransigent or unaccommodating, then Peking thought that it was open to it to negotiate with Pakistan. As Harish Kapur rightly put it

Although Chinese leaders were eager to keep the door open for eventual negotiations with Pakistan, and perhaps even to use them to obtain border concessions from India, they did not wish to begin formal negotiations, because such a step would aggravate tension between China and India. Therefore, while continuing informal talks, they avoided open negotiations.¹⁵

Peking did not contradict Pakistani reports of Pakistan taking the initiative in the matter—for it suited China very well in its delicate dealings with India and the Soviet Union and avoided embarrassment of any sort to Peking. As the Sino-Indian official level talks were continuing, Peking could not possibly have admitted publicly the taking of initiative in regard to border talks with Pakistan. Pakistan, on the contrary, felt no hesitation in owning initiative in the matter partly to create difficulties for the Sino-Indian border talks and partly to secure a better deal from Peking. Through its border overtures to China, Pakistan must have calculated advantages of securing Peking's neutrality, if not friendship, *vis-à-vis* its two main adversaries—India and Afghanistan—and possibly the USSR, and also a more favourable Chinese attitude on Kashmir. Consequently, no sooner it was made known that China had refused to discuss the area of West Karakorum in Kashmir with India, Pakistan approached Peking. Evidently Peking would not have said no to Pakistan, thereby keeping Pakistan anxiously waiting and in suspense.

Thus, Manzur Qadir, in an interview in March 1961, observed that Pakistan had taken the initiative to negotiate the boundary with China in the middle of 1960 and that China had not responded immediately but had requested for time to consider the matter. The two reasons he cited in that regard were pretences to justify Pakistan's entering into a deal with Peking in the matter. Those were, as he put it, "first, the constitutional position of the northern areas in this boundary was different from that of the other parts of Kashmir," thereby

asserting that Hunza, Nagar, etc did not actually form part of the domain of the Maharaja of Kashmir and for that matter not subject to the sovereignty of India, and "secondly, Pakistan wanted to be certain of the line beyond which Pakistan should not go and fix the line beyond which Chinese would not come,"¹⁶ thus describing the Pakistani attempt as a harmless venture to which no one should take exception by opposing or taking a critical attitude in the matter.

The above remark of the Pakistani Foreign Minister, though claiming initiative in regard to border talks with China, did not deny some sort of informal, unannounced encouraging response from Peking, though still falling far short of Pakistani expectations, which could have led him to publicly announce with confidence taking the lead in the matter. In fact, the report on border talks with China, as published in the official *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore on 11 March 1961, was sufficient to set at rest all doubts about Peking initially taking the initiative in putting an informal feeler or making informal soundings in the matter when it spoke of exchanges with Peking on the proposed frontier demarcation and observed, "It is understood that in answer to Peking's enquiries Pakistan has suggested" that although in view of the inaccessible nature of the territory it would not be possible physically to demarcate the frontier it would be in the interest of both parties if "the boundary could be amicably agreed to and defined on the map". The official Gazette also sought to discount the anxiety "expressed in western political circles" about Pakistan's border "exchanges with Peking" and "the recently concluded oil pact with Russia" by saying that Ayub had publicly declared that "these moves on a limited scale" did not represent any fundamental changes in Pakistan's foreign policy.

In the beginning of 1961, Islamabad sent a formal note to Peking expressing its desire to ensure "the tranquility of the border between the two countries" and proposing negotiations for the demarcation of "the boundary of China's Sinkiang and contiguous areas, the defence of which is the responsibility of the Government of Pakistan,"¹⁷ meaning thereby Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, but there was no satisfactory response from China for about a year. The sending of a formal diplomatic note to Peking on 28 March 1961, after about one and a half

years of informal soundings or contacts, signified that Islamabad must have received some sort of assurances from Peking about its willingness to enter into a border deal with Pakistan. President Ayub justified his title to negotiate about the territory concerned by declaring that Pakistan had "every right to ask for the demarcation of that border" because it was very much in what he called "legal occupation of territories running along the Chinese border."¹⁸ Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir spoke of Peking having agreed only "in principle" on the "demarcation of its border with Pakistan." Talks, he said on 15 January 1961, were continuing and the proper demarcation would be undertaken after an agreement had been signed. Speaking a day later, at a luncheon given by Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn, President Ayub was equally, if not more, cautious or guarded when he described Pakistan's relations with China as simply "normal" and referred to only "indications" about Peking's willingness to enter into negotiations with it about "the border" which was "undefined in certain areas."¹⁹

The informal contacts or even the despatch of a formal note from Islamabad did not produce any change in Pakistan's relations with China or its posture in international affairs. Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States Aziz Ahmed declared, in reply to a question, that "the Chinese offer to demarcate their border with Pakistan" signified "no change in our relations hitherto with China."²⁰ His mention of the "Chinese offer" clearly indicated that the initiative in the matter, even though in informal soundings, came from Peking while the word "hitherto" seemed to have been used to carry conviction with the American public as also a sort of mild warning to Washington. Pakistan participated in the SEATO and the CENTO Ministerial Council meetings in Bangkok and Ankara in March and April 1961 and fully supported Western positions. Especially significant was the mention in the communique of the SEATO Council noting "with grave concern the continued offensive by rebel elements in Laos who are continuing to be supplied and assisted by Communist Powers in flagrant disregard of the Geneva accords." In the resolution, adopted by 8 SEATO countries, the parties further undertook to take all "appropriate action" in Laos if negotiations for a peaceful settlement failed. On the question of Vietnam also, the SEATO

Council noted "with concern the efforts of an armed minority, again supported from outside in violations of the Geneva accords to destroy the Government of Vietnam" (South Vietnam) and declared "its firm resolve not to acquiesce in any such take-over of that country". The Council also decried the continued communist tactics of "subversion and insurgency" in the Treaty area and noted with satisfaction the planning work of military advisers and the effective coordination achieved by the forces of member countries in the "several military exercises" conducted during the past year²¹. Addressing the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 25 August 1961, Ayub warned against the slogan "Asia for Asians," calling it "a deadly poison for smaller countries in Asia" for it meant "Don't let those countries have the right of having friends who can help them to retain themselves" and added, with some satisfaction, "but I am very glad that one hears less and less of that."

The reason why there was no progress in the Sino-Pakistan border talks, that were said to be continuing even before the despatch of a formal note from Islamabad and no reply was forthcoming from Peking for a long time, was that China demanded some concrete proof of sincerity on the part of Pakistan before it could proceed further in the matter. The price the Chinese asked was Islamabad's support on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations. It was in these circumstances that President Ayub "publicly stated" in Washington that it was only fair to allow Peking to occupy its legitimate position in the UN²² and that Pakistan would almost certainly vote for Chinese entry into the United Nations at future sessions²³. To soften the sting of US criticism for going totally against the American position on the question, Islamabad, while voting in favour of the draft resolution on the subject, that asked the General Assembly to remove immediately from all the UN organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and invite Peking to send its representatives to participate in the work of the UN and all its organs, abstained on the US draft resolution which provided that the question of China's representation be treated as an important question requiring two-thirds majority. Though this was a feat of delicate balancing on the part of Ayub, it did not fully satisfy

Peking which continued to demand total support from Pakistan in the matter. But having moved a step further, Ayub now wanted China to reciprocate by coming forward in regard to the question of border demarcation. This is very clearly brought out by Ayub in his political autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*, in these words:

On my return from the United States in December 1961, the Chinese Ambassador came to see me. He asked for our support for the proposition that the Chinese entry into the United Nations should be decided on the basis of a simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority. I asked him about our suggestion of demarcating the undefined border between China and Pakistan. He said that was a very complicated matter. I told him that if border demarcation was a very complicated matter, China's admission to the United Nations was even more complicated. I suggested to him that we should look at the two problems on merit regardless of whether they were simple or complicated. We should be prepared to do what was right and sensible. We were supporting China's case for admission to the United Nations not to please China but because we genuinely felt that China had a right to be in the United Nations. I expressed surprise that the proposal to demarcate the border between China and Pakistan had evoked no response. I think the Chinese Ambassador was impressed by what I told him.²¹

Shorn of verbiage and moral overtones, Ayub was simply asking for a *quid pro quo* from China. Noticing the firm position taken by the Pakistani President in the matter, the Chinese deemed it necessary not to completely ignore or brush aside the important gesture or proof of sincerity made by Islamabad. Accordingly, the difficulties about discussing the demarcation of the border "because of the disputed nature of the Kashmir territory" and Peking's hesitations about it not wanting "at that time to get involved in another argument with India," as Ayub put it,²² were gradually sorted out and China responded by agreeing to discuss the problem of border demarcation with Pakistan.

The Chinese note of 27 February 1962, after pointing out that the boundary in question was an undelimited one and had been "left over by history," expressed the hope that it would

be ready to attain with the Government of Pakistan "an agreed comprehension of the location and alignment of this boundary so as to prevent the tranquility on the border from being adversely affected on account of the misunderstanding" The note went on to remark that pending settlement of the Kashmir dispute, China and Pakistan should reach an agreement of a provisional nature on the location and alignment "now actually existing between the two countries" The Chinese note proposed that negotiations should start through the diplomatic channels, *i.e.* through the Chinese Ministry of External Affairs and the Embassy of Pakistan in Peking, with a view to the conclusion of the provisional agreement

Though the Chinese note was very cautious in so far as it avoided any mention of a treaty and merely referred to "an agreed comprehension" or an agreement of a provisional nature, the Government of Pakistan was quick to accept, in its second note of 19 March 1962, the Chinese suggestion as to the nature of the agreement to be concluded as well as in regard to the channel of negotiations ²⁶ In fact a provisional agreement suited Islamabad very well as it enabled Pakistan to assert that the boundary agreement with Peking did not constitute any material change whatsoever in the situation as regards the state of Jammu and Kashmir

Even after Pakistan's acceptance of the procedure for conducting the border talks, negotiations did not start immediately This was confirmed by Ayub at his press conference at Lahore. In order to facilitate negotiations and not to complicate the delicate talks, he denied either China or Pakistan having made any claim over each other in respect of the border areas He parried a question about the divergences in the territorial position in the maps of the two countries by saying that although a "factual frontier" existed between them, it was not yet defined ²⁷ Chairman Liu Shao-chi, on his part, deemed it necessary to send a message of congratulations to President Ayub on the occasion of Pakistan's National Day on 22 March 1962 in which he wished "Pakistan prosperity and its people well being" and added 'May the friendly relations between China and Pakistan be further developed' ²⁸

At a Peking reception on the occasion of the National Day of Pakistan on 23 March 1962, Foreign Minister Chen Yi

stated that the Chinese and Pakistani peoples had "always lived together in peace" and that having suffered under imperialism both wanted to safeguard their respective independence and sovereignty and to build their own lands. That was "the basis," he said, on which Peking had established and developed friendly relations with Islamabad. Not only that, as participants in the Bandung Conference both had "the noble duty of supporting the peoples of various countries in their struggles against imperialism and colonialism, promoting solidarity among the Asian and African countries and safeguarding world peace." This meant that Peking expected Pakistan to support its policy of extolling the Bandung spirit and of strengthening the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity. After thanking Islamabad for its support on the question of Chinese representation in the UN, Chen Yi observed, "The Chinese Government will continue to work for the promotion of the friendly relations between China and Pakistan." Pakistan's Charge d'affaires *ad interim*, in his speech, expressed happiness that "friendly relations existing between Pakistan and China are developing day by day and tranquility is prevailing on our common border."²⁹

It was only on 3 May 1962 that Pakistan and China formally announced their intention to define the "boundary" between China's Sinkiang and the "contiguous areas defence of which is under actual control of Pakistan," i.e. Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which was said to have "never been formally delimited and demarcated in history," thus declaring the Indian contention that the frontiers with China were delimited in their entirety, though not all portions were demarcated, to be wrong. The joint communique issued by the two governments stated that the two sides "have agreed to conduct negotiations so as to attain an agreed understanding of location and alignment of this boundary and to sign on this basis an agreement of a provisional nature." That was said to have been done "with a view to ensuring tranquility on border and developing good neighbourly relations between two countries." The two governments further agreed that "after settlement of dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India sovereign authorities concerned shall reopen negotiations with Chinese government regarding boundary of Kashmir so as to sign a formal

boundary treaty to replace the provisional agreement " The next day, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Manzur Qadir told newsmen in Rawalpindi that a time table and a mechanism for talks with China on the demarcation of the "common border" was being worked out ³⁰

Indian protests to Islamabad and Peking dated 10 May 1962³¹ asserting that Pakistan was not entitled to negotiate with China or any other country about territory that was not its own and declaring that New Delhi would never agree to any arrangements or agreements "provisional or otherwise" regarding territory which constituted an inalienable part of the Indian Union were rejected by both Pakistan and China. The Chinese reply note of 31 May 1962 denied that Peking had ever accepted without reservation the position that the sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir vested solely in the Indian Union and that for that matter there was no common boundary between China and Pakistan and that therefore Peking had no right to conduct boundary negotiations with Pakistan. It was asserted in the Chinese reply that Peking could "not leave unsettled indefinitely its boundary" of several hundred kilometres with the areas the defence of which was under the control of Pakistan "merely because there is a dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir." Peking justified as "entirely necessary, proper, legitimate and in accordance with international practice" the Chinese decision to conduct boundary negotiations with Islamabad. The Indian charge that the Government of China "are in this matter acting in furtherance of their aggressive designs and are seeking to exploit the troubled situation in Kashmir and India's differences with Pakistan for their advantage" was brushed aside as "slander" and border talks with Pakistan were considered "a good thing" and "in the interests of both friendship among Asian countries and peace in Asia" ³² The *People's Daily* editorial of 5 June 1962 went further and characterized the Sino-Pakistan announcement about border negotiations as "heartening news to all who cherish peace in Asia" and considered Peking's attitude in the matter as "true to the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence," faithful to "a policy of friendship and good neighbourliness" and one of non-involvement in the dispute between India and Pakistan over

Kashmir.³³

The Indian note of 30 June 1962 cited evidence in support of the view that "until recently" Peking had declared itself in favour of the question of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir being settled peacefully and against any third party taking advantage of it and remarked that the stand of China had changed and "a new situation now created by the Sino Pakistan agreement to demarcate their non-existent common border." In departing from their earlier policy of non-interference in the Kashmir situation, the Indian note added, the Government of China were giving "legal and moral encouragement to an aggressor State and prejudicing the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan."³⁴ Peking replied on 12 September 1962 by objecting to what it called "Indian Government's crude interference with and malicious attacks on the boundary negotiations" between China and Pakistan.³⁵

No sooner than Islamabad signed the joint communique with Peking on 3 May 1962 that Pakistan began to flaunt its independent posture in foreign policy and speak of closest possible ties with China. When the US State Department spokesman observed that by teaming up with the Chinese Communists "in an attempted pressure tactics against India," Pakistan had embarrassed Washington and aggravated the deteriorating relations between India and China, S.K. Dehlavi, Pakistan's External Affairs Secretary, commented by characterizing the US reaction as unrealistic.³⁶ Pakistan's Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir spoke of the "historical and age-old ties" between Pakistan and China, while inaugurating an exhibition of modern Chinese woodcuts in Karachi,³⁷ and Mumtaz Ahmed Khan, Secretary of the Pak-China Friendship Association, Lahore, demanded complete revision and re-orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy and stressed the need for forging closer ties of friendship between Pakistan and China.³⁸

In one of the longest editorials on 27 May 1962, the *Pakistan Times* characterized "the growingly warmer relations with China" as "a happy augury for our future" and observed "the cordiality of our relations with China should be put on a sound, solid and lasting basis of concrete understanding." Tha

one power which Moscow "cannot disregard is Peking," it said "Will Russia continue to stonewall Pakistan on Kashmir when Mao Tse-tung follows different course of action?" it asked and added "Let us seek strength within the campus of our own geography, the Middle East on the one hand and China on the other"³⁹ Initiating a debate on Pakistan's foreign policy in the National Assembly on 27 June 1962 Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali, while not denying that the pacts had afforded "some protection" to Pakistan, expressed his dissatisfaction with them and declared that these military alliances would not stand in the way of Pakistan's developing "friendly relations with the Communists or neutralist countries" He asserted that "we do not propose to be a camp follower of any power group" and the membership in the two pacts did not mean that "we would allow ourselves to be taken for granted" Pakistan would endeavour to judge all international issues "on merits" and adopt a course of action that would be "in the best interests of Pakistan" As development of relations with Peking gave credence to Pakistan's new posture—its own variant of "non-alignment"—and helped it to establish itself more profitably in the Afro-Asian family, Mohammad Ali had nothing but admiration and respect for "the great Chinese people," who had contributed "so greatly" to the progress of humanity and whose country was "so rich in history, culture and tradition" The recent agreement between China and Pakistan to demarcate the "common border," he said, should help towards the achievement of "our mutual desire to establish and promote close relations" With China, he declared, "we have no conflict" and, therefore, looked forward to forging "the closest possible ties" with the people of China. With the Soviet Union, however, he could think of establishing concrete relations "in the scientific, economic and cultural fields" only—the promotion of good relations in political field was said to depend on Soviet support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue⁴⁰ On 19 October 1962, just one day before the Chinese attack on India, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary S K Dehlavi stated that both the SEATO and the CENTO would be subject to "agonizing reappraisal" if vital security considerations that prompted Pakistan to join them ceased to hold good⁴¹

Even after the two countries, China and Pakistan, formally announced their agreement "to conduct negotiations" on a boundary agreement of a provisional nature, formal talks on the proposed border agreement did not commence before Peking made up its mind to launch a massive attack on India. Although the new Ambassador of Pakistan in China had full powers to negotiate the border pact and while presenting his credentials in Peking on 1 September 1962, he spoke of the two governments having "recently reached agreed views on the question of delimiting the boundary through negotiations,"⁴² formal talks opened in Peking only on 12 October 1962, just a week before China's massive invasion on India, when a procedural agreement on boundary negotiations was said to have been reached by the two negotiating sides. Thus tying up of Islamabad in formal border talks was Peking's reinsurance against any possibility of Pakistani involvement, under the aegis or pressure of Western Powers, on the side of India in the coming Sino-Indian conflict. It was very difficult for Islamabad to break those talks soon after they had commenced.

During the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Pakistani reporting was very much inclined in favour of China. *Dawn*, the leading Pakistani newspaper, in its editorial on 20 October 1962, likened India of Nehru to "a wolf that has been fattened with economic aid and equipped with military fangs by communist as well as non-communist white Powers to fall on the Chinese sheep beyond the Himalayas."⁴³ The reports of Indian reverses were subject of ridicule and Chinese claims and their version of events received wide coverage in Pakistani publicity media. Peking was praised for its peaceful intentions while New Delhi came to be described as the aggressor.

The Pakistani official reaction in regard to the Sino-Indian conflict was no different. The Pakistani Ministers openly expressed jubilation over the events. Bhutto quite openly described the Chinese attack on India as "illusory aggression"⁴⁴ and declared that there was no possibility of Pakistan's coming to the help of India in her fight with China⁴⁵ while some other Pakistani Ministers described the Sino-Indian conflict as a mock fight.⁴⁶ Pakistan's Ambassador to Japan characterized India as the original aggressor in the conflict⁴⁷ while Foreign Secretary S.K. Dehlavi accused India of having "a trigger

happy mentality over Goa and over the Chinese frontiers."⁴⁸ Ayub told the National Assembly, that had been summoned into an emergency session on 21 November 1962, that it was India's conduct which precipitated that clash. In a statement issued from Rawalpindi on 5 November 1962 Ayub curiously argued that the large amount of military equipment, that was being supplied to India by the USA and the UK, had "the effect of enlarging and prolonging the conflict between China and India" and added to the "serious concern" already existing in the minds of the Pakistani people that those weapons might well be used against them "in the absence of an overall settlement with India".⁴⁹

Replying four days later to General Cariappa, former C-in-C of the Indian Army, President Ayub turned down his suggestion that Pakistan should make "unilateral reassuring gestures to India" by asking how Pakistan could deny itself "the right of self defence and forgo our vital interests," as he put it. He did not think that his suggestion was in conformity with human nature and consequently advised him to use his influence "in Delhi to make people in authority see virtue of settlement with Pakistan".⁵⁰ In the same way, Ayub rejected US President Kennedy's plea about giving assurance to Nehru "of a kind that will enable him to deploy his troops, at present concentrated against us [Pakistan] elsewhere," i.e. to face China. Pakistan, Ayub told Kennedy, could not be expected to show its friendship to India, particularly when New Delhi refused to settle the question of Kashmir to Islamabad's satisfaction.⁵¹ In another letter to Kennedy, Ayub insisted that arms aid be made "contingent on a Kashmir settlement" as otherwise he feared "serious consequences to the maintenance of the present ratio of military strength in the sub-continent and hence to the security of Pakistan".⁵²

Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali openly blamed India for initiating war with China when he observed "this conflict stems from India's unrealistic and fallacious foreign policy. Had India sincerely based its policies on the principles of peace and good neighbourly relations, the present conflict could have been averted". He considered the Sino-Indian war as only a border incident and not "a clash of political ideology, as the western countries appear to think". An invitation to visit

Peking was accepted by him the same day. Ali described the rushing of western supplies of arms to India as a hostile act against Pakistan, "a threat to our safety and security," as he put it. He declared that Pakistan would not hesitate for a moment to leave the military pact with the west if it was found that they no longer served the national interests. Commenting on the unilateral declaration of cease-fire by Peking and the Chinese willingness to withdraw 12 km. behind the so-called line of actual control that was said to exist on 7 November 1959, Mohammed Ali observed:

We cannot but applaud this action on the part of China. It is an act of great statesmanship on the part of the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai and his associates and an evidence of their sincere desire to limit this conflict to the settlement of the border dispute. We sincerely and strongly feel that it is the bounden duty of all the peace-loving nations to encourage now the possibilities of a settlement and to ensure that the present boundary conflict is not permitted to enter a new phase as a result of a massive supply of arms now being rushed to India from outside. Without entering into the issue ourselves, it will be pertinent here to point out that in regard to the Chinese Government's refusal to subscribe to the validity of the McMahon Line even the Kuomintang regime in Formosa is in complete agreement with the stand taken by the People's Republic of China and has, therefore, protested to the Government of the United States when they announced their recognition of the McMahon Line.⁵³

As late as 12 December 1966 when Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Khan spoke in the Pakistan National Assembly of Pakistan having "a most wonderful opportunity for an aggression over India when the Chinese invaded India," the Pakistani Law Minister S.M. Zafar intervened to correct him by saying that reference in his speech to invasion by China on India was "certainly not a fact," and that it had been said by him "in a loose form." Accordingly Zafar demanded that that portion of his speech "should be expunged" from the records of the Assembly.⁵⁴

Although more than seventy countries of the world expressed their sympathy for India in her conflict with China and with "a tide of sympathy for India's cause sweeping through the Afro-Asian world" even the six non-aligned Colombo Powers "made it clear that they did not propose to advance sugges-

tions prejudicial to Indian security,"⁵⁵ Islamabad sided completely with Peking both to smite India and to curry favour with China. The Chinese terms and conditions for a settlement of the border issue with India were applauded by Bhutto, then Minister of Industries, as the right conditions for safeguarding peace in the sub-continent.⁵⁶ Bhutto ruled out any collaboration with India against China even if the Kashmir dispute was resolved amicably. Friendship with China, he declared, was "a fundamental principle" of Pakistan's foreign policy and was "unconditional." "We will not barter or bargain it away for anything," he added.⁵⁷ In a television interview to an American correspondent towards the end of 1962, President Ayub stated that Pakistan could not give an assurance that it would not attack India during her trouble with China.⁵⁸ A Pakistani public man in a key position told John Strachey, Labour M.P., that if China attacked India again, he and his friends "would not miss their opportunity this time" but would immediately attack India. Almost every Pakistani public man whom Strachey met started the conversation from the assumption that India had attacked China.⁵⁹

The Chinese attack on India convinced Islamabad of Peking's abiding hostility against New Delhi and that impelled Pakistan to look towards China as its genuine friend. Ghulam Abbas, leader of the so called "Azad Kashmir", described this new-found friend of Pakistan as the only dependable friend and ally, one whose friendship could be of great value in "liberating" Kashmir from "Indian occupation." When it was reported that Peking had made an offer about signing a non-aggression treaty with Islamabad, Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman considered it worth serious examination, if placed before the Minister in Peking.⁶⁰ Khan A. Sabur, the Communications Minister, declared his country's preparedness to sign a non-aggression pact with Peking.

Speaking after the Chinese attack on India, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Dehlavi declared that Pakistan's desire to establish friendly ties with China remained "firm and unchanged" and that "the settlement of the Kashmir problem and disengagement of our troops would not change our desire and policy for friendly relations with the neighbours."⁶¹ Stressing the need for reappraising the country's foreign policy, the pro-

Peking National Awami Party leader Maulana Bhasani emphasized the necessity of reappraising the country's foreign alliances, as they did not guarantee protection against India, and observed: "The immediate danger is from India, not China." There was no possibility of communist aggression for another hundred years, he added while addressing newsmen for the first time after his release in November 1962.⁶² This assessment was in marked contrast to that of the American Republican Party Senator John Sherman Cooper who stated in Washington that China's invasion of India posed an equal threat to Pakistan.⁶³

At a time when Peking was engaged in armed hostilities against India and noticed the Western countries rushing military supplies to India, the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, more or less neutral in the matter and the vast majority of the Afro-Asian community sympathetic to India, China found Pakistan's support very helpful. It enabled Peking to continue to project its peaceful image in the Afro-Asian countries and thereby preserving its influence in the Third World, on which China so much depended in its ideological onslaught on the Soviet Union and its followers and political confrontation against the Western system, led by the US "imperialists". In these circumstances, it was not at all surprising if during then Sino-Indian clash of arms in 1962, China took special care not to offend Pakistan and to woo it in every possible way. Pakistan's Foreign Minister was invited to visit Peking. An attempt was made to lure Pakistan into a non-aggression pact. Eagerness was shown to conclude a trade pact with Pakistan, for which the visit of a Chinese trade team to Pakistan was planned. Chinese Embassy officials held two receptions in Pakistan to express their friendliness and warmth to Pakistani guests and to utilize that opportunity to deny Indian press reports that, having occupied Daulet Beg Oldi at the foot of the Karakoram Pass, Chinese armed forces have crossed the Halia Pass in "Azad Kashmir" and reached Remo, 80 miles from Skardu. In order to lay at rest any doubts in the Pakistani mind about the occupation of any portion of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir territory by the Chinese, Charge d'affaires Hsu Ying told reporters:

In the past year or so, Sino-Pakistan relations have been

continuously developing on the basis of the 10 principles of the Bandung conference. Tranquility and amity have all along prevailed in the border areas of the two countries. Sino-Pakistan border talks are going on smoothly. Of late alleged occupation by Chinese forces of Daulet Beg Oldi and alleged appearance of tension on the Sino-Pakistan border etc., fabricated by the Indian newspapers, are nothing but rumours disseminated to deliberately sow dissension in the friendly relations between China and Pakistan. It must be pointed out that such clumsy tactics are futile.⁶¹

If at the time of the Sino-Indian conflict, Islamabad would have opened another front against India with a view to grab additional territory or force India to grant concessions to Pakistan, Washington would not have liked it, among other things, because in that situation all the credit for the advantages gained by Islamabad would have gone to Peking. The Western Powers, therefore, warned that "no attempt to exploit India's difficulties will bring a settlement any nearer in Kashmir".⁶² But while warning Pakistan against any adventure in the critical situation faced by India, the western countries at the same time exerted pressure on New Delhi about yielding to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Before any plan for bringing India and Pakistan together, under western auspices, succeeded, Peking announced a unilateral cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. By that shrewd move, China not only saved itself against any possibility of retaliation by the United States and succeeded in marring the Indian image in the Afro-Asian world but also prevented any rapprochement between India and Pakistan. If there was still any hope of such an eventuality, that was sought to be destroyed by the timing of the Sino-Pakistani joint communique on the boundary question on the eve of the Indo-Pakistan talks.

As the first of the six rounds of the Indo-Pakistan ministerial level talks, that were initiated on the persuasion of the USA and the UK to reach an equitable and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, was about to begin, Peking, in order to sabotage those negotiations and thereby prevent the emergence of a joint stand by India and Pakistan against China under the auspices of the Western Powers, hastened the pace of the Sino-Pakistani border discussions and announced on the eve of those talks, i.e. 26 December 1962 complete "agreement

in principle" on the location and alignment of the so-called boundary between China and Pakistan. The communique, issued simultaneously in Rawalpindi and Peking, stated that the two parties were "highly satisfied with the *speedy* attainment of the agreement." After expressing keen desire of the two parties to sign "as soon as possible" a boundary agreement on the basis of "the agreement in principle" reached earlier, the communique went on to declare that the proposed boundary agreement "fully safeguards the rights and interests of both the countries and demonstrates the efficacy of negotiation as a peaceful method of resolving international disputes on the basis of mutual respect and good will."⁶⁶ A Pakistani writer was quite candid in admitting that Peking, by conceding more than what Pakistan had expected, forced the pace and the timing of the announcement when he observed that "Left to themselves, the Government of Pakistan would probably have chosen a different time for announcing the agreement" and added that after the Chinese had accepted certain Pakistani demands "Peking would have announced" the agreement "any way" even if Pakistan wanted to suppress the news.⁶⁷

Commenting on the Sino-Pakistani announcement of December 1962, one Indian writer has remarked as follows:

The announcement of the border agreement was ...deliberately timed to scatter the results of the efforts put in by Duncan Sandys and Averall Harriman in late November to bring about an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement...This killed all chances of the two parts of the sub-continent coming together for purposes of defence. By making the agreement 'provisional', and by leaving the door open for a 'final' agreement with the real owner of the territory after an eventful settlement of the dispute, China kept Pakistan on notice of good behaviour and India on a flicker of hope.⁶⁸

The *People's Daily* editorial of 29 December 1962, however, hailed the reaching of the "agreement in principle on the boundary question" between China and Pakistan as "a new starting point in the development of the friendship" between the two countries and also "a new important victory for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." It characterized the arrangement reached between them as "extremely fair and just" that should be welcomed "by all quarters concerned."⁶⁹

A strong protest from India dated 31 December 1962 repudiated "firmly the validity of any agreement involving Indian territory between parties who have no legal or constitutional *locus standi* whatever in respect of this territory" and described the Sino-Pakistani joint communique of 26 December 1962 as 'a brazen attempt at legitimization of the gains of aggression in the hope that the Chinese Government thereby secure Pakistani support to Chinese aggression on India and the gains of this aggression'. The calculated release of the communique at a time when delegations from India and Pakistan were attempting to resolve their differences on Kashmir and related matters was considered "clear evidence of China's desire to exploit Indo-Pakistan differences for its own selfish and expansionist designs".⁷⁰ Peking replied on 21 February 1963 by charging India of "deliberately seeking a pretext to continue poisoning the atmosphere between China and India and sabotage Sino-Pakistan relations". Asserting its non-involvement in the Kashmir dispute, the Chinese note held that the Sino-Pakistani boundary negotiations had not "at all touched on the question of the ownership of Kashmir and have even less to do" with the Indo-Pakistani talks on that question. Peking accused India of redoubling its efforts, with the encouragement of certain Western Powers, "to entice Pakistan into a joint anti China campaign" and described the Indian attitude as "downright big nation chauvinism and expansionism".⁷¹

The Indian note to China dated 2 March 1963 considered as groundless and misleading Peking's assertions, in the Chinese note of 21 February 1963, about non involvement and not coming to terms with Pakistan on the question of the ownership of Kashmir and accused Peking of pursuing an "insidious policy of poisoning the mutual relations between the countries of Asia and creating tensions and conflict in this region". The Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement, it said, manifested the Chinese desire "to exploit the differences between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question, to further its own expansionist interests". The Indian note also blamed Peking for deliberately pursuing a policy intended "to destroy the accord and amity which have been developing between India and Pakistan, as a result of the joint talks between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters".⁷²

Soon after the "agreement in principle" on the boundary issue, an official trade delegation from China, led by Lin Hai Yun, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, visited Pakistan in January 1963 and, during his stay in Karachi, purchased about 30,000 bales of raw cotton and also showed considerable interest in making further purchases of jute, cotton and some manufactured goods. A trade agreement was also signed in Karachi on 5 January 1963, which was the first of its kind between the two countries and aimed at strengthening and developing trade relations between them. It provided for the grant of the most favoured nation treatment by one country to the other in matters of commerce and trade, including shipping. The agreement also provided for the conclusion of arrangements between the two countries to facilitate the expansion of trade between them. The list attached to the agreement specified commodities and goods to be exchanged between the two countries but the exchange of commodities not mentioned in the list was not prohibited.⁷³

It was significant that while it took more than one and a half years after Islamabad publicly in a diplomatic note desired to enter into boundary negotiations with China, about nine months since Peking expressed its willingness to talk and over five months after the two sides formally, in a joint communique, agreed "to conduct negotiations" in the matter to actually commence those negotiations, it was within a brief period of about two months that the two sides sorted out all the complicated issues, worked out all the details, that included the exchange of topographical maps, their checking by technical experts and reaching of a complete understanding about the location and alignment of the boundary, and were ready to sign a full-fledged boundary agreement. There is no doubt that the "speedy attainment of agreement," to use the words from the Sino-Pakistani joint communique of 26 December 1962, was made possible and much facilitated by the Sino-Indian conflict which inclined Peking to give up delaying tactics and respond quickly to the Pakistani desire for a border agreement by making some concessions. That this was the case was confirmed by Bhutto himself. Speaking before the National Assembly on 17 July 1963 he described the situation in these words:

Though our negotiations were progressing, they were pro-

gressing in an unsatisfactory manner. Then at the time of the Sino Indian conflict an impetus was given to these negotiations and we can understand why an impetus should have been given to these negotiations because no State would like to face any unresolved situation on two fronts.⁷¹

In the light of what had been stated in the preceding paragraph, the contention of the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, in a background note on the Sino-Pak border demarcation agreement read out by him at a press conference in Karachi on 2 March 1963 that 'border negotiations with China were and are unrelated to, and entirely independent of Sino-Indian conflict or the current series of Indo Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir,'⁷² became utterly untenable. Conscious of Chinese friendship and backing, Islamabad became less inclined to be accommodating to India in the Indo-Pak negotiations on Kashmir. As one western commentary in the matter put it "Pakistan's minimum demands were far above the maximum that India was willing to concede. The improvement in Sino-Pakistani relations diminished the mutual confidence between India and Pakistan necessary for successful negotiations over Kashmir."⁷³

In less than two months of the "agreement in principle," it was announced by the Government of Pakistan, in a press note dated 22 February 1963, that as a result of further talks the Pakistan Government and the Government of China had been able to carry negotiations to their final stage in the form of an agreed text, setting forth in detail the description of the boundary alignment.⁷⁴ On the same day, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto announced that he would soon fly to Peking to sign the border agreement. He said that he would discuss "a wide range of subjects of mutual interest, including the peace of the region."⁷⁵

The Boundary Agreement between China and Pakistan was signed in Peking on 2 March 1963 by the Foreign Ministers Chen Yi and Z A Bhutto. The alignment of the boundary was described in detail in Article II of the agreement but as the maps of the two sides (these were reproduced in the *Peking Review* dated 15 March 1963) were not fully identical in their representation of topographical features, the two Parties agreed to determine the actual features on the ground by joint survey,

for which a joint boundary demarcation commission was provided in Article IV. The commission was charged with the duty of conducting "necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground," setting up boundary markers and drawing up of a protocol delineating in detail the alignment of the boundary line. Such elaborate arrangements are generally made for fixing permanent boundary demarcation or international frontiers and thus even the pretence of the agreement being "provisional" seemed to have been given up in the March 1963 Agreement. Under Article V, any dispute concerning the boundary was to be settled "peacefully by the two parties through friendly consultations." In the next Article, the two parties agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned would reopen negotiations with China so as to sign "a formal boundary treaty to replace the present Agreement," provided that, in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, "the provisions of the present Agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty" to be signed between China and Pakistan.⁷⁹

At the banquet speeches on 3 March 1963, Z.A. Bhutto described the border agreement as a "significant step" which, together with the trade agreement, constituted "tangible and growing signs in our developing relations" while Chen Yi considered the signing of the boundary agreement as "an important milestone in China-Pakistan friendship." It not only marked a "new stage in the development of friendly relations" between the two countries but also "makes an important contribution to the cause of Asian-African solidarity," Chen Yi added. The conclusion of the boundary agreement with Pakistan, after Peking's satisfactory boundary agreement with Burma and Nepal, was prescoted by him as "another new example for settling issues in a friendly way between countries with different social systems." He blamed India for not being interested in seeking a peaceful settlement of the boundary question with China in its bid to obtain arms assistance "from the imperialists," which "poses a serious menace to the peace of Asia." All the countries and people "who treasure Asian peace and Asian-African solidarity", he added "cannot but feel uneasy and disquiet" about that.⁸⁰

The joint communique of the Chinese and Pakistani governments, issued on 4 March 1963, expressed particular satisfaction at the amicable settlement of the boundary question "through friendly consultations" and described it as having "a significant bearing on the consolidation and development of friendly and good neighbourly relations between China and Pakistan" and at the same time contributing "to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world". With regard to the Kashmir dispute, Peking "expressed its appreciation of the attitude of the Pakistan Government in seeking a peaceful settlement" of that dispute and its "belief that expeditious settlement" of that question would be "conducive to peace in Asia and the world". On the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, the two sides expressed the hope that "a fair and reasonable settlement would be achieved through direct negotiations between China and India".⁸¹

Soon after the announcement of the signing of the Sino-Pakistan border alignment agreement in Peking on 2 March 1963, the High Commission of India in Pakistan lodged "an emphatic protest" against it and in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 16 March 1963, the representative of India charged Pakistan of unlawfully ceding not less than 2,000 square miles of Indian territory to China and added "the agreement claims to be provisional, and yet it is not subject to ratifications". He observed:

By signing this agreement, the Government of Pakistan has unilaterally altered, not only in its own favour but also in favour of another aggressor, China, the basis of the Security Council resolution of January 17, 1948, and the U.N. Commission resolution of August 13, 1948. The aggressor on whom an obligation has been imposed to vacate his aggression has not only assumed ownership of the part he has unlawfully occupied by invasion but has traded in the sovereignty of Indian territory, in collusion with China, to the detriment of the territorial integrity and the security of India.⁸²

Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 5 March 1963, Prime Minister Nehru referred to the difference of 3,400 square miles between the Chinese claim line and the Pakistan claim line and observed that even if one accepted the Pakistani claim of having received 1,350 square miles, including 700 square miles of area

which was in China's possession, under the March 1963 agreement, the Chinese had been given 2,050 square miles. He accused Peking of "directly interfering in Indo-Pakistan relations" and pointed to the Sino-Pakistani joint communique of 26 December 1962, Islamabad's announcement of 22 February 1963 and the signing of the border agreement on 2 March 1963—which were all timed to prejudice the outcome of the joint talks on Kashmir and other related matters between India and Pakistan.⁸³

The exchange of notes between India and Pakistan and India and China on the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement of 1963 continued but for the most part those notes repeated the positions previously taken in the matter by the respective governments. China sent a note on 25 March 1963,⁸⁴ which was in reply to the Indian note of 2 March 1963, to which India replied on 15 July 1963.⁸⁵ When it was announced that the Chinese and the Pakistani boundary demarcation teams had reached agreement on ground survey, aerial photography and erection of boundary markers along the border, India lodged protests with China (30 September 1963) and Pakistan (5 October 1963) in which the fixing of boundary markers on Indian territory by the two governments was described as "a violation of international law and practice in the matter" and it was asserted that the "collusive aggressive effort to change the status of Indian Union territory in Jammu and Kashmir" and to alter the traditional boundaries, well established by treaties and custom, "will never be accepted by the Government of India."⁸⁶

Again the announcement of the completion of the work by the Sino-Pakistani boundary commission on the protocol on 7 March 1965 and the signing of the protocol in Rawalpindi by the Foreign Ministers of China and Pakistan on 26 March 1965 were the subject of Indian protests to Peking (10 March and 7 April 1965) and Islamabad (13 March and 1 May 1965). India also lodged protests against them with the President of the Security Council on 17 March and 27 April 1965.⁸⁷ Pakistan replied to them in its letters to the President of the Security Council on 20 April and 17 May 1965, to which India again replied on 27 August 1965.⁸⁸ In their protest notes, the Government of India had repeatedly pointed out that there

was no common border between Pakistan and China and that neither had any legal or constitutional *locus standi* in concluding an Agreement in respect of the territory which belonged to India. The Agreement and every act flowing from it were illegal and unlawful. Their validity would not, therefore, be recognized by the present or future Government of India. In the Indian protest note to the UN dated 27 April 1965, the whole illegal transaction was described as 'international brigandage'. Pakistan had sought justification in the provisions of the Agreement and had tried to argue that India's interest in Kashmir was of a contingent nature since the future of the State had still to be settled, while Peking asserted its right to negotiate and delimit the 480 kilometres boundary with Pakistan because the defence of the areas contiguous to the Sinkiang region of China was 'under the actual control of Pakistani' and in order to develop friendly and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan and maintain tranquility on the border.⁸⁹

After signing the boundary agreement in Peking, Bhutto stated that by that agreement Pakistan had gained some 750 square miles of land affording salt and grazing ground, access to all passes along the Karakoram range and control of two-thirds of the K-2 mountain. A few days later he observed that three quarters of the peak of K-2, including the summit, remained with Pakistan. Dobell disagreed with much of what Bhutto claimed to be the gains for Pakistan when he remarked "Access to the Karakoram passes was less than outright control, and K-2 (Mount Godwin Austen) had never been accepted as Chinese."⁹⁰ The apologists of the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement, however, consider that by that settlement neither Pakistan nor China lost any territory administered by it, that what each one of them abandoned was its theoretical claims over the other and that the boundary agreement was "an extremely reasonable and moderate settlement."⁹¹

The fact, however, remained that Pakistan did surrender considerable chunks of territory to China over which it had no sovereign rights. The 1962 Survey of Pakistan map included the Taghdumbash area and the entire Shaksgam valley upto the Raskam river in Pakistan and thus the boundary was shown at Shahidullah, which was about 70 miles north of the Karakoram Pass. When compared with that map, Pakistan surrendered

some 13,600 square miles of territory in the March 1963 border agreement with China. The 1962 Pakistani map closely followed the British maps while the Indian map of 1959 had given up the shadowy claims of Mir of Hunza and was based on traditional boundary running along the watershed principle. Pakistan ceded about 2,600 square miles south of the traditional frontier, as given in the Indian map, and about 1,600 square miles between the traditional frontier and Pakistan's "de facto" boundary or line of actual control, as shown in a map supplied to India in 1961.⁹²

It is significant to note that when India referred to the 1962 map published in Pakistan in substantiation of that, Pakistan denied that the particular Pakistan Government agency, the Survey of Pakistan, was a proper authority to draw a line of an undefined frontier.⁹³ In the opinion of a Karachi weekly, *Outlook*, of 9 March 1963 the agreement was not to be hailed for its substance but for the major break-through it symbolized. Thus there seems no doubt that in the boundary agreement Pakistan receded from the position held in its map of 1962 and lost certain territories even according to its own version. During the election campaign in 1964, Miss Fatima Jinnah criticized Ayub for conceding a big chunk of territory to China.

The significance of the 2 March 1963 boundary agreement lay in removing a cause of possible friction between China and Pakistan and in making an important breakthrough in the relations of the two countries. Pakistan's gain amounted to the acceptance by the Chinese of Pakistan's occupation of the territory and also Peking having a vested interest in perpetuating that occupation in order to preserve the alignment agreed upon. Moreover, in view of strained relations of China with India and the Soviet Union, there seemed every possibility of drawing Peking closer to Pakistan's views on Kashmir. Presumably counting on Chinese backing, Ayub declared on 29 March 1963 that Pakistan would not accept a settlement of the Kashmir dispute unless it was based on the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris, security of Pakistan's borders and economic safeguards for Pakistan.⁹⁴ For China, not only Pakistan was committed to the alignment advantageous to Peking but, more importantly, Peking gained a significant leverage to influence Pakistan's foreign policy favourable to it.

The editorial in the *Pakistan Times*, written soon after the conclusion of the Agreement, referred not only to the oppression and persecution of Muslims in India and of Arabs by Jews in Palestine, but also to that of Negroes in the United States and the Muslim Mongol-Turk races of Central Asia by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes in Russia. The editorial, thereafter, went on to applaud the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement and observed

The common equalitarian and fraternal aspirations of Islam in Pakistan and Socialism in China demand that the Frontiers Agreement should be followed by another fuller Commercial Treaty. Then may come a defensive offensive Pact. Sino-Pakistan interests are far more identical than either the Sino-Russian interests or the Pakistan-European and Pakistan-American interests.⁹⁵

On 1 August 1963, the *Pakistan Times* accused the Soviet Union of "competing with the West in buttressing India's striking power," of deserting its Chinese ally and of practising *real-politik*.⁹⁶

The gains for Peking were, indeed, manifold. It not only secured Pakistani support on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations and during the Sino-Indian conflict but also obtained Islamabad's willing approval in regard to the peaceful image of China and the holding of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, thereby entangling Ayub in the complicated net of Chinese diplomacy. By appearing to be conciliatory to Pakistan on the border issue, Peking could, at the same time, utilize its sympathetic posture towards Pakistan to jeopardize the prospects of an Indo-Pakistani dialogue on Kashmir thereby keeping the two divided and foiling the Western Powers' attempt to forge Indo-Pak amity directed against the Chinese threat. One significant advantage of the boundary agreements with Pakistan and Afghanistan was that it enabled Peking to safeguard its precarious hold in Sinkiang, inhabited by only 2 million Chinese and 5 million Uighur and Kazakh Muslims, against the danger of a revolt "organized by the Muslim tribes with the help of Soviet weapons," resulting in the isolation of the Chinese position in Tibet. It was, as one writer put it, part of the Chinese policy to seek support among the neighbouring Muslim countries which was useful to China "in view of the reported unrest

among the Muslim tribes in Sinkiang and Russian attempts at subversion launched from the East Turkestan Republic which was also predominantly Muslim."⁹⁷ It is not without significance that Moscow expressed its disapproval of the Sino-Pakistan border agreement even while China and Pakistan were negotiating it.⁹⁸ That China was apprehensive of Soviet designs in Sinkiang is borne out by the following Chinese commentary of 6 September 1963.

In April and May 1962 the leaders of the C.P.S.U. used their organs and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government lodged repeated protests and made repeated representations, but the Soviet Government refused to repatriate these Chinese citizens on the pretext of the 'sense of Soviet legality' and 'humanitarianism.' To this day this incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in the relations between socialist countries.⁹⁹

On the boundary aspect proper also China was in no way a loser. Pakistan accepted the Chinese contention that the boundary required fresh delimitation, thereby Peking secured a point which could be made use of in its border disputes with India and the Soviet Union. The Sino-Pakistan alignment, as agreed in the March 1963 Boundary Agreement, followed no specific principle. Though it was said to be in conformity with the traditional, customary line, it was arbitrary and jumped in places without following any natural features at all. China, in fact, got an alignment away from the Aghil-Kuen Lun watershed system to the Karakoram ranges which was more in consonance with the arbitrary alignment claimed by Peking east of the Karakoram pass, and in contravention to all evidence of tradition, custom and jurisdiction. It was admitted even in the official Chinese maps that the Chinese authority in Sinkiang did not extend south of the Pamir and Kuen Lun mountains. In 1865, the Chinese lost control of Sinkiang itself, which was reconquered in 1878. Article VI of the Boundary Agreement, which spoke of the two parties agreeing that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan the sovereign authority concerned "will" reopen negotiations with Peking so as to sign "a formal boundary treaty,"

was also advantageous to China, because while it did not recognize the Pakistani title as final, India's stand concerning the traditional frontier was considerably weakened. India's title to the Aghil range was prejudiced by prior relinquishment of such a title by Pakistan, thereby weakening New Delhi's negotiating position in future.

The signing of the boundary agreement between China and Pakistan was an important landmark in the relations of the two countries. It paved the way for the rapid growth of friendly feelings and close rapport between the two nations. It marked the beginning of a special relationship between China and Pakistan that continued upto the Tashkent Declaration. Chou En-lai called it "the major achievement in the relations of friendly cooperation between the two countries" for it was not only "beneficial to the maintenance of tranquillity along the Sino-Pakistani border and to the consolidation of the friendly and good neighbourly relations between China and Pakistan" but also "of great significance to the defence of peace in Asia and the world". Ayub, in his telegram to Chairman Liu Shao-chi on the occasion of the signing of the Boundary Agreement on 4 March 1963, expressed "deep satisfaction" at the conclusion of the Agreement and shared the Chinese Head of State's conviction that the Agreement was "a positive contribution to the peace of Asia and the world". The two countries, he added, had demonstrated "the efficacy of peaceful procedure of settlement of international problems" and the Agreement was "a significant landmark in the history of friendly relations between our two peoples"¹⁰⁰.

Soon after the signing of the border agreement between China and Pakistan, Premier Chou En-lai in a long interview with the correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan in Peking on 31 March 1963, spoke highly of Pakistan's genuine desire to establish friendly relations with China which, he said, was reflected in Islamabad's taking the initiative about the boundary agreement "in disregard of India's position and US pressure". While admitting that there was "a certain contradiction" in Pakistan's friendship with China and its membership of Western military pacts, he yet expressed his full satisfaction at Islamabad's assurances that its participation in the SEATO was not for the purpose of being hostile to China and

"would not prejudice Pakistan's friendship for China." On the contrary, Chou vehemently criticized India's "so-called" policy of peace and neutrality as "only a facade" for India was getting arms from the USA "to satisfy its expansionist ambitions." If Washington could utilize Pakistan to check India, why not Peking use Islamabad as a counter-vailing force against New Delhi. It was precisely this realization that led Chou En-lai, on the one hand, to assure Pakistan of China's keen desire to develop close relations in the political, economic and cultural fields, and on the other to draw on Islamabad's hostility towards India and anger or anguish at the US supply of arms to New Delhi in an attempt to make Pakistan a subservient tool in the Chinese strategy of promoting Afro-Asian solidarity. He, thus, pointed out to Pakistani leaders:

The more India relies on the United States and the more arms it gets, the more isolated will it be in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the whole world. To my mind, the Asian, African and Latin American countries and people will change their view about India and Pakistan. The steps taken by President Ayub to sign the boundary Agreement with China has changed the view of many people in the world. Pakistan will make more and more friends in the future, while India will become more and more isolated. China has many friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the relations between the western countries and China are also changing.¹⁰¹

In a master-stroke of diplomacy, Chou was impressing upon Pakistan the desirability of joining the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, putting the example of a dissatisfied and disenchanted Western ally, Pakistan, before other Afro-Asian members of the Western alliance system and forging closer links with all of them in a bid to confront western "imperialism" and even the Soviet Union. An attempt to denigrate the USSR was made when he observed: "It is inconceivable that a socialist country would openly help India fight China... If it really does so, how could it still be considered a socialist country."¹⁰²

Soon after the signing of the Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement, Mahbubul Haq, Chief of the Fiscal and Monetary Section, Planning Commission of Pakistan, stressed the need for diversifying Pakistan's "foreign dependence" to ensure balanced

economic development.¹² A Pakistani Industrial and Commercial delegation was feted in Peking on 11 May 1963 and the Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission held its first session in Peking from 21 May to 11 June 1963. The discussions at the session were said to be permeated with an atmosphere of friendship and cordiality and the two parties reached agreed views on the specific task of the commission, the procedure and the method of work of the commission and other questions. Both delegations were highly satisfied with the outcome. With the arrival of the Chinese Survey team in Karachi on 8 June 1963, the arrangements for the demarcation of the border were also being finalized.

An important development in the relations of the two countries was the China Pakistan accord on air service. The news about Pakistan and China having reached an understanding on the joint air services between the two countries was disclosed by Air Commodore Noor Khan, Managing Director of the PIA, in Karachi on 7 June 1963, soon after his visit to China. He stated that in return for the PIA having traffic rights at Canton and Shanghai, Pakistan had offered traffic rights to the China Airways at Karachi and Dacca. Despite Washington's criticism of the proposed air-link with China, Pakistan went ahead with what it considered "a purely commercial proposition." The Chinese Civil Aviation team visited Karachi to work out technical aspects of an air transport agreement. After the signing of the agreement on 29 August 1963, regular air service between Karachi and Shanghai via Dacca and Canton started. As the traffic rights were granted on a reciprocal basis, China secured a direct air link with the outside world. The negotiations leading to the agreement were described as most friendly and cordial. The arrangements agreed upon provided for the airlines of the two countries to operate over each other's territories and for the provision of all facilities needed to ensure a smooth flow of air traffic through all the specified airports in the two countries.¹³ The air transport agreement with Pakistan was the only agreement negotiated by Peking with any non-communist country. Early in 1971, Pakistan airlines, in a full-page advertisement in the *London Times* announced with pride "There are only two London-Shanghai flights—ours."

The year 1963 also saw the signing of two other agreements between China and Pakistan—a radio-photo and photo-service agreement and the other about friendly dealings between the two leading agencies of the two countries. A barter agreement was concluded on 30 September 1963, four days after the signing of the Telecommunications Agreement. It was designed to contribute to the expansion of trade and the strengthening of friendship between the two countries. The joint communique, issued after the signing of the barter agreement in Karachi declared "The agreement provides for export of raw jute from Pakistan against import of 100,000 tons of Portland cement from China valued at Rs. 7.46 million."¹⁰⁵ In May 1964, a Chinese National Art Troupe visited Pakistan. In July 1964 Chinese leaders sent messages of sympathy for flood victims in the Hyderabad division and donated Rs. 40,000 for their relief. In the same month a 9-member Pakistani businessmen delegation went to Peking to discuss the expansion of trade between the two countries and China offered an interest-free loan of \$60 million to Islamabad on a long term basis, extending upto 30 to 40 years, for importing heavy machinery and complete plants for sugar and cement production. It was further disclosed that China was willing to accept the repayment of the loan in primary commodities and manufactured goods and to supply, on credit basis, railway coaches, wagons and rail lines as also to build railways in Pakistan.¹⁰⁶ Thus, Pakistan had the unique distinction of being the first non-communist country with an alliance with the West to receive aid from Peking.

On 12 June 1963, President Ayub made a statement in Peshawar in which he offered "all-round collaboration and cooperation" with Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. As was expected, Kabul spurned "association or defence collaboration,"¹⁰⁷ just as it had turned down the earlier Pakistani proposal, made by Ayub in 1959 at the CENTO meeting, that Afghanistan would make a useful CENTO partner, but the other two countries agreed. The result was the coming into being of RCD, Regional Cooperation and Development Agreement which was signed in Istanbul on 22 July 1964. One significant feature of this agreement was its clear and unambiguous separation or dissociation with the CENTO and was consequently in marked contrast with Ayub Khan's remarks in

1959 designed, as a loyal ally of the Western alliance system, to strengthen the CENTO. Ostensibly the RCD was meant for economic cooperation among its members—to reduce post, telegraph and telephone rates, visa formalities and custom barriers and possibly merge some shipping and airline services—the main motivation was political. It sprang from Ayub's desire to see the four Muslim Powers speak with a single voice that would command an audience in the Soviet Union, the US, China and India.¹⁰⁸ The ushering in of the RCD enabled Pakistan to let Peking know that it could hope to improve relations with other members of the RCD with Pakistan acting as an intermediary. It also signified the loosening of the ties of these countries with the Western sponsored alliance system and as such was an important milestone in Pakistan's search for a new identity and assertion of independence in its foreign policy. China, therefore, hailed the RCD as a great step towards the Asian African solidarity.¹⁰⁹ Both China and Pakistan were enthusiastic participants in the Islamic conference held in Indonesia in March 1964.

In the wake of closer Sino-Pakistan relations after the signing of the border agreement, anti-American sentiments came to be voiced freely in the Pakistan National Assembly debate in July 1963, together with strong denunciation of military alliances—the SEATO and the CENTO—all of which went unchallenged from the Government side. The air transport agreement between China and Pakistan was considered "an unfortunate breach of free world security" by the State Department in Washington and called for the suspension of \$4,300,000 development loan for the improvement of Dacca airport by the US Agency for International Development (AID). The visit of George Ball, the US Under Secretary of State, to Pakistan to arrest the deterioration in relations was hardly successful and Bhutto had a cool reception in the capitals of the UK and the USA when he visited those places in the autumn of 1963.¹¹⁰

Obviously, the USA could not agree that the modest arms aid that it was providing to India endangered Pakistan's security and for that matter should be viewed with concern by Islamabad. On the other hand, Washington saw "a very real need for India to improve the quality of its defences against

the Chinese Communist threat" and believed that it was in the "national interest" of the United States to assist New Delhi. "It is important to the entire free world, *including Pakistan*" observed the US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara before the Senate Sub-committee on Defence Appropriations in February 1964, "that India should be able to defend itself against Chinese Communist aggression."¹¹¹ To pacify somewhat feelings in the United States in order not to jeopardize Pakistan's receipt of US aid,¹¹² Ayub replaced Sino-phib Foreign Secretary Dehlavi by Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States Aziz Ahmed who considered firm alliance with the USA as essential for "security, stability and development." Pakistan also signed the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, which was violently opposed by China.

A few steps taken to pacify Washington, however, did not in any way mean a decline in Islamabad's warmth for Peking. Speaking in the National Assembly on 17 July 1963, that is after the series of bilateral Indo-Pakistani talks on Kashmir and related matters had ended in failure in May 1963, Foreign Minister Bhutto administered a veiled threat against India by hinting a close military understanding with China. To quote him:

If, God, forbid, we should be involved in a clash with India, that if India were, in its frustration, to turn its guns against Pakistan, the international position being what it is, Pakistan would not be alone.

That conflict would not involve Pakistan only. An attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. This new factor that has arisen is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, wish to elucidate it any further. It would suffice to say that the national interests of another state would be involved in an Indian attack on Pakistan because that state and other states know about India's aggressive intentions and know that India is capable of embarking on aggression against other countries. Therefore, a defeated Pakistan or a subjugated Pakistan would not only mean annihilation for us but also pose a serious threat to other countries of Asia and particularly to the largest state of Asia.¹¹³

That Bhutto had the backing of his President was evident from Ayub's remark, a few days later, that Pakistan would seek Chinese protection if the western countries continued their assistance to India ¹¹⁴ In December 1963, the Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade Nan Han chen during his visit to Pakistan told his Pakistani audience "We have to build ourselves militarily, economically and financially to beat the aggressors. If ever there is a war between India and Pakistan, China will surely support Pakistan and not India" Denouncing the joint air exercises agreement between India, the United States and Britain as grave provocation directed against China, Marshal Chen Yi, in his speech at the UAR National Day reception in Peking on 23 July 1963, observed that it also "constitutes a threat to India's other neighbours, particularly to Pakistan," thereby inducing Pakistan to carry on its agitation against the western arms aid to India with vigour and determination

In February 1964 Premier Chou En lai deemed it necessary to cultivate Pakistan in a big way. He, therefore, came on a week's visit to Pakistan at the head of a 48-member team. He paid high tributes to Pakistani leaders for portraying China as a peace loving country even after Peking's massive invasion of India. Chou described it as "a valuable support to China for which the Chinese Government and people would like to express their sincere gratitude." Friendly cooperation between the two countries was considered by him as conducive to "the defence of peace in Asia and the world." Ayub, speaking at a banquet in honour of the Chinese Premier on 20 February 1964, spoke of the two countries having inherited "rich traditions of goodwill and friendship," described the signing of the Boundary Agreement as "a notable milestone" towards eliminating potential causes of friction and for further development of friendly relations, supported the convening of a second conference of Asian and African countries and also China's admission to the UN 'to play its part as a major power in its councils' and after praising China's desire for the peaceful settlement of international differences, he remarked that "the Sino Indian boundary dispute can also be resolved through peaceful negotiations." Criticizing what he called the 'massive military preparations' of India, Ayub declared that they had never

been the answer to international differences, "they only create new tensions and bring added economic miseries to needy people."¹¹⁵

The joint *communiqué*, issued at the end of Chou En-lai's visit, "expressed satisfaction" at the further development of relations between China and Pakistan "particularly since the signing of the Pakistan-China boundary agreement in March 1963" and pleaded for "more adequate representation to the countries of Asia and Africa in the organs of the United Nations and in the specialised agencies." The rapid progress in Asia and Africa of the movement for national independence and the advancement of many countries "on the road to independent development" was noted and the time was considered propitious for convening "a second conference of Afro-Asian countries." In return for Pakistan's support to the second-Bandung idea, Chou En-lai agreed with Ayub in expressing the hope that "the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan."¹¹⁶

Addressing a press conference in Dacca on 25 February 1964, Premier Chou En-lai remarked that he was "convinced" by Ayub's explanation that Pakistan's aim in joining the SEATO was "defence, not aggression against others" and asserted the theme of Asia for Asians and opposed foreign interference in Asian Affairs "which should be settled by the Asians themselves." He also welcomed the Pakistani efforts and its offer of good offices in regard to the improvement of Sino-American relations.¹¹⁷ In an interview with the correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan Safdar Ali Qureshi in Dacca on 26 February 1964, he stated with confidence that although a treaty of friendship between China and Pakistan was not discussed "time will prove that the mutual understanding and trust shown by both parties in the talks will open up broader prospects for the development of relations of friendly co-operation between the two countries." Chou also mentioned the strengthening of the Asian-African peoples' unity against imperialism, winning and safeguarding the national independence of Asian-African countries, promoting their economic cooperation and defending world peace as the main topics on which he expected "extensive discussions" to take place at the

second Asian African conference ¹¹⁶

The outstanding result, as Pakistan's Foreign Minister Arshad Husain later put it, of Chou En lai's visit to Pakistan in February 1964 had been his support for Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir dispute. Such direct and open support had not been given before. The refusal of China, during the official level border talks with India in 1960 to discuss with India the boundary between Sinkiang and Kashmir west of the Karakoram Pass, that is Baltistan—the region under the occupation of Pakistan signified that Peking was not prepared to accept either *de facto* or *de jure* Indian sovereignty over the whole of Kashmir. The Chinese negotiations with Pakistan about that boundary and the signing of a border agreement with Islamabad was a further shift in the Chinese attitude on Kashmir in favour of Pakistan. But neither that nor Chen Yi's banquet speech in Peking on 3 March 1963, in which he expressed hope about the Kashmir question being 'settled peacefully by the two sister countries Pakistan and India' ¹¹⁷ meant that Peking was standing four square on the side of Islamabad so far as the solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan was concerned. Even the joint communique of 4 March 1963 did not go beyond expressing Chinese 'appreciation of the attitude of the Pakistan Government in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute' and the 'belief that expeditious settlement of this question would be conducive to peace in Asia and in the world'. Likewise Premier Chou En lai, in this interview with the correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan in Peking as it appeared in the *Dawn* of 11 April 1963, took a non-committal attitude as to how a settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan was to be brought about. He merely stated 'We have always cherished the hope that India and Pakistan would settle the Kashmir issue and other issues between them in a friendly way'. Thus, it was only in February 1964 that Peking went all out in support of the Pakistani stand on Kashmir. It was for that matter that Chou En lai's endorsement of Pakistan's stand in the matter was valued highly in Islamabad. To quote Arshad Hussain

China's unequivocal stand brought about a qualitative change in the international situation bearing on the Kashmir dispute. It influenced the previously entrenched

position of some socialist states in favour of India to a more realistic and correct posture and also of communist parties in various parts of the world. China's stand has also influenced the opinion of many non-aligned Afro-Asian countries. China's strong support for the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris has definite and significant implications not only because China is a great power but also because China is a regional Power with a common border with Kashmir in the Ladakh.¹²⁰

Peking's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue was not one-sided. Soon after China responded favourably in February 1962 to Pakistan's formal proposal about boundary negotiations, Peking tried to enmesh Islamabad in its net of the second Bandung strategy. Thus, Chen Yi, speaking at Pakistan's National Day reception in Peking on 23 March 1962, reminded Pakistan, as a participant in the 1955 Bandung Conference, of its "noble duty of supporting the peoples of various countries in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, promoting solidarity among Asian and African countries and safeguarding world peace."¹²¹

True to his mentor's wishes, Bhutto, in his speech in the National Assembly on 27 November 1962, made a determined effort to establish Pakistan's image in the Arab and Afro-Asian world when he condemned India for recognizing Israel and not recognizing Algeria¹²² and in his banquet speech in Peking on 3 March 1963 observed:

We in Pakistan believe that the resurgence of independent countries in Asia and Africa, accompanied by the pressing demands of awakening national aspirations, is a historic challenge and also an inspiring opportunity.

Chen Yi not only characterized the signing of the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement making "an important contribution to the cause of Asian-African solidarity" but also described India's anti-China posture and her acceptance of US military aid as posing "a serious menace to the peace of Asia." All the countries and people "who treasure Asian peace and Asian-African solidarity cannot but feel uneasy and disquiet," he added.¹²³ Likewise, Chou En-lai, in his interview with the correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan on 31 March 1963, made a powerful attempt to discredit India in the eyes of the Afro-Asian community and to induce that community to change its view about Pakistan and accept Islamabad in its

fold India, he said, was manifestly siding with the imperialists while Pakistan had joined the ranks of anti-imperialist fighters. Chou En-lai advocated the convening of the second Afro-Asian conference in these words:

We support and advocate the convening of a second Afro-Asian conference which will include all the Asian and African countries, aligned or non-aligned, but the Western imperialists and colonialists will be excluded. The first Bandung conference raised high the banner of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and under its influence some Asian countries, and in particular some African countries gained initial independence, subjecting the old and new colonialists to continuous opposition, blows and setbacks on the continents of Asia and Africa.¹²¹

Premier Chou En-lai also expressed his opposition to another Belgrade type non aligned conference, the convocation of which, he said 'is now in preparation'. The USA, he added, appreciated very much 'this kind of non-alignment' (which includes Yugoslavia as well as India) and wanted to make use of it to cover up its "actual domination". During Liu Shao-chi's visit to Indonesia, a joint communique was signed in Djakarta on 20 April 1963. It said:

The Chinese Government expressed full support for the Indonesian Government's proposal to convene a second Asian-African conference, and expressed its conviction that the convocation of this conference would certainly make positive contributions to the common cause of the Asian-African peoples in strengthening their solidarity and cooperation, opposing imperialism and defending world peace.

Chou En-lai, while talking to some Asian and African journalist delegations in Peking, included Pakistan in the "ranks of anti-imperialist fighters" and criticized India for "manifestly siding with imperialists". He held the Indian troops responsible for the murder of the Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba and pointed to the welcome accorded to Pakistani troops in West Irian by the Indonesian President Sukarno.

During his visit to Pakistan in June 1963, President Sukarno of Indonesia enlisted the support of President Ayub in calling the holding of a second Asian African Conference. That this enjoyed full support of Peking was evident from the fact that the news about a second Bandung, mentioned in the

Ayub-Sukarno joint *communiqué* of 27 June 1963, was broadcast by Peking radio and carried by the *People's Daily* the next day.

In his reply letter to Chou En-lai on 1 September 1963, Foreign Minister Bhutto welcomed and supported the Chinese proposal about convening a conference of the Heads of Government of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. If that proposal was not acceptable in the first instance, Bhutto suggested, "the earliest possible convening of a second Asian-African conference" for considering the Chinese proposal and undertaking "all preliminary steps that may be necessary to convene a world conference at the heads of Government level."¹²⁵ These views were reiterated in Ayub's letter to Chou En-lai on 2 December 1964 welcoming the carrying out of the first nuclear test by China as "a most impressive achievement of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people" and describing Peking's acquisition of nuclear capability as further reinforcing the arguments in favour of China's participation in the UN.¹²⁶ That China very much appreciated Pakistan's adherence to the second Bandung Conference proposal was borne out by the speech of Chang Hsi-jo, Chairman of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. Speaking at a banquet given in honour of the members of the Pakistani delegation, who had come to participate in the Chinese National Day, Chang Hsi-jo not only praised Pakistan's great achievements "in recent years" in the struggle to preserve national independence and oppose external pressure and interference but also "her valuable efforts in promoting Afro-Asian solidarity and good-neighbourly relations."

The proposal to convene a Belgrade-type non-aligned conference was made in the joint *communiqué* issued from Cairo, at the end of a 5-day visit of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike on 14 October 1963. The joint *communiqué* of President Nasser and Mrs. Bandaranaike stated:

In the firm conviction and belief that better understanding among nations could be created and international tension relaxed and eventually resolved by following a policy of non-alignment, the President of the U.A.R. and the Prime Minister of Ceylon have agreed that another conference of

non-aligned countries should be held some time next year

While India welcomed the UAR-Ceylon proposal about convening another non-aligned conference, from which both China and Pakistan would be excluded, Bhutto laid stress on convening a second Afro-Asian Bandung Conference "to review the conclusions reached by the first and to revitalise and renew its pledges which still remain unfulfilled," as he put it.¹²⁷ There was not the least doubt that in that venture Bhutto had the full backing of China and also Indonesia which, while agreeing to participate in the proposed non-aligned gathering, was more concerned about securing UAR's support for the early convening of a second Bandung. Thus came into being a Peking-Pindi-Djakarta axis.

Conscious of the backing of China and Indonesia, Islamabad assumed the role of an enthusiastic champion of a second Bandung Conference and began to look towards that forum for the resolution of problems with India to its satisfaction. Bhutto condemned the "myopic and restricted view" of the pre-1958 governments of Pakistan which accounted for open and contemptuous dismissal of the role and importance in the world of the Muslim and other countries of Asia and Africa and resulted in confining the forging of good relations with only a handful of Western Powers, thereby leading to Pakistan's "isolation and a sterile position in international affairs". Bhutto saw in the emergence of a large number of Asian and African countries "on the stage of history as a positive political and moral force for peace" and shared with them not only "a past history" but also "many future hopes and aspirations as free peoples." Consequently, he visualized the countries of Asia and Africa acting as "a great and positive force for world peace for the liquidation of imperialism and colonialism and as a bulwark for protecting the independence and sovereignty of small states".¹²⁸ Ayub also saw nothing but good emerging from the joint deliberations of Afro-Asian countries and, therefore, was convinced of the need to hold their conferences "at reasonable intervals" to take stock of past events and present situations and "to evolve broader unity and to extend and deepen the sphere of cooperation". He thought that the second Afro-Asian conference would help in removing or lessening tensions in the region and that it would certainly disentangle

the "internecine disputes" among the Asian countries, such as Kashmir, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia, "by providing a forum for open and frank discussion in an atmosphere free from the inter-play of interested world forces." A second Bandung, Ayub added, was needed not only to plan collective action against the stranglehold of economic imperialism of industrially advanced countries but also "to restrain and checkmate expansionist tendencies from within our own fold," a veiled reference to India.¹²⁹

Bhutto actively participated in the Preparatory meeting of the 22 Afro-Asian countries to consider the necessary arrangements for a second Afro-Asian Conference which was held at the Ministerial level in Djakarta from 10 to 15 April 1964. In the adoption of the provisional agenda, he evinced "special interest" in the items relating to genocide, the strengthening of the UN through the implementation of its resolutions by its members and basic principles for the settlement of Afro-Asian disputes because he considered them to be of "the most direct, immediate and over-riding importance" for Pakistan. Accordingly, Bhutto found the objectives as well as the agenda of the second Bandung as having been so formulated that "Pakistan will be enabled to seek, if considered desirable or necessary, the assistance of the entire African-Asian world in finding solutions and adjustments of disputes and differences with India which have so far placed the peace and stability of this region in danger and undermined African-Asian solidarity."¹³⁰

Speaking at a press conference in Karachi, after his return from the preparatory meeting in Djakarta, Bhutto declared that he had come back from the Indonesian capital "profoundly impressed with the strength of African-Asian solidarity and enthusiasm and determination" of the participants in the meeting. He described as "groundless" the fears and misgivings that the importance of and interest in the second Bandung to be convened on 10 March 1965, might well be seriously diminished because a large number of African-Asian countries would have already participated in the second Non-aligned Conference, scheduled for October 1964 and having similar items on its agenda. The two congresses, he said, were quite different "both in their political character and scope" and nothing

would detract from "the historical significance" of the second Bandung which Bhutto wanted to make "one of the greatest international congresses of our time" The role of the non-aligned countries, he said, had "greatly diminished" while the need for the development of African-Asian solidarity "as a world force" had "become even greater" Hence the proposed non aligned conference could not, according to Bhutto, be a proper substitute for a second Bandung, which was of "momentous importance" to him In order to ensure the direction of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement satisfactory to China and Pakistan, so that it could serve their needs and interests better, Bhutto lent strong support to Peking in opposing the Indian proposal in regard to inviting the Soviet Union to the second African Asian Conference He did not think that the USSR, with its capital in Moscow and being essentially a European Power, could "by any criteria of geography" be considered as an Asian Power and expressed the fear that if the Soviet Union were invited, the second African-Asian Conference might well become "a cockpit of the Sino-Soviet conflict instead of a forum for the consolidation and further development of African-Asian solidarity"¹³¹

Commenting on the "extremely significant and substantial" contribution of President Ayub in the field of foreign relations, Pakistan's Education Minister A T M Mustafa observed in October 1964 that Ayub had raised Pakistan's prestige abroad This, he said, had been done by putting Pakistan "on the map of the world as one of the main spokesmen for Asia and Africa, an honour which has been made available to us for the first time in Pakistan's history"¹³² Peking was quick in appreciating Pakistan's attitude in the matter In his report on the work of government at the 1st session of the Third National People's Congress in December 1964, Premier Chou En-lai observed as follows

In recent years the Pakistani Government has pursued an independent policy and in spite of obstruction from various quarters it has persisted in developing friendly relations with China and with other Asian and African countries This accords with the interests of the Pakistani people and with those of Asian African solidarity¹³³

During Ayub's visit to China in March 1965, Chinese

leaders showed keen interest in the implementation of Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan and Chairman Liu Shao-chi described the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement as "an important contribution to Asian-African solidarity and world peace," noted fruitful cooperation of the two countries in the preparatory meeting for the second Afro-Asian Conference and spoke of both China and Pakistan as "big countries in Asia" actively making "joint efforts for the successful convening" of that conference. Since he considered the strengthening of friendly cooperation between the two countries as of "great significance to the promotion of Asian-African solidarity and the defence of world peace," Liu Shao-chi described friendship with Pakistan "a long term policy."¹³⁴ Ayub, on his part, confirmed this "long term policy" of friendship with China and expressed the belief that "by concerting our efforts, we can contribute greatly towards the success of the second Asian-African Conference to be held in Algiers next June."¹³⁵

At a press conference, lasting over 100 minutes, Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, denounced India, though without naming it, when he referred to countries that called themselves non-aligned but were actually aligned and opposed the second Afro-Asian meet as being in league with "imperialism." He also observed that both Ayub and Liu Shao-chi were agreed that efforts should be made to thwart the designs of these countries and to make the conference a real success. In the opinion of Chen Yi the logic that a second Bandung was not necessary after the Non-aligned Conference was "very strange and helped the imperialists and the colonialists." The Non-aligned Conference, which was attended by only 40 countries, could not replace the other far more important conference, in which about 70 countries were expected to participate, he said. While adhering to Chinese support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and asserting that "imperialists" should not be allowed to meddle in disputes existing between Afro-Asian countries, which were advised not to rely in that regard on the UN because it was controlled by the Big Powers, Chen Yi yet felt that Pakistan should be "more tactful" and, for that matter, not raise that issue in the Afro-Asian conference as that might harm Afro-Asian solidarity. China on its

part, he pointed out to Pakistani newsmen, would not raise its border dispute with India at the Conference. Chen Yi was well aware that the conference did not propose to devise a mechanism to solve such issues and that such attempts were bound to end in failure. He, therefore, only expressed his feeling that Afro Asian solidarity and cooperation against imperialism would "ultimately create an atmosphere where it would be possible to solve these disputes on the basis of understanding and accommodation."¹³⁶

In the China Pakistan joint communique of 7 March 1965, signed by Chen Yi and Bhutto, the two parties held that the attainment of economic independence was "an important condition for Asian and African countries to maintain and consolidate their political independence" and expressed firm support for the national independence movements and struggles against imperialism and all forms of colonialism in Asia and Africa. The two sides were also convinced that Asian-African solidarity had become "a great force for the complete liquidation of imperialism and all forms of colonialism" and for the development of international relations on the basis of equality of states, both large and small, the consolidation of world peace and "lasting friendship between the people of the world."¹³⁷ But as Pakistan could not afford to offend Washington, no mention was made in the communique of the US aggression in Vietnam.

In the dinner speeches by the Foreign Ministers of China and Pakistan on 25 March 1965, during Chen Yi's visit to Pakistan to sign the boundary protocol between the two countries, Chen Yi spoke of China and Pakistan as "big nations of Asia and the world" united by a common determination to eradicate the last vestiges of imperialism and colonialism from the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America and contributing to the strengthening of Asian-African solidarity and the defence of world peace. Bhutto, in his speech, described friendship between Pakistan and China as "in accord with our belief in Asian-African solidarity and our dedication to world peace."¹³⁸ On 30 March 1965 the *Hsinhua* reported that Premier Chou En lai received in Algiers Sheikh Abdullah, former Prime Minister of Kashmir, and Mirza Afzal Beg and that the reception "proceeded in a friendly

atmosphere."

The People's Daily editorial of 16 April 1965 declared that the impact of the Vietnamese peoples' heroic struggle to resist US imperialism "goes far beyond the borders of Vietnam"¹³⁹ and two days later it expressed the belief that the second Asian-African Conference "will hold the banner of Asian-African solidarity against imperialism still higher, further develop the Bandung spirit and make the Ten Bandung principles more concrete," thus carrying forward the Asian-African peoples' cause of solidarity against imperialism.¹⁴⁰ Echoing these sentiments, Bhutto spoke of the coming Afro-Asian conference as "an important landmark in relations among under-developed and oppressed countries of Asia and Africa" and stated that Pakistan proposed to make useful contribution to the deliberations in that conference.¹⁴¹ China and Pakistan continued their coordination at the preparatory meetings for the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June 1965.

Speaking in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 13 July 1965, Bhutto laid stress on the common bonds that unite Afro-Asian countries, preached the virtue of self-reliance and declared that the second Bandung would make positive contribution to the maintenance of international peace. While referring to the suggestion made by certain powers that the main problem before the Afro-Asian world was economic rather than political, when Bhutto observed that political problems were of greater importance and that economic development could be properly attended to only after the crucial political problems had been solved he was indeed following the Chinese precept of "politics in command." But he did not completely forget Pakistan's own ideological moorings for he held that the conference of Afro-Asian countries, majority of whom were the followers of Islam, would provide Pakistan with "a suitable point of contact" and lead to "greater understanding among the Muslim leaders of Africa and Asia."¹⁴²

In the wake of the developments in Indonesia, which resulted in the downfall of Sukarno—a powerful force in the Peking-Pindi-Djakarta axis and a strong advocate of a second Bandung—it became quite clear that China would not be

allowed to dominate the Afro-Asian movement. Hence Peking in a complete somersault in October 1965, came to abandon support for the second Asian-African Conference. As Pakistan had identified itself "completely with the Afro-Asian movement" and made "a definite contribution" in preparing for the second Afro-Asian Conference, to quote Ayub's words, the failure of the attempt to convene the second Bandung came as "a great disappointment." Though at that time Ayub felt that "a dream had been shattered and that it would take a long time before the pieces could be put together again," he did not give up hope of ushering in "a major constellation extending from Casablanca to Djakarta," the seeds of which he saw in the RCD, so that the Third World, "a universe of the developing countries," could "confront the developed world." In being faithful to the Chinese dogmas and susceptibilities, Ayub could not, at the same time, help ignoring the ideological base of Pakistan itself and consequently often confused that "constellation" with a Muslim grouping as he found most of the countries in the region from Casablanca to Djakarta "suspect in the eyes of the major powers" because they professed faith in Islam. He would not, likewise, give up his anti-India bias for he accused India of "big power illusion," of subverting Afro-Asian solidarity, of turning the proposed second Afro-Asian Conference "into an arena of Sino-Soviet tussle" by insisting on the Soviet participation in the conference, and of "deep pathological hatred for Muslims and hostility to Pakistan." He, therefore, concluded that India would "never tolerate a Muslim grouping near or far from her borders."¹⁴

In short, the boundary agreement with Pakistan was indeed the master stroke of Chinese diplomacy. It helped Peking to drive a wedge between India and Pakistan, to prove its reasonableness as against Indian intransigence, to cope with the problem of Turkic-Muslim unrest in the sensitive Sinkiang region, to confront India and the USSR more effectively by drawing Pakistan to its side and to minimize the sting of the anti-Chinese US alliance system by cultivating Islamabad.

4 The Indo-Pakistan Conflict of 1965

WITH its armed strength growing day by day, as a result of supplies from the West, Pakistan began to have confidence in its military might and think in terms of sorting out its problems with India by means of war. In 1961, Ayub Khan labelled cease-fire in Kashmir as a "grip around our neck," which indicated that Islamabad was getting impatient about grabbing Kashmir from Indian hands. In 1962, the UN Security Council failed to adopt even a mild resolution urging India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations. During 1962-63, the six rounds of India-Pakistan talks started on the initiative of the United States and Britain in the wake of the Sino-Indian conflict, proved fruitless. The situation created in the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the theft of a holy relic in 1964 provided Pakistan another opportunity to raise the issue in the UN Security Council. This time no formal resolution could be tabled. Even an attempt to evolve a consensus on asking the Secretary-General to assist the parties to negotiate a settlement proved ineffective. Likewise the joint statement on Ayub's meeting with Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri in October 1964, which spoke of promoting "better understanding" between the two countries and settling "outstanding problems and disputes on an honourable and equitable basis"¹ held no hopes for Islamabad for the solution of the Kashmir dispute to the satisfaction of Pakistan.

That Pakistan was getting angry at these frustrations was reflected in the statements of the Pakistani leaders. Thus Z.A. Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, speaking in September 1964 characterized G M. Sadiq as "the puppet premier of the

India-held Kashmir,' and declared that the time had come when the patience of the people of Jammu and Kashmir had been completely exhausted and exhorted "all the leaders of the Liberation Movement on both sides of the cease-fire line" to unite and direct all their energies and talents for "the overthrow of colonial domination in Kashmir"² Inaugurating the session of the Pakistan Organization for Afro Asian Solidarity a little later, Bhutto warned the Afro Asian countries against the emergence of "a new form of colonialism which has found its most aggressive manifestation in Indian occupied Kashmir."³ That was the time when a high powered Chinese delegation, led by the Chief of the Chinese Air Force was visiting Pakistan and having secret talks with Pakistani officials, which were seen as leading to military collusion, if not a formal agreement between the two countries

In January 1965, the National Assembly of Pakistan voiced a strong protest against "India's stranglehold on Kashmir" and demanded determined measures "to help Kashmiris liberate themselves" When speaking on his adjournment motion on that subject, Maulvi Mufu Mahmood observed that if the Government failed "in their last attempt" to settle the Kashmir issue peacefully, it might be decided 'through Jihad' The Leader of the House in the Assembly Khan A Sahur assured him that Pakistan would do its utmost 'for the liberation of the 50 lakh people in the held state of Jammu and Kashmir' and warned India that if she continued to ignore the voice of reason, "the consequences might be disastrous."⁴ President Ayub endorsed that warning in his nationwide broadcast on 1 February 1965 when he observed that if a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute was not found 'the final solution will mean a greater loss to India' ⁵

Though the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 was the result of Pakistani frustrations in getting a satisfactory solution to the Kashmir problem and over confidence in its military strength, it could, at the same time, be said that it was, in a way, the direct result of Sino-Pakistani collusion The Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade Nan Han-chen, during his visit to Pakistan in December 1963, remarked 'If ever there is war between India and Pakistan, China will surely support Pakistan and not India' Marshal Chen Yi, who accompanied Premier

Chou En-lai during his visit to Pakistan in February 1964, observed that the two neighbouring countries, China and Pakistan, were confronted with a common fighting task. In the light of these remarks, Bhutto's statement, in the National Assembly on 17 July 1963 that in any conflict with India, "Pakistan would not be alone" as that would also involve "the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia" (Bhutto called "this new factor" as "very important") acquired the character of a positive assurance from Peking. In these circumstances, it was not quite unnatural for Peking to point to Pakistan its exploits against India in the 1962 war as an example. It was not without significance that soon after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, the Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University confided to a western writer that with no strings attached to the US aid, Pakistan and India might soon be facing each other across their Punjabi frontiers with American tanks and guns.⁶ Commenting on the possibility of war about Kashmir Herr Erwin Erasmus Koch wrote in the *Generalanzeiger* (Bonn) on 2 April 1964: "Peking is fanning the fire, because a war about Kashmir would separate Pakistan completely from her alliances with the West, the SEATO and the CENTO, and would draw her to Red China's side."

Thus encouraged by Chinese persuasions and promises of support, the military dictatorship of Pakistan became bold in staging border incursions and provocations against India and in organizing subversive activities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The number of cease-fire violations increased very much in the year 1964 and Pakistan began to think in terms of sorting out matters with India by the use of force. Thus, on 4 December 1964, when the Home Minister Shri Gulzari Lal Nanda announced in the Lok Sabha the decision of the President of India to make Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan protested to the Indian High Commission in Pakistan and addressed a communication to the United Nations in which it threatened India with "disastrous consequences" in case Article 356 and 357 of the Constitution were applied to Kashmir. Before the announcement of the Indian Home Minister, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Bhutto, threatened India's disintegration if "plans to integrate" the State of

Jammu and Kashmir continued and after the announcement vouchsafed to "fight to the last moment" and teach India "a lesson". In March 1965, the Dacca paper *Azad* of 11 March 1965 demanded "living space" from India for the rehabilitation of Muslims evicted from India.

Bhutto's Government attempted to teach India a lesson when surreptitious intrusions into Indian territory were started by the Pakistan Rangers in the beginning of 1965 on the Gujarat-West Pakistan border. Pakistan forcibly occupied Kanjarkot and established a standing post there. Later, Pakistan launched full-scale military attacks with tanks and artillery, on four Indian posts, namely, Point 84, Sardar, Vigokot and Chhad Bet, six to eight miles deep into Indian territory south of the Gujarat-West Pakistan (Kutch Sind) border. While asserting its claim to all these posts and declaring the northern half of the Rann to be a disputed territory (India considered Kutch Sind border to be well defined though partly demarcated), Pakistan demanded the vacation of all territory north of the 24th parallel by the Indian military and civil forces and categorically "turned" "negotiations" with India on that "dispute". Elated with its success in Kanjarkot and Sardar, Pakistan showed no interest in reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.⁶

The part played by the People's Republic of China before and during the Rann of Kutch crisis was quite significant. Soon after Pakistan started its intrusions into Indian territory in Kutch, Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, stated during President Ayub Khan's visit to China, while talking to Pakistani newsmen on 6 March 1965, that China was not afraid "to offend an aggressor" and that Peking would go to the assistance of every friend if asked for against an aggressor. He added that China could never forget the support Pakistan had given during the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 and observed "rest assured, we would not disappoint you".⁷

Speaking at the banquet given in honour of President Ayub Khan on 2 March 1965, Chairman Liu Shao chi characterized Ayub as "an outstanding statesman of Pakistan and an esteemed friend of the Chinese people" who had scored "marked success in opposing foreign interference and pursuing an independent policy". He called both China and Pakistan

as "big countries in Asia" and spoke of the two countries having given "sympathy and support to each other in the cause of safeguarding our respective independence and State sovereignty." He concluded the speech by expressing the belief that Ayub Khan's visit to China would contribute to "the common cause of strengthening China-Pakistan friendship, promoting Asian-African solidarity and safeguarding world peace."¹⁰

Addressing the Peking rally on 5 March 1965 Ayub assured his Chinese friends of the "close friendly cooperation" between the two countries who, he said, were united by a "common determination to eradicate the last vestiges of imperialism and colonialism in all their forms from the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America." Premier Chou En-lai, in his speech, observed that "with continued concerted efforts from both sides, Sino-Pakistan friendship will develop further on the existing basis."¹¹ The exchange of views was continued when Chen Yi visited Pakistan towards the end of March 1965 and Bhutto held talks with Premier Chou En-lai on 2 April 1965 in Karachi which were described by Bhutto as a "follow up" of the talks he had with Chen Yi in March 1965.¹² Before his departure from Pakistan Foreign Minister Chen Yi extended an invitation to Sheikh Abdullah to visit China. Announcing this invitation on 27 March 1965, Bhutto declared that Pakistan was capable of defending itself against all aggression.¹³ This confidence on the part of Bhutto was obviously the product of Chinese assurances that Pakistan could get moral and material support from Peking in case hostilities break out between India and Pakistan.

The exchange of these visits and mutual consultations between China and Pakistan were followed by the launching of an armed attack, equipped with US Patton tanks, by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch on 9 April 1965. The Chinese press coverage during the Rann of Kutch crisis was one-sided. It was slanted in favour of Pakistan and based on Pakistani sources. The first reference to the Pakistani attack in the Rann of Kutch was contained in the *People's Daily* of 14 April 1965 under the caption "Pakistan Repulses the Fresh Indian Attack." This news-item limited itself to quoting the Pakistani paper *Morning News* of 13 April 1965. Later report-

ing on the Rann of Kutch fighting, the *Hsinhua* of 22 April 1965 quoted the Associated Press of Pakistan to the effect that the Indian forces were planning to consolidate their occupation by establishing military posts and that in an "effective counter action" the Indian forces were 'thrown back with heavy losses' It added that "Pakistan border forces in the Rann of Kutch had to move forward in order to prevent India from establishing new forward military posts in the disputed territory" It found fault with India for not giving assurance in respect of 'its military preparations in the disputed area' and played up India's rejection of Pakistan's cease fire proposals suggesting that both India and Pakistan withdraw their civilian and military personnel from the 'disputed territory' In this way and in accusing India of disturbing the *status quo*, Peking sought to draw parallel between Indian action *vis a-vis* Pakistan and in relation to China itself during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and tried to blame India for adopting an intransigent attitude for not being interested in peaceful negotiations

The official Chinese reaction was contained in the *Hsinhua* of 4 May 1965 when it was "authorised" to make a statement on the Indian Government's slander against China in connection with the Indo-Pakistan border conflict This "authorised" statement accused India of provoking armed conflict in the Rann of Kutch and of attempting to forcibly occupy the disputed territory by armed attack By stating that the Indo-Pakistan border in the Rann of Kutch 'has never been delimited,' Peking accepted Pakistan's case in its entirety and in adding "the area is a disputed territory, left behind by history," it sought to find a similarity with its own border problem with India The *People's Daily* article of 5 May 1965 went further when it observed that before the partition of India and Pakistan 'the northern part of the Rann of Kutch about 3500 sq miles, was under the administration of the Province of Sind' ¹¹ The official Chinese statement published in the *Hsinhua* of 4 May 1965 also blamed India for having gone back on the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of 1960 which, it added, was 'the crux of the present Indo-Pakistan border conflict.'

In order to project the image of an intransigent, unreason

able India which was unmindful of Afro-Asian interests and served the interests of US imperialists, the *Hsinhua* of 4 May 1965 asserted: "Events show that India's neighbours have often been subjected to its bullying and interference." India's present conflict with Pakistan was stated to be yet another instance of India's "big nation chauvinism and expansionism" of which China itself has had experience during the Sino-Indian border dispute. In its perverted logic, China accused India of following the maxim: "My territory is mine, yours is also mine." The *Hsinhua* statement referred to India as being "a pawn of the United States in its anti-China crusade and a party to the evil imperialists scheme of making Asians fight Asians" and disrupting Afro-Asian solidarity of which both Pakistan and China were said to be emerging as true guardians. By following its present policy, the *Hsinhua* statement added, the Indian Government "has made itself more isolated than ever before in the world and intensely hated by its own people." The arrogant behaviour of China was reflected in the "advice" Peking gave to the Indian Government "to give primary consideration to the interests of the Indian people and to the Afro-Asian solidarity and thereby settle its disputes with the neighbouring countries through peaceful negotiations." The authorized *Hsinhua* statement of 4 May 1965 concluded with the threat that if India insisted on having her own way and continued to "play with fire" and widened armed conflict, she would certainly come to no good end.¹⁵

Both China and Pakistan had sought to create border disputes with India by trying to alter the *status quo* by the use of military force. Their efforts for mutual withdrawal were designed to leave India defenceless in the border regions. Thus, when Pakistan attempted to emulate China in the Rann of Kutch crisis, Peking was delighted to extend its strong support to its partner in aggression against India and thereby encourage Pakistan to take further actions to humiliate India. The main objectives of Peking in following the attitude stated above in the Rann of Kutch conflict between India and Pakistan were to find justification for its own case on Sino-Indian border issue by accusing India of an intransigent and unreasonable posture—first by its denial of the existence of dispute and later spurning negotiations to solve that dispute;

to create illwill and discord between India on the one hand and her neighbours on the other, by portraying India as a chauvinist and expansionist power bent upon bullying and interfering in the affairs of her neighbours, lastly to discredit India in the eyes of the Afro-Asian countries by depicting India as a pawn of the US imperialists

The visit of President Ayub Khan to the Soviet Union from 3 to 11 April 1965 was an attempt to persuade the Soviet leaders not to support India in her disputes with Pakistan. The visit of Pakistan's President, which was the first of its kind, was not without success. It helped not only in removing some of the misunderstandings between the two countries but also ensured a neutral attitude on the part of the Soviet Union during the Rann of Kutch crisis. Thus, when Pakistan launched its major assault towards the end of April 1965 by moving its troops in the Rann of Kutch, the Soviet leaders adopted a non-committal attitude in the conflict by refusing to go into the merits of the case. Moscow advised both India and Pakistan not to weaken each other and threaten peace in the region as it was only "the imperialist circles of the western powers" which stood to gain by such a conflict.¹⁶

Side by side with attempts to use force in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan mounted heavy attacks on the night of 16/17 May 1965 on Indian picquets in the Kargil area with a view to disrupt the Indian line of communication to Leh over which supply moved for the Indian troops facing the Chinese forces on the northern border of India. For the defence of this vital Srinagar-Leh Road, India had to take effective action which resulted in dislodging Pakistan from two of its posts. These posts were vacated by the Indian forces following assurances from the UN observers against the repetition of Pakistani attacks on the vital supply route and the posting of the UN observers at Kargil and Skardu.

By taking up the "dispute" in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan sought to resuscitate or rather draw the attention of the world towards the Kashmir question and to establish for that the principle of arbitration, which was provided in the Rann of Kutch agreement signed by India and Pakistan on 30 June 1965 as a result of the good offices of the British Government.

The British efforts to arrange arbitration in the Rann of

Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan was quite palatable to Pakistani leaders. During the critical situation created by the Kutch war, Pakistan did not want to displease the United States either. As such, Foreign Minister Bhutto did not mind signing the communique issued by the London meeting of the SEATO Council in May 1965 which contained the charge that the aggression against South Vietnam was organized and directed by the communist regime in North Vietnam. Thus, Pakistan seemed to take full account of the American sensitivity in Vietnam. Earlier in May 1963 Islamabad achieved a settlement with Kabul through the good offices of the Shah of Iran, thereby ensuring conditions of peace and security along its 1,450 mile border with Afghanistan and in 1964 Ayub Khan reached an agreement with General Ne Win of Burma on the East Pakistan-Burma border problem.

In its confrontation with India, it was not sufficient to enlist the support of China and to take reinsurance measures on the external front vis-a-vis other powers which counted in the matter, while there was turmoil and discontent within the territory. The struggle of the democratic forces was on the upsurge despite the fact that the communist party continued to be declared illegal throughout Pakistan and the leaders of the liberal democratic parties such as those of the National Awami Party, Awami League and the National Democratic Front were being rounded up every day and detained without trial or subjected to harassment on charges of sedition. "In the case of East Pakistan in particular," observed J. M. Kaul in the *New Age*, political monthly of the Communist Party of India, "the popular struggle against the Ayub regime has acquired the character of a national struggle for liberation from what is considered an alien domination."¹⁷

Maulana Bhashani, leader of the National Awami Party, had threatened to launch a civil disobedience struggle from the middle of December 1963 to secure the release of political prisoners and the restoration of democratic rights. Quiet on the home front was most essential for Ayub in any conflict with India and in this field also Communist China proved to be of immense help to the military dictator of Pakistan. Maulana Bhashani was invited to Peking to participate in the October Day celebrations. He spent almost two months in

China and had long talks with the Chinese leaders who effected "brain wash" on him. As a result of it, Maulana Bhashani, soon after his return to Pakistan, announced that he was calling off the civil disobedience struggle and he stated that his talks with the Chinese leaders had convinced him that other issues were "trifling matters" compared to the task of organizing the people for the defence of the country. Maulana Bhashani offered to cooperate with the Ayub regime in this task. The need to defend the country had become imperative in view of the danger from India. Leaving no doubt about the Chinese inspiration, Maulana Bhashani went on to remark "If Dange could support the Nehru Government against China, there was no reason why he should not support Ayub against the aggressive designs of India."¹⁸

Feeling secure on both domestic and external fronts, encouraged by the Chinese support which was evident in Premier Chou En lai again stopping over in Karachi on 9 June 1965, and elated by its performance in the Rann of Kutch, the military regime of Pakistan under Ayub came to think of bigger exploits against India. Accordingly, Pakistan started sending infiltrators on a large scale in Jammu and Kashmir which led to the Indo-Pakistan conflict of September 1965. According to the report of the UN Secretary General (S/6651), the series of violations that began on 5 August 1965 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease fire line from the Pakistani side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This conclusion was reached on the basis of investigations carried out by the UN Observers. One had the first test of the Sino-Pakistani collusion during the Rann of Kutch crisis, but during the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965 this collusion could be seen working band in band in full force.

Like the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 was an important landmark in the relations between China and Pakistan. From the moment Pakistan mounted the massive attack on the Chhamb sector, China gave consistent support to Pakistan and condemned India. Pakistan's Ambassador Raza held talks with the Chinese Prime Minister on 3 September 1965. Marshal Chen Yi flew to Karachi on 4 September 1965 and had a long meeting with Pakistan's Foreign

Minister. After the meeting, Chen Yi declared that China supported "the Kashmir people's just struggle to resist Indian tyrannical rule" and also "Pakistan's just action in hitting back at armed Indian provocations."¹⁹

The Observer's article in the *People's Daily* of 5 September 1965 not only characterized "the armed uprising" in Kashmir as "an inevitable result of the Indian Government's reactionary rule...communal oppression and political persecution," but also accused India of violating the cease-fire line, launching armed provocations against Pakistan and adopting the policy of bullying and threatening her neighbours (India's provoking of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959 as well as the clashes in the Rann of Kutch area were cited as specific cases in point). The Observer's commentary went on to observe that the policy of Indian reactionaries of carrying out "this unscrupulous expansionism cannot be separated from the backing and instigation of the United States and some other big powers." The economic and military aid received by India from the United States and the "Khrushchev revisionist" was mentioned in that regard.²⁰

The Chinese Government's statement, issued on 7 September 1965 after India had launched a counter-offensive against Pakistan, condemned India for what it called "an act of naked aggression" in pursuit of its "chauvinist and expansionist" policies and that of bullying its neighbours with the "backing of the U.S. imperialists and the modern revisionists." The Chinese Government's statement referred to the massive armed attack on China by India in October 1962 and to India's continuance of intrusions and provocations along the Sino-Indian border thereafter. Voicing its concern over India's "armed aggression against Pakistan," the Chinese statement observed "India's aggression against any one of its neighbours concerns all of its neighbours" and warned New Delhi that "it cannot evade responsibility for the chain of consequences arising therefrom."

On the Kashmir question, the Chinese Government statement of 7 September 1965 found fault with India for brazenly declaring Kashmir as an integral part of India and accused India of subjecting the Kashmir people "to brutal national oppression." The Indo-Pakistan conflict, prior to India's launch-

ing of its counter-offensive, was described as "in the nature of a local conflict in the disputed territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan" The Chinese statement supported the right of "national self determination" for Kashmir It called the report of the Secretary General "unfair" and the United Nations was described as having proved "a tool of US imperialism and its partners in their attempt to control the whole world" ²¹ The Chinese observations and statements of 5 and 7 September were to be seen against the background of Pakistani Ambassador Raza's interviews with Chou En-lai on 4 and 7 September

In order to give more effective support to Pakistan and to put pressure on India, the Chinese Foreign Ministry deemed it necessary to address a protest note to India on 8 September 1965 against what it called serious violations of Chinese territory and sovereignty by Indian troops and thereby attempting to involve itself with the Indo-Pakistan conflict and preparing ground for opening a second front against India, in case it was considered necessary The Chinese note reflected more complete identity of Chinese views with Pakistan and more active Chinese interest in the Indo-Pak conflict The Chinese protest note demanded that India dismantle all the aggressive military structures it had illegally built beyond or astride the China-Sikkim border, withdraw its aggressive armed forces and stop its acts of aggression and provocation against China in the western middle and eastern sectors of the Sino Indian border Otherwise, it warned, India must bear the responsibility for all consequences arising from its action The Chinese note went on to add

Indian Government probably believes since it has backing of US imperialists and modern revisionists it can bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes This will not do Aggression is aggression India's aggression against any one of its neighbours concerns all its neighbours Since Indian Government has taken first step in committing aggression against Pakistan it cannot evade responsibility for chain of consequences arising therefrom ²²

The collusion between China and Pakistan was proved, among other things, by the fact that the day China addressed its note of 8 September 1965, Ayub Khan of Pakistan, in a letter to the UN Secretary General, warned that the conflict in

the Indian sub-continent was bound to assume "graver and wider dimensions."²³

On 9 September 1965, speaking on the occasion of the 17th Anniversary of the founding of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, Prime Minister Chou En-lai characterized the Indian reactionaries as "out-right aggressors both in the local conflict in Kashmir and in the general conflict between India and Pakistan." He pointed out that India would not have engaged in such a serious military adventure "without the consent and support of the United States" and the encouragement "of the modern revisionists" who had also played a most "unseemly role." Collaborating with one another, they were "using the United Nations to make insistent appeals for peace without distinguishing between right and wrong." Chou En-lai further observed:

If peace is to be safeguarded, aggression must be opposed. To appeal for peace without distinguishing between right and wrong will only encourage the aggressor. India's acts of aggression posed a threat to peace in this part of Asia and China cannot but closely follow the development of the situation. ...The Chinese Government firmly supports Pakistan's just struggle against aggression and the Kashmir people's struggle for freedom and the right of national self-determination; it resolutely condemns India for its crimes and aggression and strongly warns the Indian Government that it must bear full responsibility for all consequences arising from its extended aggression.²⁴

The *People's Daily* editorial of 11 September 1965 described the August events in Kashmir as "an armed uprising...to oppose Indian tyranny and demand self-determination of their own future. This was "an entirely just action" and there was no question of Pakistani "infiltration." Drawing comparison with the Sino-Indian conflict, it stated that the tactics which India applied against China in the past "are now being used against Pakistan."²⁵

The *People's Daily* editorial of 14 September 1965 was entitled "UN Sanctuary for the Indian aggressor." It was an attack on the role of U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and that of the United Nations Security Council. The UN Secretary-General was criticized for taking sides with India in his report of 4 September 1965 and the two resolutions

of the UN Security Council dated 4 and 6 September 1965 were likewise castigated as 'in favour of India'. In undertaking his mission to India and Pakistan on the basis of these resolutions, U Thant was described as "merely acting as Washington's political broker". In the words of the *People's Daily* editorial, the UN had become "a sanctuary for the Indian aggressor" and 'a tool of US imperialism' which had done much evil and "cannot do anything good"²⁶

This scathing criticism against the United Nations efforts to arrange the cease fire between India and Pakistan was intended to prolong the Indo-Pakistan conflict. A protracted war between India and Pakistan not only fitted well into Mao's dogma but also would have weakened both India and Pakistan and no one would have been benefited more from such a situation than China itself. Accordingly, Peking wanted Pakistan to reject the cease-fire proposals, withstand the pressure of the two super powers and to continue the fight with India. In order to make Pakistan follow such a course of action, Peking thought it necessary to come out more openly in support of Pakistan so as to steel its nerves. This was done by giving India a 72-hour ultimatum asking India to dismantle within 3 days the "aggressive military works," return the alleged kidnapped men and sheep and yaks and promise to refrain from any more "harassing activities across the territory". The Chinese note of 16 September 1965 further added

The question now is that India has not only refused to recognise the right of the Kashmir people to self-determination, but openly launched an all out armed attack against Pakistan, this cannot but arouse the grave concern of the Chinese Government. So long as the Indian Government persists in its unbridled aggression against Pakistan, China will not cease supporting Pakistan in her just struggle against aggression.

The overt threat from China came at a very crucial time when serious efforts were being made by the United Nations to arrange a cease fire between India and Pakistan. Peking followed its 16 September ultimatum and open threat of grave consequences for crossing the border of Sikkim by another ultimatum on 19 September 1965 which gave another three days to India for dismantling the military structures and for returning the so-called kidnapped Chinese citizens and stolen

cattle. In its note of 19 September 1965, the Chinese Government considered itself "linked with all the other neighbouring countries" which India was "bullying" because of the Indian Government's "expansionism" and reiterated its "all-out support to Pakistan in her just struggle against Indian aggression." That these trumped up charges contained in the two Chinese ultimatums were allowed to die down quietly after Pakistan accepted the 20 September 1965 cease-fire resolution of the Security Council, adopted by the United Nations Security Council, brought out the real motive behind the Chinese action during the Indo-Pakistan conflict, which was to prolong the conflict by influencing Pakistan not to accept the cease-fire, thereby create more problems for the two super powers, complicate their task, and to profit by the aggravation and prolongation of the conflict which would have led to weakening of both India and Pakistan and the creation of unstable conditions in the sub-continent—a fertile ground for Peking to assert its influence.

The Soviet attitude during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 was quite different from that of China, which gave unstinted support to Pakistan by encouraging it to continue the fight, and tried to aggravate the situation with an eye to prolong the Indo-Pakistan conflict by insisting on drawing the distinction between right and wrong, by addressing threats and ultimatums against India for allegedly violating its territorial integrity along the Sikkim border, by Chinese references to the Kashmir peoples' "just struggle to resist Indian tyrannical rule" and condemnation of India for the extended aggression against Pakistan. Like China, the Soviet Union was also deeply interested and concerned about the conflict in the Indian sub-continent near its borders. But Moscow's aim throughout the conflict had been to maintain its friendship with India, to preserve its newly established normalization of relations with Pakistan and to prevent Peking from exploiting the Indo-Pakistan conflict for its own use.

While Peking condemned India's counter-offensive in the Lahore sector as a case of *out and out aggression*, Moscow considered India's proceeding towards Lahore a "defensive action...to divert Pakistani forces." S. Mikoyan, writing in the *Literaturnia Gazeta* clearly recognized the validity of the

Indian point of view on such questions as Kashmir's accession to India, the plebiscite offer, and secularism and drew a contrast between conditions prevailing on the Indian side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir and in the so-called "Azad Kashmir" held by Pakistan. He even remarked that owing to the nature of the terrain and other strategic considerations, India had to move into the Lahore sector in an attempt to relieve Pakistani pressure on Kashmir. All this indicated that Moscow, as always, was showing greater preference for India. If S Mikoyan stated that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was constituted by that territory which under that name was within the Indian Union and did not include the territory of the so-called "Azad Kashmir" area which was under Pakistani occupation,²⁷ it meant that the USSR was in favour of the stabilization of the situation in the sub continent on the basis of the acceptance of the *status quo* in Kashmir.

From the very beginning of the conflict, the Soviet stress had been on the cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and peaceful settlement of outstanding issues between them. Thus, the Soviet Union offered its "good offices" to both India and Pakistan to restore peace in the area. After Peking began to involve itself in the Indo Pakistan conflict by threatening India with grave consequences for alleged violations of Chinese territory in the Sikkim sector, Moscow became particularly concerned about the developments. No sooner had China addressed its protest note to India on September 1965 on the Sino-Indian border question than Brezhnev issued a warning against "third forces" which tried to profit by the aggravation of the Indo Pakistani relations and sometimes added fuel to the fire.²⁸ As against Peking's insistence to make a distinction "between right and wrong," Premier Kosygin, in his message to both Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri offering his good offices if the parties so desired, not only pleaded for the "immediate cessation of military operations" but also declared

In the present grave situation, the main emphasis should not be placed on the question of the cause of the conflict or of ascertaining who is right and who is wrong, the main effort should be concentrated on halting the tanks and silencing the guns.²⁹

Peking sought to spoil the Soviet offers of mediation by describing Moscow as taking a partial attitude in favour of India. The Chinese reminded Pakistan that as early as 1955, by declaring Kashmir an integral part of India, the Soviet Union had supported India in what it called "sabotaging" international agreements on Kashmir and annexing it. According to Peking, the Soviet offer of "good offices" had come at a time when India was meeting firm resistance from Pakistan and beginning to suffer reverses. As such "what the Soviet leaders intended to do is, in the name of 'good offices', to aid Indian aggressors, to force Pakistan to accept India's annexation of Kashmir as legitimate."³⁰ These Chinese outbursts were made at a time when Peking had given an ultimatum to India. Consequently, seeing the "ominous threat to international security" and being concerned about the spread of hostilities that were taking place in a region immediately adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, the Soviet representative observed in the Security Council on 18 September 1965:

It is quite obvious that such a turn of events is not at all in the interest of peoples of India and Pakistan or the peoples of Asia as a whole...it is equally clear that the continuation of this conflict benefits only the forces which are pursuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples so as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims.³¹

The physical involvement or military intervention of Peking in the Indo-Pakistan conflict was ruled out by the joint stand taken by both the USA and the USSR which was reflected in their statements and attitude within and outside the United Nations. With Dean Rusk's warning to China to keep off from "fishing in troubled waters" and Chairman Zabolcki's statement that in case of Chinese attack on India, the USA would help India, Peking knew that any intervention on its part would invite retaliation and destruction by the Americans of their nuclear installations and other basic industries. But the Chinese threats, sabre-rattling at the Sikkim border and all the noise and hullabaloo made by Peking was not without effect or purpose. That made the two super powers realize the catastrophic effect of Chinese intervention on Asia and the world and compelled them to work more vigorously for achieving a cease-fire in the sub-continent. A Pakistani writer has

assessed the role of China in the Indo-Pakistan conflict in these words

Washington officials viewed the ultimatum more as a 'psychological gambit' to unnerve India and to embarrass the United States and the Soviet Union than as a military threat. Yet none of these analysts could be sure that China was merely bluffing. It had been astute in choosing the location of its threatened action. Crossing the Sikkim border in a swift manoeuvre, the Chinese could cut off Assam from the rest of India in a matter of hours. It seemed that while they did not contemplate a major attack on India, they might do something serious enough to trouble the Indians, though not big enough to evoke US military intervention. But, then, even if they merely took a few posts, India would either have to fight on two fronts or suffer another great humiliation.

China's impact on the conflict issued precisely from the uncertainty surrounding its intentions. No one knew what it would do. Some courses of action might be considered unlikely, none could be ruled out. This confronted the United States and the Soviet Union with painful choices. If China launched a major attack on India, the result might be a world war. If it made only small, pin prick advances, and the two great powers did not go to India's aid, they would alienate Delhi. And if they did aid India, they would alienate Pakistan and push it closer towards China. The Indo-Pakistan War had been a nuisance, it now became intolerable. It must be stopped.³²

The timely and strong indirect support rendered by China to Pakistan in the 1965 conflict helped Pakistan in other ways too. It was said to have led to the easing of Indian military pressure in the Sialkot sector in West Pakistan, and as Foreign Minister Bhutto asserted in the National Assembly on 15 March 1966, it was instrumental in making India desist from attacking East Pakistan which was otherwise quite indefensible and vulnerable. To quote Bhutto's words

The defence of East Pakistan and the attack on East Pakistan were the subject matter of consideration and debate between the United States representatives and Chinese People's Republic at Warsaw, and it was during this period that the United States' Ambassador to Pakistan came with the proposal that East Pakistan should be insulated and quarantined from the war. Why? Why was India so anxious not to invade East Pakistan? I say with

all responsibility at my command that India could not dare to lift its little finger on East Pakistan....

All this notwithstanding, the fact will come to light one day. The whole of the people of Pakistan will know everything in its fullest detail, with all the commas, semi-colons and full stops.³³

The fabricated allegations against India and the creation of tension on the Sikkim-Tibet border in September 1965 was a measure of direct assistance rendered by China to Pakistan. The pressure on Sikkim was obviously meant to immobilize Indian forces and thereby protect East Pakistan. Sikkim was chosen as it offered the nearest point for coming into East Pakistan. Throughout the Indo-Pak conflict and even thereafter, Peking's attitude was totally biased against India and out and out in favour of Pakistan. In the *New China News Agency* reports, India was accused of brutal suppression of Kashmiris, and student disturbances in Jammu and Kashmir were seen as a revolutionary upsurge against Indian oppression and given the name of liberation struggle *a la* Vietnam while Pakistan's attempts at creating disorder in Kashmir were ignored. Although the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri denied the existence of any revolution in Kashmir or of "any revolutionary council",³⁴ the *Hsinhua*, quoting from clandestine "Voice of Kashmir," identified the existence of a "Revolutionary Council for Kashmir" as a being with an independent entity. The Indian action against Pakistani infiltration was seen as deliberate "provocation" on the part of India. After all, how could Peking disown those who were "using Mao Tse-tung's classic principles of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir—perhaps even with Chinese advice and training."³⁵ The Pakistani attack on Chhamb was justified in the Chinese statements on grounds that India had crossed the cease-fire line in Kargil, Tithwal and Haji Pir. Further the Indian counter-measures across the Lahore-Sialkot sector were denounced as "open invasion" and "naked aggression" and the conciliatory attempts by Moscow, Washington, the United Nations or U Thant were all dismissed as pro-Indian manoeuvres. On 20 October 1965, the *Hsinhua* correspondent from Karachi alleged that 70,000 refugees had fled "Indian occupied" Kashmir to "Azad Kashmir" as a result of Indian atrocities.

President Ayub acknowledged the Chinese help in his

broadcast to the nation on 22 September 1965 in these words "the moral support which the Chinese Government extended to us willingly and generously will ever remain enshrined in our hearts" ³⁶ In a message sent to Chairman Liu-Shao-chi and Premier Chou En lai Ayub characterized the Chinese expressions of solidarity and full unstinted support as "a great source of strength to us and has greatly warmed our hearts" ³⁷ The Pakistani Foreign Minister, in his letter to his Chinese counterpart, spoke of the Chinese stand as "a source of encouragement to the people of Pakistan in repelling the aggressor" and described the Security Council resolution of 20 September 1965 as a China resolution. Speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on 21 November 1965 the Pakistani Foreign Minister read out the Chinese statement of 17 September and observed that that spontaneous support would serve as a source of inspiration "for us" and added that the support that China gave "to this country was a matter of great significance"

Even after the acceptance of cease-fire by Pakistan, the Chinese press continued in its nefarious design of creating strains in Indo-Pakistan relations and complicating matters for the two super powers in their efforts to bring about a settlement between India and Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani versions of cease-fire violations along Punjab and Rajasthan sectors were faithfully reproduced in Peking papers which, at the same time, continued to highlight alleged development of public opinion in Pakistan against the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Nations. This was in line with the Chinese attempts at criticizing UN efforts in the direction of a stable cease fire and discrediting the two super powers in Pakistani eyes by portraying their roles as pro-India in the 1965 conflict. The Ayub administration was taunted for relying on the super powers and the UN for bringing about a solution.

The statement in the Pakistani press about Moscow making good the military hardware lost by India in the conflict was republished in the Peking press in order to show that "reactionary India had the full backing of Soviet 'revisionists' in the 'just struggle' waged by Pakistan against 'Indian expansionism'". The news about the Tashkent meeting was disclosed to the Chinese people only on 12 December 1965 and it was stated that Kossygin had invited both the Indian and Pakistani

leaders to meet in Tashkent only after the Indian attack on Pakistan, thereby portraying the Soviet attitude as being biased in favour of India. Peking propaganda played on Soviet support of Indian policies with a view to deterring Islamabad from attending the Tashkent conference.

Likewise during President Ayub's visit to the United States, the Chinese press highlighted the Pakistani allegations of cease-fire violations and Ayub's anti-Indian statements. It sought to utilize such incidents as the burning of the American flag from the US Consulate in Lahore by a crowd of Pakistani youth on 9 September 1965 and the Pakistani press statement protesting against the press release issued by the US Information Service in Karachi which reminded Pakistan that its friendship with communist countries should not be used to bring pressure on India. An attempt was made to show that Washington was adopting a pro-Indian attitude and that US help to India was actually against Pakistan, no matter how much pains the White House might take to justify the same against China. Thus, Peking's aim had been to complicate Ayub's diplomatic initiative and to convince the people of Pakistan that dependence on Washington and Moscow would not be beneficial for Pakistan.

Pakistan continued to bank on Peking and utilize Chinese support for getting favourable treatment at the hands of the two super powers in whatever arrangement they devised for the solution of its problems with India. Thus, Bhutto spoke on 22 September 1965 of "a wider conflagration," implying thereby that China would get involved in the war if the Kashmir question was not solved to his satisfaction and the Pakistani letter to the UN dated 26 September 1965 talked of "the real danger of a resumption of hostilities which may lead to a conflict of much greater dimensions." These outbursts and threats had the full support of Peking. Speaking at a press conference on 29 September 1965, Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, observed.

The fact is that Pakistan is the victim of aggression and India the aggressor. Recently Indian troops have continued to launch attacks in the Lahore area...If the situation is aggravated, it is certain that the Chinese Government and people will give moral and material support to Pakistan.³⁸

That this was not mere verbosity on the part of Chen Yi was borne out by the fact that on the same day Air Marshal Ashgar Khan of Pakistan was visiting China and that he was successful in obtaining Chinese credit of the amount of \$67.5 million in foreign exchange to enable Islamahad to purchase military equipment from abroad. According to one report Peking also supplied as a gift military hardware worth over \$200 million which comprised 200 T-59 tanks, 120 MiG-19s fighter bombers 11 L-28 bombers equipment sufficient for arming two infantry divisions and other unspecified equipment.³⁹ Three Chinese T-59 tanks and 4 MiG-19s were displayed with pride at the Pakistan National Day parade in Rawalpindi on 23 March 1966. It was also reported that about 150 Pakistani pilots had received flight training in MiG-19s in China and had returned to active duty.⁴⁰

Though its September ultimatums were allowed to lapse, Peking kept the pressure on the Indian frontiers particularly as the withdrawal of troops in the sub-continent by India and Pakistan had not been accomplished and no satisfactory solution of Indo-Pak problems seemed in sight. Thus, Peking not only addressed a severe note to India on the eve of the Tashkent meeting but the Chinese troops also entered the demilitarized area in Ladakh and occupied the Thagla ridge area and Longju in the eastern sector. Peking practically remilitarized the 20 km demilitarized zone in the western sector thereby violating the provisions of the Colombo proposals as well as China's own unilateral declaration. Speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on 24 November 1965, Qasim Malik, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, observed

It was in the battlefield that friendship was tested and evolved. Who have stayed by us in this crisis was our friend. For us Hinduism was worse than communism and we would join hands with communism against it.⁴¹

5 Tashkent and After

The considerations which led Peking to take a hostile attitude towards reconciliation between India and Pakistan also accounted for China coming out against the Tashkent meeting, which was a step in that direction. What irked Peking more was that such an endeavour was being undertaken under the auspices of the USSR, an arch rival and enemy of China with the blessings of "imperialist" USA. According to the Chinese press, in promoting understanding between India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union was acting only as a henchman of US policies. Peking's was the lone voice criticizing the Tashkent Declaration and this was well reflected in the Observer's article in the *People's Daily* of 2 February 1966 in which he criticized the Soviet press for going out of its way "for obvious ulterior purposes" in peddling "the so-called Tashkent spirit" and extolling it as far exceeding the confines of the Indian sub-continent and saying that it was also "of great importance to the whole of the South East Asia." In the opinion of the Observer the Tashkent talks, though initiated by Moscow, were "a product of joint US-Soviet plotting," for as soon as Moscow put forward the proposal for such a conference, Washington voiced approval and lost no time in acclaiming the Tashkent Declaration when it was signed. He went on to remark:

During the India-Pakistan conflict both the United States and the Soviet Union instigated and encouraged the Indian aggressors and crudely pressured Pakistan which was acting in self defence to safeguard its sovereignty. Why did they work hard in close coordination afterwards to bring the Indian and Pakistani leaders together to "make peace". The

truth is the Soviet leaders went to all that trouble to conjure up a 'Tashkent spirit' for the simple reason that they wanted to continue backing up the Indian reactionaries and to use that 'spirit' to publicise their general line of 'peaceful co-existence,' in order to weaken the united struggle against imperialism in Asia and Africa. As far as US imperialism was concerned, its purpose was to make common cause against China and to push ahead with its global strategy, utilising the Soviet leaders' intervention in Asian affairs.¹

In December 1965, Ayub Khan went to Washington in his bid to clear the misunderstanding and improve relations with the USA and in January 1966 he attended, after initial hesitation, the Tashkent meeting where he agreed with India about not taking recourse to force. Soon after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, Washington suggested joint economic ventures between India and Pakistan. All this created apprehensions in the minds of the Chinese leaders who saw in it not only Pakistan's sliding towards Moscow and away from China but also signalling an end of Pakistan's confrontation with India and in course of time tending to a joint stand with New Delhi against China, a revival of the "joint defence" idea, under the combined auspices of the two super powers. That was the time when Peking was intensely concerned about the fast-developing Japanese Soviet amity, which was seen as an extension of the Soviet US collaboration. In these circumstances, it was not unnatural for China to view Moscow's support of India as "an instrument of joint US-Soviet opposition to China and a flank in the encirclement of China," to quote from the same Observer's article in the *People's Daily*. In the growing community of national interests of the two great powers, the USA and the USSR, Peking saw the emergence of "the Soviet US axis" against China.

In the light of the coincidence of the US and the Soviet interests during the Indo Pakistan conflict and their joint stand against the Chinese threat or involvement, Peking's apprehensions were not without any foundation. As early as 13 September 1965, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk commended the USSR for its "helpful" attitude on the Indian-Pakistani fighting and accused Peking of seeking to make political capital out of it.² The door was, however, kept open for the UN considering "the

political problem underlying the present conflict" in operative para 4 of the Security Council resolution of 20 September 1965 because the two super Powers wanted to prevent Pakistan from falling into Chinese arms completely and to secure Islamabad's acceptance of the cease-fire. They did not wish to write off Pakistan altogether for their purposes. Whereas Washington wanted to maintain intact all its ties with its ally, including its intelligence base near Peshawar, Moscow was interested in ensuring that Pakistan did not lean too heavily on China. It feared that China might threaten its southern flank and use Pakistan as a base from which to spread its influence in the Middle East.³ China might even mount an anti-Soviet offensive in the Muslim countries of West Asia and seek to frustrate Soviet efforts to gain access to the Indian Ocean.

During his visit to the United States, President Ayub tried to downplay Pakistan's relations with China as he must have realized that in the delicate situation then existing not much purpose would be served by stressing Pakistan's closeness to a power which was at loggerheads with both the super Powers. While justifying the use of American arms in the conflict on grounds of self-defence, Ayub must have sought the replacement of military equipment, destroyed in the war, by describing them as a loss through attrition and by pointing to the USSR making good the losses sustained by India as also the resumption of economic assistance. That Ayub's pleadings in Washington were not without effect was proved when Washington announced a new \$50 million loan to Pakistan during Vice-President Humphrey's visit to Pakistan in February 1966, the first since a freeze on new aid was imposed in July 1965 and "widely regarded as presaging a general rewarming of relations between the two nations"⁴ and the resumption of supplies of non-lethal military equipment to both India and Pakistan on 2 March 1965. As Pakistan's forces were mainly equipped with US arms it was the primary beneficiary of this resumption which amounted to resuscitation of the US-Pakistan Military Aid Agreement of 1954. Not long after, Washington came to authorize the sale of lethal weapons through third countries, particularly the NATO countries, thereby getting around its own embargo on lethal weapons. Thus, 100 American M-47 Patton tanks were sold by Italy to Pakistan at cheap rates

and four US supplied C-130-B troop transport aircraft were received by Pakistan from Iran.⁵ The USA also agreed to offer 300 000 tons of wheat to Pakistan in 1966.

Tashkent signified the beginning of reconciliation with India on the part of Pakistan "without exacting any real commitment on Kashmir"⁶ and the Tashkent declaration was welcomed by President Johnson as a "step in the right direction." At about the same time the suggestion of Arthur Lall, former Indian diplomat who became Professor in Columbia University, about the Indo Pak treaty of non-aggression guaranteed by the great powers gained currency in the United States. The Secretary of Defence McNamara, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 20 April 1966, observed that the Chinese military aid to Pakistan was no obstacle to resumption of US military assistance to Islamabad which, he said, depended on further reconciliation between India and Pakistan.

Likewise, the USIS press release of 19 February 1966 on Vice-President Humphrey's visit to Pakistan stated that in his opinion both India and Pakistan "are fully aware of the threat of Communist China." His remarks that the granting of US assistance depended on Pakistan sharing with India "a common understanding of the activities and designs of Communist China,"⁷ published in the Pakistani press, created a delicate situation for Ayub as these remarks signified convergence of US interests with that of the USSR and an anti-Chinese shift in Pakistan's foreign policy. Ayub was trying his best to set right the ravages of war, replenish the resources destroyed in the conflict in both the military and economic fields from every conceivable source and for that purpose was performing the balancing act of making new friends without losing the old ones. He was acutely aware of certain elements in Pakistan who believed that as a result of the Tashkent Declaration the Kashmir dispute would be put in cold storage and the basic political problem which had bedevilled Indo-Pakistani relations would gradually recede into the background. Ayub attempted to sell the Tashkent Declaration to his people by saying that it had not damaged "our national viewpoint on Kashmir" in any way as it provided "a possibility for the peaceful settlement of the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir" by creating "an atmosphere of mutual understanding." While conceding that the

Kashmir dispute had not been settled at Tashkent Ayub remarked: "...complicated issues are not easy to solve and the Government has to adopt various means to solve it according to circumstances." He looked forward to the possibility of restoring peace between India and Pakistan as a sequel to the Tashkent Declaration and appealed to his people to keep the "national interests" above their sentiments. He warned against "a few power seekers pursuing selfish interests" by trying to mislead people and striking "a discordant note merely for the sake of opposition."⁸

In this connection, it is worth recalling that the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (Lahore) wrote on 19 January 1966 that the people of Pakistan were "in no way prepared to hear that Bharat is our friend" and asked: "If Bharat is our friend, then who is our enemy?" On 5 February 1966, the same paper observed: "We cannot displease a friendly neighbour like China merely for the sake of a meaningless document." What other name, the paper added, "can be given to the Tashkent Declaration." The American-phobe critics of Ayub also viewed the US offer of 300,000 tons of wheat as quite insignificant when compared to 1.5 million tons of wheat which Washington had been supplying to Pakistan annually. Besides, it was considered hardly sufficient for Pakistan's immediate needs. The revised terms of supply of that wheat were also not very favourable to Pakistan because:

1. Pakistan would have to pay 100% freight charges.
2. Out of the price of the wheat supplies 20% would go to counterpart funds; and
3. the balance would have to be paid in dollars or hard currency.

Moreover, the US offer to Pakistan was seen in marked contrast to the US offer of 3 million tons of wheat to India for which India would not have to pay anything, no freight charges, no counter funds and no payments in hard currency.

In the light of this growing criticism, Humphrey's remarks created a very embarrassing situation for Ayub. While Sino-phil Bhutto reacted by saying that "it had been Pakistan's position throughout that the People's Republic [of China] did not pose any threat to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent" and added that "this continues to remain Pakistan's position,"⁹ President Ayub was more cautious and balanced when he remarked:

The guiding principle of our foreign policy is that differences among other countries should not interfere with our relations with them. Consequently alongside our ties of sincere friendship with China, we are developing friendly relations with the United States on the one hand, and USSR on the other. It is a matter of great satisfaction that these countries understand and appreciate our point of view.

Recently, US Vice President, Mr. Hubert Humphrey paid us a visit. He mentioned his country's problems in South-East Asia and also had discussions on some other matters. A statement attributed to Mr. Humphrey, about these talks ran counter to the principles of our foreign policy. Immediately we made our stand emphatically clear. I am grateful to Mr. Humphrey that he himself disowned that statement and thus helped in clearing the misunderstanding. However, I would like to reiterate that Pakistan attaches due importance to her relations with the United States which have a context of their own just as our relationship with China had its own context. It has been our belief from the very beginning that there is no danger to the sub-continent from China provided no uncalled for provocation is aimed against that country.¹⁰

The above Pakistani refutation regarding the Chinese threat to the sub-continent was highly commended by Chairman Liu Shao-chi in the course of his speech at the banquet given in his honour by Ayub in Rawalpindi on 26 March 1966. The Chinese Head of State referred to the attempts of 'the imperialists and their collaborators' to vilify China with scruple and to form a ring of encirclement against China and observed: 'The Pakistan Government sternly refused the nonsense about China's threat to the sub-continent, thus expressing the firm will of the Pakistan people to maintain friendship with the Chinese people.'¹¹

Humphrey's talks with Kosygin on Indian soil in January 1966 aroused misgivings in Peking which saw in the 'tripartite Soviet-US-Indian meeting in New Delhi' open strengthening of 'the united front against China' which was part of the policy of the new leaders of the USSR 'to unite with US imperialism and the reactionaries of various countries in following a counter revolutionary ring of encirclement against China.'¹² To China, thus, appeared the possibility of Pakistan turning away from China and appealing exclusively or in

greater degree to its more munificent benefactors like the USA and the Soviet Union in the wake of the Tashkent Declaration for building up its defence and economy. Liu Shao-chi, therefore, deemed it necessary to avail of the long standing invitation, extended during President Ayub's visit to China in March 1965, to visit Pakistan. The main purpose of the first ever visit of a Chinese Head of State to both wings of Pakistan with a large contingent of advisers and officials was to arrest Pakistan's harmful drift away from China, to incite the Pakistani people against India, by working towards the erosion of the Tashkent agreement and to create a pro-Chinese political base in Pakistan, evidently around the Indian issue. Unprecedented arrangements were made during the visit of Liu Shao-chi and Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China. Children dressed up in Chinese clothes were seen shouting in Chinese as never witnessed before. In order to mollify the feelings of the Chinese about the Tashkent Declaration, President Ayub allowed Z.A. Bhutto (who had been instructed not to open his mouth since November 1965, thereby jeopardizing his peace efforts with the help of the two super Powers, and even made to proceed on leave for health reasons on 18 January 1966) to make strong statements against the Tashkent Declaration. For instance, Bhutto declared in the National Assembly in the middle of March 1966 that the Tashkent Declaration "forecloses no possibilities, blocks no avenues to the achievement of our legitimate aims and the vindication of our just rights," that in spite of the Tashkent Declaration, Pakistan "could always go to the defence of her people in Jammu and Kashmir, and that unless the dispute of Kashmir was settled to the satisfaction of Pakistan, the task of establishing peace in the sub-continent would remain unfinished."¹³ The Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar was also permitted to assert on 4 March 1966 that "refraining from the use of force applies to independent states and territories and not to disputed territories," such as Kashmir was in Pakistani eyes. Similarly, the principle of non-interference in the "internal affairs of each other," enshrined in the Tashkent Declaration, did not bind Pakistan in any way; for "how can a dispute between two countries be an 'internal affair' of any one of them?"¹⁴ About the same time Pakistan resumed its hostile propaganda against India.

Speaking at the banquet in honour of the Chinese Head of State on 26 March 1966, President Ayub himself tried to satisfy the Chinese leaders by saying that the Tashkent Declaration was "a declaration of intent," which neither derogated in the slightest degree "our commitment to the people of Jammu and Kashmir" nor weakened "our resolve to defend our independence and sovereignty or to pursue a policy guided by the interests of our country." He described the Tashkent Declaration as providing another "framework and a procedure" which could be tried for settling Kashmir dispute with India. Ayub then expressed his 'deep gratitude' for the support Peking gave in the "hour of trial." He added:

The ties of friendship between our two countries have been further reinforced as a result of the just stand that your great country has taken on the question of the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self determination and in upholding the struggle of our people to safeguard their political independence and territorial integrity.¹⁵

Lest Ayub's remarks in the company of his Chinese friends might be construed in other circles as going too far in his closeness towards Peking or deviating from Pakistan's friendship with the USA or the USSR or the path of reconciliation with India, Ayub deemed it absolutely necessary to clarify the matter to his other friends, in his first-of-the-month broadcast to the Nation on 1 April 1966, in these words:

I have repeatedly declared that our relations with China do not militate against the interest of any other country. These relations are being strengthened in the interest of peace and peace alone. There should, therefore, be no apprehension in any country about our relations with China. Our relations with other countries continue to be friendly and it is our endeavour to strengthen them further.¹⁶

Chairman Liu Shao-chi, in his speech at the state banquet, gave a firm assurance to Pakistan of China's support in case of aggression. He observed:

The Pakistan people can rest assured that, when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defence of its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance. We have always held that the Kashmir dispute

should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmir people. Any attempt to deprive the Kashmir people of their right of self-determination or to bury the Kashmir question will not neither be countenanced by the Kashmir people nor by the Pakistan people. President Ayub has of late repeatedly stated that the Pakistan Government will not change its position on the Kashmir question and will continue to support the Kashmir people in their struggle for freedom. The Chinese Government and people firmly support the righteous stand of the Pakistan Government and the just struggle of the Kashmir people for their right of self-determination.¹⁷

The joint communique issued on 31 March 1966 recorded firm support on the part of the two heads of state for the Kashmiri peoples' right of self-determination, expression of "deep gratitude" by Pakistan for the support received from China "in resisting aggression" and Liu Shao-chi's "admiration for the heroism and patriotism" of the Pakistani people in their struggle against foreign aggression and intervention. He also reaffirmed Peking's adherence to its "principled stand of opposing aggression and assisting its victims" and that "the Chinese people unswervingly stand on the side of the Pakistan people in their struggle to defend national independence and sovereignty and oppose aggression." While Ayub, on his part, reiterated the firm belief that Peking should be restored its lawful rights in the UN. About the "friendly relations" between the two countries, it was stated that they were not based on expediency and the further strengthening and developing of the same was said to be "in accord with the common desire of the two peoples and conducive to Afro-Asian solidarity and world peace."¹⁸

Speaking at a civic reception in Dacca on 15 April 1966, Marshal Chen Yi explained that Chinese support was not one-sided, gave a specific undertaking to Pakistan in safeguarding East Pakistan and replied to the Soviet criticism about the Chinese role during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. He observed:

We were merely doing our bounden duty in giving support to your struggle against aggression. Moreover, support is in our view always mutual. Your struggle against aggression has not only upheld the sovereignty and dignity of Pakistan but also made an important contribution to the defence of peace of this part of the world. This constitutes

in itself a strong support to the Chinese people .

Some people said that by supporting Pakistan's struggle against Indian aggression and the Kashmiri peoples' struggle for the right to self-determination, China was adding 'fuel to the fire' and 'fishing in troubled waters'. These assertions are a complete reversal of right and wrong. Should China have refrained from supporting the victim of aggression but supplied large amounts of weapons to the aggressor as they did in order not to be labelled as 'adding fuel to the fire'? Should China have supported India's annexation of Kashmir while disguising herself as an impartial mediator as they did, in order not to be labelled as 'fishing in troubled waters'? We always draw a clear line of distinction between right and wrong and uphold principles. We maintain that only by supporting the victim of aggression and dealing blows to the aggressor can justice be upheld and peace defended.

In the future should East Pakistan or West Pakistan again face the armed attack of any aggressor, the Chinese Government and people will continue to support the Pakistan people in their struggle to safeguard national independence, state sovereignty and national unity. So long as the Kashmir people still suffer brutal oppression and are deprived of their freedom, the Chinese Government and people will continue to support them in their struggle for the right to self-determination. We will never change this stand of ours no matter how others may abuse and slander us.¹⁹

Convinced of the strong backing of China, Z. A. Bhutto, in his address to the Sind University Convocation on 4 May 1966 came out openly in favour of "a policy of confrontation" against India to which he saw "no alternative." This was certainly not in tune with Ayub's policy of mending fences with the USA and developing close relations with the USSR. Bhutto was accordingly relieved of his post as Foreign Minister and a more pliable and non controversial figure, Sharifuddin Pirzada, was installed in his place in office on 20 July 1966, who immediately declared that Pakistan would continue balancing its interests between the Western and Communist Powers.²⁰ Although Pirzada vouchsafed to continue the policy of friendship towards Peking the Chinese suspected a shift in Pakistan's foreign policy, particularly when Ayub was speaking of his relations with the USSR as "growing in depth".²¹ The Chinese apprehensions in the matter were reflected in the statement of Marshal Chen Yi on 28 July 1966, soon after

Pirzada's assumption of office, given below:

Our Pakistan friends can rest assured that when you resolutely resist foreign aggression and threat, we will certainly support and assist you. The Chinese people remain forever the most reliable friends of the Pakistan people. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said that we should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports. The US imperialists and the Soviet modern revisionists do not like Sino-Pakistan friendship, nor do the Indian expansionists. They try hard to undermine the relations of friendship and cooperation between our two countries. This proves that we have done the right thing to develop Sino-Pakistan friendship, which is in accord with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Pakistan peoples and conducive to the consolidation of peace in this region. The United States and the Soviet Union are trying by every means possible to plot joint Indian-Pakistan opposition to China; this is detrimental to China and is also harmful to Pakistan. I can say with certainty that this scheme of the United States and the Soviet Union will not be countenanced by the people of our two countries, nor by our two Governments. No force on earth can undermine the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistan peoples.²²

Z.A. Suleri, writing in the *Pakistan Times* on 22 January 1967, described the *raison d'être* of Pakistan's pursuit of an independent policy and collaboration with China, admitting at the same time that it "is no smooth sailing." He said that so long as the US was principally pitted against the Soviet Union, it suited Washington to have Pakistan as its ally against India who was pursuing policies calculated to support the opponent's cause. With the initiation of the policy of containment of China not only the USA made up with the USSR (readily accepting Khrushchev's olive branch of peaceful co-existence which he held out to Washington under pressure from the massive challenge of non-conformist China) but also made friendship or rather "alignment" with India. "Once this metamorphosis took place, Pakistan was dropped." The mending of fences with China and the USSR, he based on the "same instinct of survival" which led Pakistan to enter into partnership with the USA. To allow the US to keep its hold on Pakistan in the changed circumstances when the US had thrown its lot with India, he warned, would mean that

Pakistan 'toe the line of India and also join her against China. After stating that while Pakistan's economic aims motivated its friendship with the US, its political interests called for closer relations with China and the Soviet Union, he went on to accuse the USA of "using all its aid-giving power to bend us to its geo-political goal. If we succumb to it we shall not only offend China but also endanger our independence." The impression created by Bhutto's exit that Pakistan would make an about turn and swerve completely to the side of the USA, he said, had proved entirely erroneous and "in fact, relations with China are growing. He also stated

Actually, Communism has proved meaningful not so much as an ideology but as an instrument to telescope industrial development in the shortest period possible.

Writing in the same paper, *i.e.* the *Pakistan Times* on 5 March 1967, under the heading "Mr Bhutto's challenge," Z.A. Suleri justified Ayub's going to Tashkent by saying that the Pakistani President achieved "a timely retreat from the brink of a precipice" and added

That the country which had a completely closed mind on Kashmir—remember Khrushchev's declaration—should have been made to take the initiative for the talks on it itself marked an advancement for our cause.

The Kashmir dispute, Suleri said, had been internationalized through reference to and adjudication by the United Nations—it could not be settled unilaterally. Its solution, he remarked, would only accrue to international pressure which "may not be available at present, but the last word in politics is never said."

Just as the dismissal of another architect of the pro-China policy, S.K. Dehlavi, who was until 1963 the Permanent Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a move to placate Washington, so also the resignation of Bhutto was the manifestation of the growing rapport between Islamabad and Moscow and reflected Ayub's concern about meeting Pakistan's requirements of economic aid and sophisticated military equipment which could better be met from the USA and the USSR. Bhutto was removed within two days of the US announcement of its decision to resume economic aid to Pakistan and India. Ayub's forward to the Third Five-Year

Plan, in which he spoke of "no grand experiments in nationalization, no fancy slogans about socialism, no undue intervention in the private sector," the removal of most of the administrative and bureaucratic controls that hampered progress of the private sector,²³ and the grant of \$30 million by Tokyo on 31 July 1966 and \$70 million by the USA on 17 August 1966²⁴ i.e. soon after Bhutto's departure from government, are to be seen in this context. Likewise, Ayub was hopeful about Moscow doing something, apart from economic and technical assistance, to ease matters for Pakistan regarding Soviet military aid to India, which might be the result of "whatever deep international motivation" but "its menace to us is clear and manifest," as Z. A. Suleri put it.²⁵ That Ayub must have got some assurance from Soviet leaders was evident from his remarks, even before the USSR actually agreed to sell arms to Pakistan, that the Russians "certainly show concern for the safety of Pakistan."²⁶ The spokesman for the establishment justified Pakistan's close relations with the USSR in these words:

A gradual but perceptible change has taken place in the attitude of the Soviet Union to the sub-continent affairs. Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin have clearly repudiated the blatantly partisan stand taken by Khrushchev in support of India. Their efforts to bring about the Tashkent talks was a move towards detachment. The decision to sell arms to Pakistan is a further proof of the Soviet intention to hold a balance between Pakistan and India.

The striking point about Pakistan's foreign policy is that it has been based on the realities of national interests and international situation. Pakistan did not hesitate to discard the one-sided alignment with the United States once its defective premises were exposed. Just as the national interests demanded and the international situation called, it developed equally strong bilateral relations with the US, the USSR and China.

So long, as India did not settle the Kashmir dispute, the threat of aggression loomed large. It was because of this consideration that Pakistan turned to China in order to correct the imbalance which the American policy had created. Pakistan took up its stand in self-interest and not to brow-beat America. The same realism turned it to the Soviet Union. There is no element of chicanery in our balanced policy.²⁷

The policy of "special relationship" with China, which was characteristic of the 1963-65 days, was, it seemed, giving way to an emphasis on balanced relationship with the three great Powers—the USA, the USSR and China—during 1966-69. Suleri justified this shift in policy or change in emphasis in these words:

The Pakistan Government has rightly struck a realistic stance. It has not allowed itself to be submerged by the disillusionment which the people naturally felt at the American attitude during the 1965 Indian aggression or before, because it had nonetheless to do business with that country. Nor has it allowed itself to be swept off its feet towards China because the latter, by virtue of its stand on Kashmir, aroused boundless enthusiasm among the people. Equally realistically it has given due appreciation to the Soviet role in the Middle East even if it was not as effective as the Arabs expected it to be. There is sanity in this course even if it lacks lustre.²⁸

And again on 24 April 1968 Suleri observed:

Our policy of balanced relations with the Super Powers is correct. It is correct because it is dictated by realism and not illusion. We must steadfastly adhere to it. Goodwill to Moscow and Washington must be matched by warmth of feeling for Peking—which can do with a fresh demonstration.²⁹

Even when Pakistan was convinced of "complete identity of views" with China than with the other two great Powers, it realized that in the set of circumstances in which Islamabad then was, it was not profitable to be "wholly allied with it,"³⁰ thereby tying itself to one end of the triangle. This was reflected in Suleri's following remarks:

However friendly the US and the USSR may be to us, their global strategy favours India because it is on the same wavelength with them against China. The Arab debacle in the Middle East has accentuated the value of India's presence in the Indian Ocean. It is not merely the compulsion of our geopolitical position that we befriend the three powers, the US, the USSR and China, it is also necessary that while on the one hand we maintain a rapport with Washington and Moscow in the hope of exerting some restraint on them against adopting an extreme policy of support to India, on the other our relations with Peking are

calculated not to allow Delhi a free and upper hand in this region. The attitude cannot, however, be rigid. It must not pin us down to fixed points.³¹

That there was a cooling off or lack of warmth in Pakistan's relations with China during the post-Tashkent period of Ayub's dictatorship in Pakistan was evident in such circumstances. This was clear from Bhutto's remarks about a change in Pakistan's foreign policy and the lustre of Pakistan-China friendship disappearing,³² the comments of the Leader of Opposition in the National Assembly of Pakistan about the conspiracy of the US and the USSR to bring India and Pakistan together against China and his remarks about Pakistan at one time courting China but "now it is cold-shouldered," as he put it.³³ The fact of cooling off was also proved by the Chinese references—Vice-Premier Nieh Jung-chen's allusion to the enemies of China and Pakistan trying "in a thousand and one ways to sow discord and dissension between our two countries" necessitating thereby the heightening of their vigilance "so as to frustrate any scheme aimed at undermining Sino-Pakistan friendship"³⁴ and Marshal Chen Yi's remarks about the efforts of "the imperialists, the modern revisionists and the expansionists" to sabotage Sino-Pakistan friendship.³⁵ The fact of a change in Pakistan's policy towards Peking was also attested by observations in the British press. The London *Times* had this to say in this matter:

The link with China may now be looking rather unstable—though it has paid off in defence aid. At least President Ayub had been careful not to press the association too far or to allow it to damage Pakistan's other ties.³⁶

The *Economist*, commenting on Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Pakistan in April 1968, during which he offered aid for "an apparently million-ton steelworks in West Pakistan and an atomic power station in East Pakistan," observed as follows:

The Pakistanis have clearly been drifting away from their Chinese friends since 1966 and this visit, with its promise of far greater economic aid than the Chinese have yet been able to offer, was another blow to China's diminishing influence...what was the northern tier of American influence is becoming part of the Soviet Union's backyard.³⁷

In such a situation, time was considered propitious for

Pakistan and on the New Year day in 1969 Peking Radio began its broadcasts in Bengali. The feelings of the conservative people were naturally aroused. In such circumstances, the introduction of new scripts for the Uighur and Kazhak minorities, using slightly modified Latin alphabets but based on the phonetic system of the Han language, was seen as loosening the hold of Islam and the Arabic script and an attempt to progressively assimilate those minorities into the mainstream of the Han civilization.

To the Chinese, this campaign coupled as it was with Soviet accusations of the mal-treatment of Muslims in China and reports of the large scale settlement of Han people in minority areas seemed to revive the 1949 Pakistani concern about the Han race pursuing chauvinistic policies of forcible sinicisation, assimilation and economic exploitation of other nationalities in China. Peking, therefore, was very much concerned about it. To allay Chinese apprehensions in the matter, the Central Information Minister Khawaja Shahbuddin came out strongly against the attitude of the Jamaat-i-Islami for its "miserious propaganda" against China and declared that such a thing was "detrimental to the independent foreign policy of Pakistan" and "certainly against the interests of Pakistan".³⁵

Zahid Choudhri, a senior journalist, speaking at a function organized by the Pakistan-China Friendship Association, Lahore, to celebrate the 19th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, characterized as "baseless and misleading the allegation being made in certain quarters in Pakistan" against the Chinese Government for its suppression, persecution and cultural annihilation of the Muslim minority. Far from being persecuted, he said, the Muslims were being given preferential treatment—the university students being given 10% more by way of stipends and granted special holidays and allowances to celebrate their religious festivals. The Muslims were free to worship in their mosques and were provided every facility to live according to their values and beliefs, he added. These remarks were purposely made in the presence of the Chinese Cultural Attache and reported in detail in the *Pakistan Times* to carry conviction with Peking.³⁶ Speaking at a farewell banquet at the end of the visit of Syed Fida Hasan, Adviser to Ayub Khan, Marshal Chen Yi expressed his thanks

to the Pakistan Government for publicly refuting allegations that China was persecuting the Muslims. These lies, he added, were spread by the people with ulterior motives.⁴⁰ On his return to Daeca, Shah Azizur Rehman, a member of the official goodwill team led by Syed Fida Hasan and Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, observed that Muslims in China had equal rights like other Chinese citizens and they were free to practise their religious faith.⁴¹

That inspite of the insinuations against Peking's treatment of its minorities at the hands of the conservative section of Pakistan and Ayub's pursuing a policy of balanced relationship with the three great Powers, if China continued to voice support for Pakistan in meeting and repelling any foreign invasion and aggression and for the people of Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self determination and render military and economic assistance it was because it had no other option. The only alternative for Peking was to let Ayub patch up with India and allow Pakistan to become part and parcel of the growing US-Soviet axis against China and thus another link in the chain of encirclement of China. This would weaken the pro China lobby in Pakistan and put out all hope of warmer relations emerging again at some future date. To Bhutto, who saw in the Rann of Kutch episode "vindication of the policy of confrontation" which was considered having been replaced by "submission euphemistically described as cooperation" after Tasikent, a closer link with China was a must for Pakistan. He observed

As a token of its appreciation of Pakistan's agreement to change its attitude towards India, particularly on Kashmir, Russia might in the future provide Pakistan with some military assistance, which will not be comparable to what India receives. But neither Russia nor the USA will permit the imbalance to be reduced. If we look around us the only great power, whose objective interests coincide with those of Pakistan and the only country capable of assisting Pakistan is the People's Republic of China. That country alone is capable of reducing the imbalance, either by supply of military equipment or by political means or both. It is the immediate neighbour of India and Pakistan, and has a territorial dispute with India, which Pakistan cannot ignore. China's influence in Asia is bound to grow.⁴²

Pakistan continued to be an important factor in the Chinese policy towards the two super Powers and particularly towards

India. Peking saw a coincidence of interests with Islamabad in its conflict with India and its attempts to weaken India. The Chinese incitement and encouragement of Naxalbari incidents and Pakistan-China collusion in fomenting trouble in Naga and Mizo Hills in India were cases in point. Moreover, Peking's aim was not only to wean Pakistan away from the US alliance but also to prevent Islamabad from moving closer to Moscow. China did not like the USSR presiding over detente or reconciliation between India and Pakistan and thereby emerging as a major Asian Power interested in peace. Besides, having been frustrated or at least stalled in its ambitious Afro-Asian policy, Peking was trying to build up a secure political base in a few selected countries where objective conditions for that existed.

Peking, therefore, continued to adhere to its policy of two-fold support—for the military regime in Islamabad in its struggle against New Delhi and for the Kashmiris in their struggle for the right of self-determination. This decision to support Islamabad and the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris was stated and reiterated in almost every official statement or speech. It was highlighted, for instance, in Chen Yi's speeches at the Pakistan Day receptions in Peking in March 1967⁴³ and March 1968.⁴⁴ On 29 September 1967, Vice-Premier Nieh Jung-chen took care to reassure the visiting Pakistani guests that they could always depend upon China.⁴⁵ In October 1967 Chia Shih, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, visited Pakistan, and wherever he went, the one theme which he never tired of speaking about was his country's support for Pakistan.⁴⁶ This theme was repeated in the speeches made at the banquets given in honour of the visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain in August 1968⁴⁷ and another Pakistani delegation visiting Peking in October 1968.⁴⁸ Indeed, this became so commonplace a premise of China's policy towards Pakistan that even minor dignitaries, such as the Charge d'Affaires and First Secretaries of the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, spoke of it as a matter of course on various occasions in 1967⁴⁹ and 1968.⁵⁰ They expressed firm Chinese support for the struggle of Pakistan against "Indian imperialism and expansionism" and firm support for the people of Kashmir in their "just struggle" for self-determination. Sometimes this

right was referred to as "rational self-determination". The significance of this was that it left enough room for China to agitate for the respect of the rights of the Kashmiri people even after the whole of Kashmir came under Pakistani control, thereby making possible the emergence of an independent Kashmir which could be brought within the Chinese sphere of influence or neutralized like Nepal or Burma.

The usual expressions of support were accompanied by the assurance that Peking will, as always, consistently stand "on Pakistan's side" and that the Chinese people "have been and will forever remain the most reliable friends of Pakistan in the fight against Indian expansionism". Often the US "imperialists" and Soviet revisionists were accused of supporting India and sabotaging Sino-Pakistani friendship and Pakistan extolled for belonging, like China, to "a great Afro-Asian family" and having a glorious anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist tradition.

Each visit of a Pakistani delegation to China was looked upon as deepening the mutual understanding between China and Pakistan and making a new and important contribution to the further consolidation and strengthening of friendly ties and cooperation. In October 1967, Chairman Mao Tse-tung made an important gesture by speaking to each member of the Pakistani goodwill delegation that had gone to Peking for participating in the Chinese National Day individually.⁵¹ Marshal Chen Yi made another friendly gesture when he invited Pakistan's Ambassador in China and members of his staff to a dinner on the eve of the Chinese New Year in January 1968 at which the usual remarks about the consolidation and development of Sino-Pakistani friendship were made. The Pakistani guests were entertained to a cultural performance—the highlight of which was a song entitled "Sino-Pakistan Friendship," specially composed for the occasion and its Chinese words being set to Pakistani folk music. The song read as follows in English:

China and Pakistan are friendly neighbours. The friendship between our two peoples is more profound than the Yangtze. No matter how high the mountains are in Pamir they cannot block the constant development of our friendship and cooperation. China and Pakistan are neighbours

and the friendship between our two peoples will last for ever. The peoples of China and Pakistan unite.⁵³

Utilizing the occasion of the Soviet agreement to supply India with 200 new-type SU-7 fighter-bombers, the *People's Daily* commentator, in one of the strongest attacks on the USSR, accused Moscow of following a policy of opposing China "in collusion with US imperialism and with India as a pawn." The Soviet military aid to India was considered as being "clearly designed to help Washington exert pressure on Pakistan and to try and draw the latter into the anti-China alliance organised by the United States and the Soviet Union to encircle China."⁵⁴ Thus, by one stroke, Peking was trying not only to score a point in its ideological conflict with the USSR and its hostility against India but also to administer a warning to Pakistan against attempts to sabotage Sino Pakistani friendship. Chen Yi's remarks at the Pakistan Day reception in Peking on 23 March 1968 brought out this point more clearly. He observed

The Pakistan Government and people have recently smashed foreign schemes to subvert and split Pakistan and exposed the criminal manoeuvres of imperialism and modern revisionism in stepping up the arming of India and threatening the security of Pakistan and South Asia as a whole. The just struggle of the Pakistan people has won them the sympathy and support of the Chinese people and the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and the rest of the world. In recent years the friendly relations and cooperation between China and Pakistan have steadily developed and our mutual understanding is constantly increasing. In spite of the fact that imperialism, revisionism and reaction have an intense hatred for Sino-Pakistan friendship and are constantly trying to sow discord between us and to sabotage our friendship, all their schemes have failed ignominiously thanks to the joint endeavours of the Chinese and Pakistan Governments and peoples.⁵⁷

The Chinese Embassy in Rawalpindi, in a news bulletin circulated in Pakistan on 6 May 1968, tried to expose Soviet Premier Kosygin's efforts, during his visit to India in January 1968 and to Pakistan in April 1968, at promoting rapprochement between India and Pakistan by drawing attention to the steady flow of military aid by "Soviet revisionists" to the "Indian reactionaries with the tacit consent of the United

States " It thereby warned Islamabad in regard to the sincerity of Soviet efforts at reconciliation in the sub-continent and launched an attack on a Power, considered friendly by Ayub Khan, on the Pakistani soil The Chinese bulletin stated

The Soviet modern revisionist clique has recently conducted conspiratorial activities in connection with India-Pakistan relations Superficially the clique pretended to promote the normalization of relations between the two countries, but in reality it colluded with US imperialism in continuing its policy of fostering Indian reactionaries and bullying Pakistan⁵³

Apart from statements of support, Peking also continued to humour Islamabad by sending a number of delegations to Pakistan and extending economic and military aid to bolster up the military regime there Thus, among the delegations that visited Pakistan were a medical mission led by Dr Lu Chih-chun, a trade team led by Hsiao Fan-chou, a writers' delegation, a geological team led by Ma Chung yuan, a veterinary delegation led by Ma Wen-tien, a delegation of the Chinese Ulema, a Chinese trade delegation led by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Chia Shih, a 53-member cultural troupe, a survey team led by Chang Ta yi, the Chinese Trade Minister's visit, Kuo Mo-jo's visit on his return from the wedding of the Crown Prince of Nepal, an economic and friendship delegation led by Fang Ye and a trade delegation headed by Lien Chang-shieu Premier Chou En lai visited Rawalpindi on his way back from official visits to Romania and Albania in June 1966

Just a few days before Liu Shao chi's visit, an exclusive Chinese exhibition, displaying over 3,000 articles of both light and heavy industries, agricultural implements, food products, textiles and crafts, books and publications, was organized in Karachi for three weeks While inaugurating the Exhibition on 15 March 1966, Ghulam Faruque, the Minister of Commerce referred to the 500% increase in trade from Rs 48.5 million in 1951 to Rs 277 million in 1965 because of the joint efforts and the "highly generous" act on the part of China in granting a loan of \$60 million to Pakistan in 1964 that enabled Pakistan to receive capital goods Commenting on the exhibition, the *Pakistan Observer* said

One is left a trifle dumbfounded by the wide range and fine quality of the goods China is producing today, just a

decade and a half after her revolution. From chemicals and medicines to superb machine tools, from agricultural implements to elegant handicrafts—it makes one want to make a trip to China and come back loaded with all those goodies, that probably could not be obtained anywhere else at such low prices

The exhibition was meant to impress on the Pakistanis the achievements made in the economic and industrial spheres by the people of China and to dump in Pakistan in an increasing degree various types of consumer goods, such as playing cards, glass tumblers, chinaware, stationery items, light engineering and electrical goods etc

In August 1966, an agreement was signed between Pakistan and China under which Peking agreed to take all possible steps for the immediate shipment of 100,000 tons of rice to East Pakistan on barter basis—30,000 tons were to be shipped during August and the remaining quantity by the end of 1966. To meet the food crisis in Pakistan, Peking granted in January 1967 a long-term interest-free loan to enable Pakistan to import 150,000 tons of foodgrains.⁵⁹ This grain deal was regarded in Washington as offering "the Ayub regime a political cushion for its unpopular dependence on the United States."⁶⁰ Apart from the \$60 million credit extended by Peking in February 1965 (half of which was utilized for commodity import) and \$6.90 million given mainly for the purpose of importing foodstuffs, China agreed in December 1967 to give a new interest-free credit of \$40 million, (two-thirds of which was to be utilized for development projects and one-third for the import of essential commodities, particularly coal, cement, and steel) demonstrating thereby "Peking's economic support to Pakistan on a continuing and long-term basis."⁶¹ The first Chinese credit of Rs. 30 crores helped Pakistan to set up a heavy machinery complex near Taxila costing about Rs. 13 crores (an agreement for the supply of building materials and erection machinery worth Rs. 40 lakhs for that complex was signed on 1 May 1968 and a batch of 31 engineers and technicians left for China to undergo a training programme in that connection on 2 May 1968) and a supplementary project for the foundry and forge, again at Taxila, costing about Rs. 12 crores. Peking agreed to supply Rs. 1.5 crores worth of machinery for the Taxila complex in July 1968.⁶² An important outcome of

Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain's visit to China in August 1968 was the Chinese offer to assist Pakistan in the control of floods in East Pakistan.⁶² Chang Ta yi, who came to Pakistan as the leader of an 11 member Chinese official survey team for the utilization of the \$40 million new credit on 13 September 1968, observed in Karachi on 18 October 1968 that there were good prospects of setting up a specialized refractory in West Pakistan in addition to three other projects in porcelain mining and textile machinery.⁶³ Peking also gave help for a fertilizer plant in East Pakistan, a paper mill in Chittagong and a sugar refinery in West Pakistan.

A significant feature of the Chinese loans was that they could be used in financing any project either in the private or public sector while Soviet credits were to be utilized in the public sector only by WAPDA, PIDC and other similar public agencies.⁶⁴ Commenting on Pakistan's experience of the \$100 million Chinese assistance, the *Morning News* in an editorial on 31 May 1968, observed

Without any question this is one of the best loans negotiated by Pakistan so far. It is not only interest free but is repayable after twenty years. With the major portion of the aid being in projects the fact that the prices of Chinese machinery comparable in quality with any of its kind available anywhere else are at least 50 per cent cheaper than the ruling prices in the world market. What is more the technical service provided by the Chinese on these projects are perhaps the cheapest without suffering in quality. And above all the repayment of the Chinese loans can be made through exports of Pakistani goods both manufactured and semi-manufactured.⁶⁵

Commenting on the fresh credit of Rs 20 crores (\$40 million announced in December 1967) the *Pakistan Times*, in its editorial of 27 December 1967, had this to say

The quantum of Chinese loan may appear to be modest vis-à-vis the Western credit but it has several significant features. First it is—like the 60 million dollar loan extended in 1964—interest free which makes it particularly attractive and is also indicative of China's keen interest in assisting Pakistan's economy. Second its terms and conditions are generous and free from political strings. Third it is selective in nature and is designed to spur the development of basic industries here both during the Third and Fourth Plans. This would help to save the import

component of machinery, fill certain gaps in the industrial edifice and also augment the pool of technical know-how. Fourth, the new credit has been extended at a time when the grim prospect of more cuts in Western aid has loomed up on the horizon. It would, therefore, enable this country to give a more tangible shape to its policy of diversifying the sources of foreign aid. Finally, the Chinese aid, as Mr. Ahmed has very rightly observed, will take Pakistan a step forward on the road to economic self-reliance, the ultimate objective of all developing nations.⁶⁷

There was a significant growth of the Sino-Pakistani trade as well. The volume of trade rose from Rs. 28 million in 1961-62 to Rs. 381 million in 1966-67 when China was ahead of the USSR in importing goods from Pakistan. Pakistan had been the only country, aligned with the West in the SEATO and the CENTO to which Peking agreed to extend the most-favoured-nation status in trade and commerce.⁶⁸ Moreover, the reopening of the "silk route," the traditional overland route connecting Sinkiang and Gilgit (an agreement in that regard was signed in October 1967), was considered "a significant milestone" which, coupled with the existing air service and the decision to start joint shipping services, was expected "to maximise manifold" the prospects of mutual trade and cooperation in the economic sphere between the two countries.⁶⁹ The Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade and leader of the trade delegation Chia Shih stated with confidence that positive results would emerge from his visit to Pakistan in October-November 1967 in regard to expanding the two-way trade between China and Pakistan.⁷⁰ A barter agreement providing for the exchange of goods worth Rs. 11 crores was signed on 27 April 1968.⁷¹ In July 1968 Pakistan signed a barter deal for the import of 150,000 tons of Chinese cement and the export of raw cotton yarns and jute sacks.⁷²

The military assistance rendered by Peking to Pakistan at a time when Washington imposed an embargo on its supplies was of great significance to Islamabad. That China supplied a significant number of T 54/59 tanks, MiG 15/19 aircraft and IL-28 bombers to Pakistan after the 1965 conflict and provided training to a large number of Pakistani army and air force officers in the use of Chinese weapons had been mentioned earlier. While the Chinese economic aid was said to be

"on the most generous terms," all Chinese weapons supplied to Pakistan in the past five years, i.e. from 1965 onwards, had been "given free," according to the *Pakistan Times* of 21 May 1971. Besides giving military hardware and training to officers, Peking also helped Pakistan in setting up an ordnance factory and a guerrilla training centre in East Pakistan. Chinese help in guerrilla training and collaboration with Pakistan in rendering assistance to the Naga and Mizo rebels were part of Peking's policy of pressurizing and weakening India by exploiting internal dissent and hostility between India and Pakistan. Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969, which excluded Pakistan from the list of countries where "revolutionary struggles" were going on, indicated that Peking was keen not to offend Pakistan.

An important aspect in the development of Sino-Pakistani relations and their military collaboration had been the construction of road communications between China's Sinkiang and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 not only gave an impetus to the border negotiations between China and Pakistan but also led the two countries to think about establishing road links through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir between the two countries which could be of immense use to them in a situation of confrontation with the other neighbouring countries, particularly the Soviet Union and India. In a broadcast from Radio Pakistan, Rawalpindi, on 3 March 1964, the Communications Secretary of the Pakistan Government observed that the all-weather Indus Valley Road to Gilgit when completed in 1965 would not only revolutionize the entire economy of the northern areas but also link Rawalpindi with Peking through a land route. The following report which appeared in the *Tribune* of 4 May 1964, is significant in this regard:

A road being blasted through Pakistan's northern mountains may provide western China with an outlet to the sea some day. The Indus Valley Road is scheduled for opening next year. It will link Rawalpindi with Gilgit. Rawalpindi is connected with the port of Karachi by an existing 1000 mile road and railway. The Indus Road following Indus river for much of the way will immediately improve Pakistan's communications with Gilgit. It will 'revolutionize the economy' of that remote, sheep breeding sub-Himalayan

region, an official said. A fuller economy in Gilgit may in turn stimulate more trade with Sinkiang, informed observers believe....The Rawalpindi-Peking road, therefore, will not materialize soon, but observers who have studied the matter say it might become a significant project in the event of war between China and the Soviet Union.

According to the *Pakistan Times* editorial of 19 July 1964, the Indus Valley Road was to be completed by October 1965. The 252-mile all-weather road would link West Pakistan with Gilgit through Swat and by joining up with the existing Gilgit-Hunza Road would make it possible for motorists to drive straight through the Karakorams to Kashgar in China. The present road to Gilgit was through the Kaghan valley but that consisted of a narrow pony track that was open for only three months in the year. The editorial continued:

The road will also prove to be of great strategic importance for Pakistan and strengthen the commercial and cultural ties between Rawalpindi and Peking. That the project was begun much before the Sino-Pakistan border pact is itself a tribute to the farsightedness of the planners.

In an interview published by the Associated Press of Pakistan on 1 October 1964, the Pakistani Works Minister Rana Abdul Hamid disclosed that the Chinese had already completed their portion of the road up to the last Chinese border post. On the Pakistani side the new all-weather road between Rawalpindi and Gilgit would be in use by the following summer. A rough road suitable for jeeps from Gilgit to Baltit in Baltistan was being surveyed for re-building, he added. It was hoped that the 100-mile pony track, once used by caravans crossing to and from China, which ran from Baltit to the border, would also be converted in a road by next year. Besides providing a link with China, the Minister said, the new road planned between Rawalpindi and the isolated mountain area of Gilgit would provide supplies to the Karakoram state.⁷¹ This news report was, however, contradicted by the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office who said that "the Pakistan Government have at present no plan to build an all-weather road between Pakistan and China." He also said that the report appearing in the Indian press and broadcast by the BBC, quoting the Pakistani Minister for Works Rana Abdul Hamid, "was a distortion of the Minister's statement."⁷²

Although the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office denied that the Pakistan Government had any plan to build "an all-weather road between Pakistan and China," the work on the Karakoram highway to link Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with China seemed to have begun on both sides. The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 quickened the pace of that work as both Pakistan and China would have felt an urgent necessity of that road, particularly for the delivery of Chinese supplies to Pakistan. On 21 October 1967, China and Pakistan signed an agreement on the opening of an overland trade route between Gilgit in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Sinkiang in China. Although the text of the agreement had not been published, the official handout issued by the two Governments tried to present the agreement as no more than the re-opening of an old caravan route (also called the silk road) closed in 1949, with a view to facilitating the movement of goods between border areas "on a limited basis" and facilitate the overall trade and communications between China and Pakistan.¹² The argument about spending vast sums of money for a road link in areas with a scarce population and at an average height of over 8,000 feet for commercial purposes was hardly convincing particularly because the industrial areas of China were in its eastern parts and the proposed road was not only tortuous but open only for part of the year. The old silk road was hardly a mule track whereas the proposed road, which was stated to take its place, was to be jeepable on which heavy traffic trucks could ply for at least a part of the year.

The proposed road link between China and Pakistan was not devoid of military significance. It was clear that by facilitating the transportation of supplies and equipment from China to West Pakistan through the proposed overland route (may be for only part of the year) it was bound to make the Sino-Pakistani military collusion more effective thereby increasing the threat to Jammu and Kashmir from the north and particularly to India's lines of communications to Kargil and Leh where Indian troops were facing Chinese troops.

As the Sino-Pakistani agreement on the opening of the overland trade route affected Indian sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir and posed a military threat to India, India addressed protest notes on 19 April 1968 to both Pakistan and China

for the purpose of safeguarding the sovereign rights in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and exposing the military aspect of the proposed road link between China and Pakistan. It was stated in the Pakistani press release of October 1967 that the agreement was intended for the benefit of "the people living in the border areas of both the countries." India objected to this as the implication was that the people living in the area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir bordering China were Pakistani nationals. The Chinese complicity in this regard was clear, the Indian note to China pointed out, from the news item carried by the *Hsinhua* on 25 October 1967 which referred to the "territories of Gilgit and Baltistan on the Pakistan side." While the so-called border agreement of 1963 between China and Pakistan described that agreement as "provisional" in nature, that tenuous pretext "appears to have been dropped" now, the Indian notes to Pakistan and China added. The Indian protest notes also made it quite clear to both China and Pakistan that the presence of Pakistan in the northern part of Kashmir was based on aggression and illegal occupation. It further stated: "Pakistan has no *locus standi* whatsoever to enter into negotiations or to conclude any agreements with any country which would affect in any way Indian territory illegally occupied by Pakistan in this area."

Exposing the military aspect of the proposed road link, the Indian note to Pakistan observed that against the known background of Sino-Pakistan designs in Kashmir and Pakistan's efforts to seek Chinese military support against India, it was obvious that the agreement "has purposes other than to facilitate 'traditional overland trade' between China, Pakistan and the West Asian countries." When it was reported in the Pakistani press and radio that Pakistan and China had finalized arrangements for "border trade" between Gilgit in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Sinkiang in China through the overland route⁷⁶, India again addressed a protest note to Pakistan on 23 November 1968.

Side by side, Pakistan and China started to work on another road linking Quila Nabi in Sinkiang with Mor Khun in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir through the Khunjerab Pass (16,000 feet). Some 12,000 Chinese military personnel were inducted in the area for completing the new road. As the second road

would provide easier access for Chinese troops in Aksai Chin and Tibet to the Pakistan-occupied Gilgit area of Kashmir and thereby increase the possibility of joint Sino-Pakistani military manoeuvres just north of the cease fire line between India and Pakistan in that area the military significance of the new road was very clear India again lodged protests with both China and Pakistan on 25 June 1969 China was accused of abetting illegal occupation of the Indian territory by Pakistan and 'wilfully complicating Indo-Pakistani relations and adding new tensions' ⁷⁷ The Indian note to Pakistan described the road as forming a part of a 'calculated and co-ordinated plan' The new road was 'a threat to the peace and tranquility in the region' which could not be justified except on the grounds of military expansionism ⁷⁸ In his statement before the Lok Sabha, the Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh observed on 22 July 1969 that Pakistan's willingness to build the road with Chinese help showed that "Pakistan's intentions and ambitions in Kashmir equally serve Chinese designs in the area" ⁷⁹

The new road between China and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir through the Khunjerab Pass had been completed and was formally inaugurated on 16 February 1971 Answering a question in the Rajya Sabha on 16 June 1971, the Indian Deputy Minister of External Affairs stated that this new road afforded China "an outlet to the Indian Ocean through a connected network of roads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan" The Government of India considered that "not only a misuse of the territory which is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan but also as a danger to peace and security in the region" By this new road, China acquired a major trade outlet for its exports to African and West Asian countries through the seaport of Karachi A report published in the monthly journal, *The Pak Export*, further added that the opening of this four lane all weather highway which linked Sinkiang with Gilgit, more than 100 truck loads of Chinese products including military supplies for the Pakistan armed forces, were being moved into Pakistan daily The Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, anticipating a large volume of Chinese exports, began planning to double its present fleet of over 30 large vessels in the next five years, purchasing new vessels from

Germany, Yugoslavia and Spain.⁸⁰

Although in official Pakistani and Chinese statements only the economic benefits accruing from the road communications were emphasized, the strategic importance of the Karakoram Highway—named the Friendship Highway at the time of inauguration—was quite obvious and the *Morning News* described it as "primarily a defence project built by the Pakistan Army with substantial Chinese assistance."⁸¹ Moscow was also said to be apprehensive of the strategic roads linking Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Sinkiang as the same would help China in the movement of troops and logistics to the borders adjoining the USSR in Sinkiang and for that matter was understood to have conveyed its strong displeasure to Pakistan in the matter.⁸²

Apart from political, economic and military assistance, Islamabad could not lose sight of the fact of the geographical proximity of China and its continued hostility towards Pakistan's enemy No. 1—India—which made for Peking provide a counterpoise to India, a counterpoise that the United States or the Soviet Union "will not supply," as a Pakistani writer put it. There was, thus, "a powerful community of interests between Pakistan and China," he added.⁸³ Besides, the close relations with Peking served Pakistan's purpose of extracting maximum possible economic and military aid from the two super Powers and to look towards Peking for such help, which Washington and Moscow could not possibly provide, such as helping Islamabad "to make a bomb" (meaning atomic weapons) or/and spreading "the umbrella of its bomb over our bare heads," thereby enabling Pakistan to cope with "India's nuclear threat." In the face of that threat, the spokesman of Ayub Khan's establishment, Z.A. Suleri, remarked that no matter how strong "our preference for a balanced policy" vis-à-vis the three great Powers—the USA, the USSR and China—"little choice is left to us but to be more partisan to China than we are at the moment."⁸⁴

The above compulsions were foremost in Suleri's mind when he wrote the following on 31 July 1968—by that time it must have dawned on Islamabad that it could not expect much from the USSR by way of military hardware and that Moscow could not afford to alienate India by allowing Pakistan to

create a rift or misunderstanding between India and the Soviet Union To quote him

While balance between the three powers must be scrupulously observed, affinity with China should not be blurred in a theoretical essay at keeping equidistant from all. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush That applies to RCO and it applies to China The need for saying this arises because a tendency is discernible to flaunt our diplomacy for having acquired a pervasive orbit of good relations No doubt we should have economic and cultural relations on the widest spectrum But it should not be ignored that their value is peripheral The sum-total of these relations cannot amount to concrete acts of solidarity which tested the circle of fellowship in the 1965 war We know who stood with us and they should come before everyone else Ultimately the touchstone is what adds dimension to our equation with India with which we are locked in mortal combat ⁸⁵

Thus, Pakistan, on its part, continued to maintain friendly relations with China and to demonstrate the high regard it had for its relationship with China, even when Islamabad appeared to be closer to others than to Peking, by sending a number of delegations to Peking, by expressions of gratitude for the support given by China in 1965 and the valuable assistance extended thereafter and by its declarations that Pakistan would under no circumstances "abandon the cause of the people of Kashmir," ⁸⁶ thereby making it known that it would continue to maintain a posture of hostility towards India. Among the Pakistani dignitaries and delegations that visited China after the Indo-Pakistan conflict were the Commerce Minister Ghulam Farouq in July 1966, a parliamentary delegation led by the Speaker of the National Assembly in August 1966, Foreign Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada in October 1966, an economic delegation led by the Planning Commission chief M M Ahmed in December 1967, Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain in August 1968, an agricultural delegation in September 1970 and friendship delegations led by Governor Abdul Monem Khan, Minister Khwaja Shahabuddin, the Adviser to Ayub Khan Fida Hasan, and Governor Lt. Gen M A Rehman that went to Peking to participate in China's National Day celebrations in 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1970 respectively In 1969 as many as 3 delegations—a Government goodwill delegation

led by the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan, Mumtaz Ahmed Khan, the President of the Pakistan-China-Friendship Association, and Shakir Ullah Durrani, the Managing Director of the PIA and his entourage—attended the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Apart from the visit of President Yahya to China in November 1970 and the two friendship delegations headed by military personalities to participate in China's National Day, as many as five high-powered military missions were sent to China between 1966 and 1970 to obtain military hardware as also to forge closer links between the armed forces of the two countries. Thus, Defence Minister Vice-Admiral A.R. Khan visited China in May 1966, a military delegation headed by General Yahya Khan went to Peking in November 1968, Air Marshal Nur Khan in July 1969, Air Marshal A.R. Khan, C-in-C of the Pakistani Air Force at the head of an Air Force delegation in May 1970 and a naval mission led by Vice-Admiral Muzaffar Hassan, C-in-C of the Pakistani Navy, in September 1970.

General Yahya Khan, during his visit in 1968 stated that not only friendship and cooperation between China and Pakistan had been "growing constantly over the last few years" but also there had been "increasingly friendly contact between the Armed forces of our two countries." The Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Huang Yung-sheng, reciprocated by saying that Yahya's visit would "contribute to the strengthening of friendship between the peoples and Armed forces of our two countries" and make a "new valuable contribution to anti-colonialist tradition." He also applauded the Pakistani Armed Forces for heroically repulsing "the armed attacks by the Indian reactionaries" and criticized the "US imperialists and the chieftains of modern revisionism" for giving large quantities of arms and equipment and economic aid to India, thereby "threatening the security of our two countries."⁸⁷ The Pakistani Naval Chief was assured of Chinese support in safeguarding Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity against foreign aggression and interference and in the struggle of the Kashmiri people for their right of self-determination.

To assure Peking of its continued friendship, Islamabad also took quite a number of steps in the diplomatic field. Thus, when nine Chinese communists were arrested in Brazil for espionage, it was the Pakistani Ambassador who interviewed and looked after them and after negotiations arranged for their safe return to Peking via Karachi. Pakistan also kept itself aloof from the Seoul Conference of 9 Asian countries in the middle of 1966, which was denounced by both the USSR and China. In October 1966, the Pakistani Foreign Minister described the Chinese test of a guided missile with a nuclear head as the "latest and significant achievement a symbol of the great strides China has taken in the field of science and technology." He added that "the Chinese people can justifiably take pride in achieving so much in so short a time." In November 1966 the Pakistani delegate in the United Nations not only rendered strong verbal support to Peking on the question of Chinese representation in the UN but also voted against the US draft resolution requiring two thirds majority for deciding the issue, thereby going much further than in 1961 when Islamabad abstained. In April 1967, Pakistan "unexpectedly" joined France in boycotting the two day Military Advisers Conference of the SEATO countries,⁸⁸ and in October 1967 Islamabad expressed reservations on the contents of Chapter II, Sections A and D, of the annual report of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which accused North Korea of sending armed infiltrators into the South and listed South Korea's commitment of 45,000 combat troops to South Vietnam's "pacification" programme.⁸⁹ The April 1968 notice to Washington about the non-renewal of the Peshawar intelligence base, in close proximity to western China, afforded satisfaction to Peking, as it certainly did to Moscow, for it was evidently used for listening in and detection purposes in China as well. July 1968 saw the inauguration of a direct news service with China with the installation of a high-powered radio receiver at the Associated Press of Pakistan wireless office for receiving the world service of NCNA direct from Peking over a radio teleprinter.⁹⁰ In May 1969 Pakistan sent only an observer to the SEATO meeting and declined to take part in the drafting and signing of the joint communique. A month later, Pakistan, along with France, refused to take part

in the SEATO naval exercises and the *New China News Agency* (*Hsinhua*) of 9 June 1969 (No. 7451) spoke of Pakistani seamen firmly supporting the Chinese Government's statement of 24 May 1969 on the Sino-Soviet boundary question.

Pakistan took special care to assure Peking whenever there was any occasion for misgiving or apprehension in the minds of Chinese leaders about Pakistan's drift away from close relationship with China. Not long after Bhutto's dismissal, the new Foreign Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada made a trip to China and soon after the announcement of Pakistan's arms deal with the USSR Foreign Minister Mian Arshad Hussain went to Peking to assure Chinese leaders that "no power on earth can shake the friendship of our two peace-loving countries."⁹¹ Writing on the eve of his visit to China, the pro-government daily, the *Jung*, remarked that his trip was "a mission of reassurance that third parties cannot disturb the rock-like solidarity of Sino-Pak friendship."⁹² Yahya's trip to Moscow, resulting in an arms deal, was followed, besides Arshad Hussain's trip, by visits of two other important dignitaries Fida Hasan and Yahya Khan himself to Peking. In keeping with the sensitivity of the Chinese leadership, it was not until the beginning of September 1968 that articles about the Cultural Revolution and that too applauding its successes and achievements appeared in the *Pakistan Times*.⁹³

President Ayub himself deemed it necessary to send a message to Premier Chou En-lai on the occasion of the Chinese National Day, 1 October 1968, expressing his firm belief that "the close and good neighbourly relations that so happily exist between our two countries will continue to grow stronger for mutual benefit for the preservation of peace in the region."⁹⁴ In a feature article on that occasion entitled "Growth of Sino-Pakistan Friendship," contributed by Minhaj Barna in the *Pakistan Times*, the following words of praise for China were written:

China's support to Pakistan was complete and unhesitant. It was partly because of China that India dared not attack East Pakistan which from the beginning of the war was completely cut off from its western wing. The assistance of China in the crucial hour was unparalleled in recent world history. Again, after the war, when the Western Powers, including the United States, put an embargo on

arms sale to Pakistan, it was China which met all the immediate defence needs of Pakistan. Currently, the first Ordnance Factory of East Pakistan is being set up with Chinese financial and technical assistance. China since then has reiterated a number of times that it would help Pakistan if India again commits aggression⁹⁵

In a long discourse on Sino-Pakistani relations before the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 2 November 1968, Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain justified close friendship with China in these words

Pakistan's policy towards China is based on a careful assessment of Pakistan's immediate and long term interests. It would be incorrect to assume that these relations could be based on mere expediency or opportunism. The political aspects of Sino Pakistan relations are of vital interest to Pakistan and friendship with China is of fundamental importance to Pakistan's security. Since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 the global policy aims of the super powers have tended to coincide over the issue of India's posture of confrontation with China. Although there is no possibility of any large scale military clash between China and India, certain foreign powers, have given substantial material help in building up India's military capability. This military build up, coupled with India's militant outlook and hostility to Pakistan, has created a grave and continuing threat more to Pakistan than to China. China is well able to take care of itself. Considering the security problem with which Pakistan is faced as a result of Indian threats and the need to ensure minimum defence requirements, it is not difficult to visualise how much more vulnerable Pakistan's position would be without Sino Pakistan friendship⁹⁶

Towards the end of 1968 when Bhutto came to be arrested and a widespread agitation against the Ayub regime under the leadership of Maulana Bhashani came into existence, it became difficult for Peking to either support the establishment or the opposition. Even when Ayub came to be replaced by Yahya in March 1969, it was not until 5 May 1969 that Premier Chou En-lai sent a message to the new President and Chief Martial Law Administrator reminding him of the friendly relations and cooperation, which was in "the common interests" of the two countries, that had "greatly developed in recent years". It reiterated the desire of the Chinese Government to strengthen "as always" friendly and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan

on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. It assured Islamabad of the usual support to Pakistan against foreign aggression and interference and for the Kashmiri peoples' struggle for the right of self-determination and expressed the hope that "through the joint efforts of both sides, the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani people will continue to consolidate and develop."⁹⁷

Peking's silence during the period of turmoil in the last days of Ayub's rule and the cautious and guarded nature of Chou's message to Yahya reflected the Chinese concern about the growing Pakistan-Soviet relations, which was evident from the arms deliveries that started coming into Pakistan at about the time Yahya took over, the support extended by the USSR to the establishment in Pakistan and the sudden visit of Premier Kosygin to Rawalpindi in May 1969. At a time when China was having armed clashes with the USSR on the banks of the Ussuri, Kosygin's discussions with Yahya about regional economic cooperation between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India created apprehensions in the minds of Chinese leaders while the Brezhnev plan of collective security in Asia came to be regarded by Peking as a hostile move against China.

To set at rest the Chinese fears in the matter, Air Marshal Nur Khan was sent to Peking in July 1969. The highlights of the visit were the speeches made by Nur Khan and Chou En-lai at the State banquets. As in the last few years no joint communique was issued on the visit. At the banquet he hosted on 13 July 1969, Chou En-lai attacked both the proposals of the "system of collective security in Asia" and regional economic cooperation. The former was described as "a new step taken by social-imperialism in its intensified efforts to rig up a new anti-China military alliance aimed at aggression and expansionism against Asian countries" while the so-called regional economic cooperation was regarded as a "trap" for luring Asian countries and gradually placing them within its sphere of influence. "It is only natural and perfectly just that the Pakistani people and the righteous world opinion have recently exposed and rebutted its [Soviet Imperialism] schemes," Chou En-lai added.⁹⁸ Thus, Pakistan was specifically warned against participating in any regional econo-

mic cooperation or security plans Nur Khan's reply of 13 July 1969 was full of the general sentiments of friendship between the two countries and gratitude for Chinese support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir,⁹⁹ but offered no satisfaction to Peking on those matters

Strong Chinese pressure must have been responsible for Nur Khan's coming out openly in setting at rest Chinese anxiety in the matter. In his speech of 16 July 1969 he thanked China profusely for the assistance given to Pakistan and referred to "the existing identity of views on problems of mutual interest". He spoke of Pakistan and China as having set an example in neighbourly cooperation which others could emulate. He added "Where such understanding is lacking and furthermore where differences exist on fundamental issues, any talk of regional cooperation on economic or other issues is unrealistic". There can be no doubt that the words "other issues" referred to the Soviet proposal for collective security. The reason why Nur Khan came out openly against the Soviet proposals was not only because they were considered anti-Chinese but also because they were regarded as pro-Indian and were as such unpopular in Pakistan. He also referred to the "outstanding success of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" which signified the extent to which Nur Khan could go to show Pakistan as the true friend and admirer of China. He, at the same time, characterized the strength of China as "a stabilizing factor in the maintenance of peace in the region" and declared that "China does not pose a threat to any nation". He denied the existence of any "outstanding issues between our two countries" and assured Peking of Pakistan's "unshakable determination to secure the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir."¹⁰⁰ Obviously satisfied by the Pakistani attitude, as reflected in Nur Khan's speech of 16 July and the private assurances he might have given to Chinese leaders, Chou En lai, in his speech of 16 July, spoke with confidence of Nur Khan's visit as having made "new contributions to the strengthening of the friendly relations between the two countries" and asserted "no one on earth can undermine it". He added "Imperialism, modern revisionism and their lackeys have once again failed in their recent scheme to wantonly sabotage Sino-Pakistan friendship."¹⁰¹

Nur Khan's visit to Peking, thus, represented a stage when the Soviet attempt to wean Pakistan away from China by giving economic assistance and arms supplies to Pakistan remained unfulfilled. In going to Peking, Nur Khan was following the tradition which led both Pirzada and Arshad Hussain to visit China soon after they assumed office as Foreign Ministers. While for its requirements of sophisticated arms and large-scale economic aid, Pakistan might continue to try to expand its relations with the two super Powers—the USA and the USSR—the strategic consideration was a compelling factor in inducing Pakistan to remain friendly with China and this made for the fact that the Chinese position in Pakistan remained dominant. Nur Khan's visit to Peking confirmed that fact. The *Pakistan Times* of 19 July 1969 spoke of China as a "natural ally" of Pakistan and Marghub Siddiqi called China "an ally in peace and war."¹⁰² After pointing to Sino-Indian relations that continued to be strained with no likelihood of their being assuaged in the near future and China's genuine interest in Pakistan's viability and capability "in all fields of confrontation with India," Z.A. Suleri came to propound a theory of "a greater identity of interests" with Peking than with the other great Powers and of Pakistan being "closer to some than others"—almost a new version or revival of "special relationship" with China—in these words

The allegation that Pakistan's relations with China have undergone a change is humbug. No government in Pakistan can go against the requirements of the country's basic and compulsive interests. America and Russia cannot give up its partiality to India and that's that. That decides our attitude firmly and irrevocably.¹⁰³

During 1970 Sino-Pakistani relations seemed to have acquired a new warmth, even though at times there was some hesitation on the part of Peking in recollecting the events of 1965 after the chill of the 1966-69 days, with each side firmly believing that it was in its interest to maintain close and cooperative relations with the other. This was reflected in the Pakistani government's warning to politicians in the beginning of 1970 against making hostile references to China during the election campaign. By 1970 China had also recovered from its internal upheaval, known as the Cultural Revolution, and was looking for activating its dip-

lomacy in the world arena. The *Hsinhua* while reporting on the meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Rawalpindi, stated with confidence that the people of Pakistan would frustrate any attempt to put the Kashmir problem in cold storage in the name of "Indo-Pak amity," indicating thereby Peking's interest in maintaining tension between India and Pakistan. The launching of the Chinese satellite was hailed by *Dawn* in banner headlines in April 1970.

As possibilities of receiving arms deliveries from the two super Powers—the USA and the USSR—remained nil or insignificant and as there was no hope of Pakistan ever obtaining their cooperation against India, Islamabad looked to Peking for greater help in economic and military spheres. By dispatching high level Air Force and Naval delegations to China, an attempt was made to forge closer links among the armed forces of the two countries. Air Marshal Rahim Khan, during his visit to China in May 1970, spoke highly of the "generous economic assistance" given by Peking, assistance which, he said, "contributed significantly to strength of our Armed Forces." He reportedly sought spares from China for the MiG 19s and IL-28s, supplied by it earlier, as also military electronics equipment, possibly a sensitive radar network for the Pakistani Air Force. It was also reported that Peking had agreed to supply Islamabad with two or three W class submarines and to provide training for the Pakistani Navy crew. During the visit of the Naval Chief Vice-Admiral Muzaffar Hasan in September 1970, "the possibility of Chinese assistance in strengthening and 'rejuvenating' Pakistan's aging fleet" was examined. That Peking could help Pakistan in constructing medium size fighting ships was also not lost sight of.¹⁰¹ By demonstrating its continuous closeness to Peking, Islamabad was, at the same time, inducing the USA and the USSR to give more economic and military aid to Pakistan.

In October 1970, President Yahya Khan declared publicly from the United Nations rostrum that friendly relations with China, the USA and the Soviet Union was "the cornerstone of our policy."¹⁰² Although this could be said to be reiteration of the policy of 'bilateralism' with the great Powers, the order in which the names of countries were listed is not to be lost sight of. That Yahya held friendship with China in high esteem

was proved not only by the spate of high-powered Pakistani missions visiting China but also by the fact that soon after his visit to Moscow and without waiting for the long awaited Chou En-lai's visit to his country, he himself deemed it necessary to go to China in November 1970. The visit of Yahya at the head of a 15-man team, that included several senior army officers and the Economic Adviser, M. M. Ahmed, came at a time when Pakistan had been anxiously seeking resources for its growing development requirements, for coping with its debt-repayment difficulties and also for maintaining its armed strength at a level that would serve as "an effective deterrent." In both these fields "Pakistan has had so far only limited success," as the diplomatic correspondent of the *Pakistan Times* put it. He added:

Faced as it is with a evergrowing military might of an hostile India, Pakistan has been trying to buy weapons from various sources. However, its efforts in Washington and Moscow have not had much success. The recent American offer is so limited in its scope as to be of only small significance. At the same time, the 1968 deal with Russia remains largely unfulfilled.¹⁰⁶

That Peking was in a receptive mood to meet the Pakistani requirements was reflected in the *People's Daily* editorial welcoming "distinguished Pakistani guests" in which it was noted "with satisfaction" that Islamabad "defying outside pressure, firmly adhere to the policy of friendship towards China" and by opposing the plot of creating "two Chinas" actively "stand" for the restoration of Peking's rights in the UN.¹⁰⁷ The *New China News Agency* remembered Pakistan's rejection of the Soviet proposals about regional economic cooperation and collective security in Asia in 1969 and appreciated Islamabad's stand in these words:

Last year when a super power, flaunting the banner of "regional economic cooperation", peddled a pernicious "system of collective security in Asia" in a vain attempt to control the Asian countries, further push its aggression and expansion in Asia and oppose China, the Pakistan government and people firmly rejected the proposal. A spokesman of the Pakistan foreign ministry declared that Pakistan found "no attraction" in the proposal on "regional economic cooperation." The people and public opinion in

the form of the Chinese side "noting with interest" that offer and considering it "worthy of the support of the people of various countries." Another significant gain in the joint communique for Pakistan had been Chinese appreciation, perhaps for the first time, of Pakistan's stand for a peaceful solution of the Indo-Pakistani dispute over the distribution of the Ganges waters and the hope expressed there for an early settlement of that dispute. On the Vietnam and Middle East questions the similarity of viewpoints was stressed. The struggle of the three peoples' of Indo-China for "national liberation" was described as "just" and it was stated that the Indo-China question must be settled by the peoples of Indo-China themselves but the communique omitted any reference to American troops or aggression there. In the case of situation in the Middle East, the two sides demanded vacation of "all Arab lands" by Israel and reaffirmed "their resolute support to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and Israeli Zionism and for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."¹¹¹

The most significant outcome of President Yahya's China visit, called his most rewarding visit, was in the economic field. The joint communique merely expressed the willingness of the Chinese Government to render to Pakistan "further assistance within China's means and capacity to help make the economy of Pakistan self-reliant."¹¹² But after the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed in Peking on 14 November 1970,¹¹³ it was disclosed by Yahya's Economic Adviser M.M. Ahmed that China had given a \$200 million interest free loan, payable in kind through exports to China in 20 years with a 10 year grace period, for Pakistan's economic development projects in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. This amount was almost double of what Peking had pledged in the past—Rs. 100 crores as compared to Rs. 54 crores worth of Chinese financial aid provided during the past Plan periods.¹¹⁴ The new Chinese loan, remarked M.M. Ahmed, was a hundred per cent increase over the financial assistance of previous Plans and would mean more than its face value as the commodities to be bought in China were considerably inexpensive as compared to the world prices.¹¹⁵ On 17 November 1970, the Red Cross Society of

China decided to donate 3 million yuan (2 million in the form of supply of such materials as rice, blankets, foodstuffs and medicaments and 1 million yuan in cash) to help the people in the cyclone stricken areas in East Pakistan. On the same day Premier Chou En lai sent a message to President Yahya Khan expressing deep sympathy and solicitude for the people of the afflicted areas in East Pakistan hit by cyclone.¹¹⁶ Thus, the year 1970 ended with Peking recovering the ground lost in 1966-69 in Pakistan and the consolidated Sino-Pakistani amity was well poised to reveal itself during the Bangladesh crisis a year later. Apart from misjudging the outcome of elections in Pakistan (in fact calculations of many others had gone wrong and no one had thought that the Awami League would be able to obtain an absolute majority even in the National Assembly of Pakistan), an important factor which led Peking to tender strong support to Yahya was that a democratic set-up in Pakistan was likely to release forces which would have favoured an accommodation and even friendship with India—a possibility to which China was particularly sensitive.

6 The Bangladesh Crisis and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971

During the Bangladesh crisis and the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, Peking's attitude had been twofold—to continue to render support to the military administration of Yahya Khan in his confrontation with India and prevent Islamabad from giving in to pressure from one or the two super Powers and secondly, to work towards the strengthening of its influence in East Pakistan in every possible way. The *Hsinhua* carried only one item on the hijacking of the Indian plane in which it noted that the Pakistani Government had "deplored" the destruction of the Indian aircraft by the hijackers. The Chinese news agency denounced the Indian Government's "unilateral" banning of overflights of Pakistani civil and military aircraft and also referred to the Jan Sangh as fanning "anti-Pak sentiment" following the hijacking incident. As only a united Pakistan could better serve as a counter-weight to India, Chou En-lai, in his message to Yahya on 12 April 1971, laid stress on "the unification of Pakistan and the unity of the people of the East and West Pakistan." He considered them to be the "basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength."¹ In supporting the freedom struggle of the Awami League leaders, which could by no stretch of imagination be considered as Maoists or faithful to Peking, China saw the risk of not only losing its close friend and ally in Islamabad but also of seeing its influence disappear in East Bengal altogether. On the contrary, if the liberation struggle became prolonged, there was every possibility of extremists and revolutionary Maoist elements gaining the upperhand in Bangladesh. If these elements could

successfully scuttle the movement for autonomy or liberation, they were likely to receive preferential treatment at the hands of the military junta in Islamabad which would in turn enable them to infiltrate into the army and administration and to build their organizational strength in East Pakistan. Even if they were not able to establish a People's Republic through revolution under the auspices of China, that too helped Peking in having a powerful leverage to bend Islamabad to its wishes.

Over the years Peking had been attempting to forge closer economic, political and cultural links with East Pakistan. Although the Calcutta branch of the Bank of China was closed because it was found extending a substantial amount of money for communist activities, its Dacca branch was opened which facilitated the penetration of Chinese influence in East Pakistan. The presence of a large number of Chinese experts there in connection with the setting up of an Ordnance factory or assisting in flood control methods, the improvement of agriculture or the building of a bridge over the Brahmaputra, in addition to those stationed or working with shipping or air services, were an important element in extending Chinese influence in East Pakistan. Likewise, the existence of the Chinese Consulate in Dacca, the establishment of Pak-China Friendship Societies in various towns of East Bengal, the visit of delegations, which was much facilitated by the PIA flights, support given to pro-Chinese elements such as Bhashani and underground movements led by Toha, the Chinese residents engaged in restaurant and petty business and the Chinese students and teachers in Dacca University—all were helpful to Peking in their own way. Peking Radio broadcasts in Bengali, pamphlets published in Bengali by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Peking and a number of Mao's works translated in Bengali and published in Dacca—were all good vehicles of popularizing Chinese communist ideology in East Bengal.

As early as October 1965, A N Das, writing in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* spoke of the increasing movement of Chinese military officers and the concentration of the overseas Chinese population—as much as 4 000 in the Khulna district alone and a 'China Town' coming into being in Rajshahi Town. The Chinese military officers were seen visiting more and more districts of East Pakistan and imparting training to members

of the Pakistani Army in tactics of guerrilla warfare. There were also reports that the Chinese were supervising the construction of a river port in Barisal and were associated with the expansion of airports and the construction of air strips at Lalmonirhat, Kurmitala and Iswardi.²

In view of the multifarious channels of Chinese penetration and influence in East Pakistan, it was hardly surprising that a Bengali author in 1966 came to view Peking's main interest not in Kashmir but in East Pakistan—the biggest prize that it could hope from cultivating friendship with Pakistan.³ The National Awami Party which had been infiltrated by communists and was following a pro-Chinese line had not supported Mujib's 6-point programme and as a result the NAP leaders were not arrested. Similarly, when the trouble started with the army crackdown in East Bengal in March 1971, only one of the four different communist groups in East Bengal still owing allegiance to Mao sternly opted out of the guerrilla struggle waged by the Mukti Bahini under the auspices of the Awami League.⁴ In the opinion of Peking, success of the struggle for civil liberties and democracy would have paved the way for harmonious relations between Hindus and Muslims, which in turn made for Indo-Pak amity directed against China. Peking sought to counter that threat by aspiring for the installation of a pro-Peking regime not confined to East Bengal. A secret document detected in Europe in 1964 and meant for a pro-Chinese communist leader of West Bengal, spelt out the Chinese ambition in the eastern region of the Indian sub-continent. The goal of Chinese policy, as stated in that document, was the establishment of a People's Republic of Bengal which would not only include East Pakistan and West Bengal but would also extend from Nagaland in the east to the borders of Nepal in the west.⁵

While Washington and Moscow suspended or stopped their aid to Islamabad after the army crackdown in East Pakistan, Peking continued its assistance to Pakistan. Thus, a 7-member Chinese technical delegation arrived in Islamabad to survey the possibilities of setting up a basic refractory plant in Pakistan, according to a Radio Pakistan report of 28 March 1971. China signed a protocol in Karachi on 28 April 1971 on the construction of a sugar mill in the public sector near

Larkana Peking agreed to supply about 5,000 tons of newsprint to Pakistan on an *ad hoc* basis to help Pakistani newspapers tide over the crisis caused by the disruption of supplies from Khulna in East Bengal and also to export 20,500 tons of coke to Pakistan—the first supplies of which were expected during May-June 1971. Islamabad expressed its "deep appreciation" to Peking for the supply of two tons of powdered milk as "relief assistance to East Pakistan".⁶

Commenting on the suspension of US aid and the reported pressure by some member countries of the World Bank on Pakistan to devalue its currency, a Pakistani official was said to have privately remarked "If the United States tells us to go to hell, we have no alternative but to turn to China". In order not to disappoint Islamabad in the matter, Peking announced its offer of a new interest free loan of \$20 million not tied to the purchase of Chinese products.⁷ According to a Pakistani press report, China had till then pledged a total of \$307 million in economic assistance to Pakistan. The Pakistani paper, the *Sun* (Karachi) of 14 May 1971, in its editorial, stated that the Chinese loan had been interest-free and in some cases, instead of pressurizing Pakistan into speedy repayment, China had expressed willingness even to write off some of the loans. Comparing the conditions of aid and loans offered to Pakistan by Western countries and China, the *Pakistan Times* of 17 May 1971 found a striking contrast between the two. While the Russian aid carried an average rate of interest of 2½ per cent repayable in 12 years, the editorial in the *Pakistan Times* observed, Chinese aid carried a zero per cent rate of interest with a maturity period of 20 years and a grace period of 10 years, which too was generally extended on request. The paper held that the real worth of China's aid was considerably greater than its face value for three reasons —

- (i) The tied dollar borrowed from a consortium country buys 30 to 40 per cent less than in the capitalist world market. Chinese prices, on the other hand, were lower than even the world market prices and so a Chinese aid dollar buys about 60% more than the world market.
- (ii) The Chinese experts are not as expensive as the Western experts.
- (iii) The repayment of Chinese loans involved no reserve currency and took the form of the export of goods.⁸

In August 1971, the Bank of China transferred all its assets and offices in Karachi and Chittagong to the National Bank of Pakistan as a gesture of goodwill and with a view to help increase trade between the two countries. According to a Radio Pakistan broadcast of 15 October 1971, a Chinese team of experts was to visit East Bengal in November to work out details in regard to the laying of railway tracks and telephone and telegraph lines between Dacca and Chittagong. Chinese aid had also been sought in the setting up of several gas-operated fertiliser factories, sinking of 5,000 tube-wells and setting up of a cotton textile mill and a cement factory.⁹

The Pakistani papers gave detailed accounts of the celebrations of the 20th Anniversary of the Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations. Functions were held in Karachi and Lahore. The *Pakistan Times*, in an account of such a meeting in Lahore, expressed some satisfaction over the fact "that there was no abundance of Mao pictures or Mao buttons; no recital from the Little Red book either." According to the report, there was less of show business and more dealing—"a profound people to people rapport." The *New Times*, in an editorial dated 23 May 1971 said that all the Chinese weapons supplied to Pakistan during the last 5 years had been given free—"absolutely gratis, not even with the semblance of a string." According to the editorial, when Pakistan offered to pay, Mao's reply was: "China as a matter of policy does not trade in weapons. Politically the Chinese have agreed to provide the weapons to any country of liberation movement, arms have been supplied free." According to US estimates, China supplied \$133 million worth of arms to Pakistan from October 1965 to the end of 1970.

Peking was not indifferent to Islamabad's military needs at the time of the crisis in East Bengal. This was proved when a Pakistani Air Force delegation, consisting of instructors and cadets, and led by Air Commodore Kamal Ahmed, undertook a two-week "friendship visit" to China in April-May 1971. The purpose of the visit was to negotiate the sale or lease of transport aircraft to Pakistan which could be used in ferrying troops and supplies from West Pakistan to East Bengal.¹⁰ Chou En-lai was said to have offered not only help in rebuilding the economy of East Pakistan but also assured

Yahya of additional military aid through the Pak Air Force delegation. That China was supplying additional arms to Pakistan since the outbreak of the freedom struggle in Bangladesh was confirmed by the Indian Minister of State for Defence Production, V C Shukla, in the *Lok Sabha*. China had also announced that whatever aid was necessary for Pakistan to overcome its present difficulties and also to meet any alleged threat from India, it would be willing to give it, Shukla added.¹¹

According to the *Daily Telegraph* (London, 31 May 1971) despatch, China had agreed to supply the bulk of the weapons and equipment for two new divisions—about 40,000 men—being raised by the Pakistani army at a time when the latter was taking action in the break away Bangladesh. More than a hundred military lorries were reported carrying military and other supplies from China daily along the newly opened Karakoram highway, named the Friendship Highway at the time of its inauguration in February 1971. Radio Pakistan disclosed on 29 and 30 September 1971 that an 18-member Chinese trade caravan with merchandise for exchange with Pakistani goods, led by Lin Chia-hsien, arrived in Gilgit and left for Sinkiang through that highway after exchanging goods.¹² According to authoritative reports, the shipment of Chinese arms and ammunitions in about 100 crates was unloaded at Chittagong port in June 1971 under the joint supervision of two senior Pakistani and three Chinese officers. The supplies included machine guns, automatic rifles and long-range mortars which would enable Pakistanis to pull back from the forward positions, in many areas of the Indo-Bangladesh border, held by them in violation of the ground rules.¹³

In August 1971, Peking gave three 1,000-ton freighters at rock-bottom prices on interest-free credits for use on the coast to transport supplies to areas where roads and railways had been disrupted by the freedom fighters. This, along with other commodity assistance, was provided out of the \$200 million loan announced by China in November 1970 during Yahya Khan's visit to Peking.

According to a UNI report, quoting the Dacca correspondent of the *Daily Mail* (London), 200 Chinese guerrilla warfare experts were flown to Bangladesh to train the Pakistani forces. The correspondent said the experts arrived in the wake of

mounting Mukti Bahini attacks in the Mymensingh sector during the third week of October. He added that the experts were sent by Peking in response to an urgent appeal by President Yahya. Twenty training camps, each comprising of 250 Pakistani soldiers and 10 Chinese instructors, had reportedly been set up in the forests near Dacca. The *Daily Mail* also reported that China was planning to build an arms, ammunition and an aircraft factory in Dacca next year.¹⁴ This report was further corroborated by the statement of an Indonesian military spokesman, Brig. Gen. Angus Marpang, in Djakarta on 24 November 1971, in which he justified his own country's training of Cambodian troops in guerrilla warfare by referring to China's sending of 200 military instructors to Pakistan for training Pakistani troops in counter-guerrilla warfare.¹⁵ On 30 November 1971, Radio Tokyo reported that Chinese military aircraft were ferrying arms to Pakistan. Islamabad on its part was reported to have lent China a complete engine of the F104 Star Fighter "presumably for purpose of imitation."¹⁶ According to an article in a Mongolian newspaper, the *Unen*, China provided Pakistan facilities to fly military planes to the east over its territory and gave it massive military assistance in a bid to suppress the national liberation movement in Bangladesh. At the height of the Indo-Pakistan war when US ships were close to India's southern shores, the article added, Peking increased its troops on the northern borders of India.¹⁷

Though the West Pakistani army crackdown on the East Bengal population started on 25 March 1971, Peking maintained a studied silence which was broken only on 4 April 1971, when Radio Peking and the official press agency the NCNA reported Yahya's announcement of sending troops into East Bengal and his statement blaming "secessionist elements" who wanted independence for the eastern wing of Pakistan. The agency also reported that Pakistan had lodged protests against alleged Indian interference in Pakistan's affairs.¹⁸ On 6 April 1971, a Chinese note protested against the Indian Government's "connivance" in a demonstration of several hundred Indians outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on 29 March 1971 and charged India with "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan." The demonstration was

organized to protest against Peking's giving aid to Islamabad in "its war on the freedom-loving people of East Bengal"¹⁹ The words "freedom-loving people of East Bengal" were taken from the placards displayed by the demonstrators and put within quotes in the Chinese protest note and therefore did not signify either Peking's approval of the freedom fight of the people of East Bengal or its disapproval of Yahya's repressive actions.

However, the *People's Daily* commentator on 11 April 1971 came to justify the atrocities perpetrated by Yahya Khan on the unarmed people of East Bengal by calling them "relevant measures taken by President Yahya Khan in connection with the present situation in Pakistan" which he said was "the internal affairs of Pakistan in which no country should or has the right to interfere." He accused the Indian Government for openly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan and "busily plotting for international intervention in league with the two super powers." He also denounced India for making inflammatory remarks over the Pakistan situation, massing troops along the East Pakistani border and "even instigated armed plain clothes men to infiltrate into Pakistan territory for disruption and harassment," thereby seriously prejudicing the security of Pakistan. He then resolutely supported "as always" Pakistan's just struggle for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and interference.²⁰

The *People's Daily* commentary was followed by Premier Chou's message to Yahya in which he sought to justify the handling of the situation in East Pakistan by the military administration of Pakistan when he referred to Yahya doing "a lot of useful work to uphold the unification of Pakistan and to prevent it from moving towards a split," and differentiated the broad masses of the people from "a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan." He declared emphatically that "what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely the internal affairs of Pakistan, which can only be settled by the Pakistani people themselves and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever." He expressed confidence in the "wise consultations and efforts" of Yahya Khan and "leaders of various quarters in Pakistan," by which he presumably meant Bhutto and his ilk, about bringing the situation in Pakistan to normalcy again. Posing himself as "a genuine

friend of Pakistan," Chou contrasted the Chinese attitude with that of the USSR and the USA and accused India of "gross interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by exploiting the internal problems" of Pakistan. In the end, the Chinese Premier assured Yahya of the firm Chinese support "as always" in case "Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan."²¹

Chou En-lai's message to Yahya of 12 April 1971 was in marked contrast to that of Podgorny's letter of 2 April 1971 and was addressed after Yahya had replied to the Soviet President. But the intriguing thing was that the *Peking Review* and other Chinese news media—Radio Peking or the *Hsinhua*—which published in full the *People's Daily* commentator's articles of 11 April 1971 and texts of Podgorny's message and Yahya's reply, had kept silent about Chou's letter to Yahya. Apart from that, what was important was that Chou En-lai's letter, the full text of which had been reproduced in the Pakistani papers—the *Dawn* and the *Pakistan Times* of 13 April 1971—expressed "close concern" of the Chinese Government and people about "the development of the present situation in Pakistan" and his apprehensions about "the unification of Pakistan and unity of the people of East and West Pakistan" which he regarded as "the basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength." He took cognizance of "the internal problems" of Pakistan and though distinguishing from the broad masses of the people "a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan," Chou En-lai, unlike the *People's Daily* commentator, did not speak about Yahya's repressive action as "relevant measures". When he referred to Yahya and the "leaders of various quarters in Pakistan" having done "a lot of useful work to uphold the unification of Pakistan and to prevent it from moving towards a split" he was obviously referring to the Dacca parleys, before the army crackdown on 25-26 March 1971, between Yahya, Bhutto and the Awami League leaders. In expressing his belief that "wise consultations and efforts" of Yahya and "leaders of various quarters in Pakistan" would lead to the restoration of a normal situation in Pakistan, Chou was indeed counselling moderation otherwise he would not have chosen the words "useful work," "wise" before "consultations" and "various quarters" after "leaders"

but simply used the phraseology "relevant measures," "action" etc. as was done by the *People's Daily* commentator. It was not easy to say anything with certainty as to whether or not the "leaders of various quarters in Pakistan" included Mujib and other Awami League leaders. The Chinese Premier deliberately chose to keep that vague. It was also significant that Chou En lai as well as other Chinese news media, while loudly criticizing, condemning and denouncing the Soviet leaders, did not join issue with Podgorny's mention of "bloodshed and repressions," in his letter to Yahya, for fear of coming out openly at that stage against the Awami League and other popular leaders of East Bengal. Nor did China say a word denouncing the military regime for its atrocities in East Bengal.

In his reply, Yahya drew the attention of the Soviet President to the "open and unashamed interference" by India in the "present situation" in Pakistan with the object of inflaming that situation further "by encouraging and materially assisting a handful of people to create disturbances" and the concentration of Indian forces on Pakistan's borders which, he said, constituted "a direct threat to our security." He justified his actions against what he called "anti national elements" and added that no Government, including that of the Soviet Union, "can condone or fight shy of dealing with subversive elements attacking its sovereignty and territorial integrity." Yahya then administered a mild rebuke to Podgorny for his discourse on a democratic solution when he said that "no one is more conscious than I am of the need for democratic processes to be allowed to take their own course" and advised him to use his "undeniable influence with India to prevent her from meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs." 22

As Yahya's letter of reply to Podgorny was regarded by Chou as exposing Moscow's "unreasonable interference" in the affairs of Pakistan, it was very much played up in the Chinese press and news media. Radio Peking, in its broadcasts, basing itself on the comments in the Pakistani papers, tried to establish the absurdity of the USSR's claim to "humanity" by referring to its misdeeds of eliminating countless human beings in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia and made fun of its having any "conscience." It quoted with approval the *Pakistan*

Times comment that Podgorny was taking "a one-sided view of the situation." While *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, carried side by side both Indian and Pakistani versions of border incidents etc., Radio Peking and Chinese papers based themselves entirely on Pakistani press reports. Consequently, the Chinese news media highlighted Islamabad's lodging of strong protests with the Indian Government and the mass demonstration in Dacca against the so-called Indian interference and sending of armed infiltrators on 13 April 1971, reports of Indian soldiers being taken prisoners in East Pakistan, the massing of Indian troops along the East Pakistan border and the despatching of armed personnel in civilian clothes for infiltration purposes—and all that was said to "arouse the indignation of all justice upholding countries."

A Radio Peking commentary on 28 April 1971 endorsed Yahya's charge of "open and shameless interference" against India, of concentration of troops by India and of aggravating the situation "through instigating and materially supporting a handful of people to create turmoil." It added:

Taking advantage of the current situation in Pakistan, the Indian reactionaries have gone to great lengths to stir up evil winds and make trouble. This has fully laid bare their attempt to split Pakistan so as to realise their ambition of expansionism.

Meanwhile, the two super-powers have also closely co-operated with Indian reactionaries to crudely interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Indian newspapers and periodicals and reports by Western news agencies reveal that the meddling activities in the past month were designed by India, together with the United States and the Soviet Union. UP admitted that, in addition to talks in the United Nations, discussions were also conducted by the United States, the Soviet Union, and India in Washington, Moscow and New Delhi, so that united action could be taken with regard to the situation in Pakistan.

The US State Government openly declared its concern about the situation in Pakistan, in a fruitless attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan through the so-called international relief activities. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, openly stepped forward to arbitrarily criticise the measure taken by the Pakistani Government to stabilise the situation in East Pakistan. However the attempt by Indian reactionaries and two super powers to make the Pakistani

people yield to their pressure has run into resolute resistance and opposition from the Government and people of Pakistan²³

As compared to *Pravda's* report of 24 June 1971 that carried side by side both the Indian and Pakistani versions of border incidents under the same heading 'On Indo Pakistan Border —one datelined Delhi and the other datelined Karachi —both dated 23 June 1971 Radio Peking on 27 June 1971, quoting the Press Communiqué issued by the Pakistan Press Information Department on 23 June 1971, spoke of the Pakistan Government handing over two protest notes to the Indian High Commission in Pakistan on 21 June 1971 and 22 June 1971 against the repeated acts of firing and intrusions into Pakistan territory by the Indian Border Security Force and other armed personnel. Radio Peking also referred to the reports of the Associated Press of Pakistan according to which a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan stated on 24 June that the situation created by New Delhi's policy and action was causing serious concern to Pakistan which had drawn the attention of Government leaders of various countries to the mounting Indian threat to the peace and security of the sub-continent.

That Pakistan attached great importance to its relations with China was evident from Yahya's message on the anniversary of China's National Day, in which he urged China "to continue to play a valuable role in the preservation of peace in the world" and expressed his confidence that relations between Pakistan and China would grow.

The visit of Z A Bhutto at the head of a delegation consisting of the three Service Chiefs of Pakistan and high officials in the Foreign Office to Peking from 5 to 8 November 1971 was not the first attempt of Pakistan to establish rapport with the Chinese after the army crackdown in East Bengal. Besides usual exchanges or consultations through diplomatic channels, a Pakistani Air Force delegation was in China for two weeks in April-May 1971. However, such a high power delegation as the one led by Bhutto and that too coming at a time of mounting tension between India and Pakistan, with the two armies poised against each other in combat readiness, was highly significant.

The very timing of the visit as also the composition of the delegation suggested that serious discussions about military assistance and the possible intervention of China in case of an Indo-Pakistan war must have taken place in Peking. This was partly confirmed by the statement of the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman who mentioned arms aid as a topic of discussion, though Radio Pakistan spoke of bilateral matters of interest to the two countries. The visit has to be seen against the background of the growing diplomatic isolation of Pakistan and the steadily diminishing sources of military supplies resulting from the pursuit of its repressive policy in East Bengal (Washington suspended arms aid as of 25 March 1971 and later gave notice of its termination and cancellation of all licences for the export of the remaining arms shipment). The inclusion of Bhutto, who was considered as the architect of Pakistan's China policy, was based on many considerations—his greater persuasiveness with the Chinese, to avoid the impression that it was only military matters that were discussed and to dispel any lurking suspicions in the Chinese mind about the ruling military junta in Pakistan behaving the same way as the Indonesian in 1966 (the association of an elected leader commanding a good measure of popularity in West Pakistan was likely to carry conviction with Peking against that eventuality).

The probing of the Chinese mind as to where exactly Peking would stand in the event of a war with India was extremely important for Yahya at that juncture as it would enable him to make a fateful decision of war and peace with India—the decision that Bhutto said, after his talks in Peking, would be "ours". It was fairly well calculated that even if the trip did not yield some concrete results, the usual reiteration of support against Indian intervention etc. by China, the only Power that could carry some conviction for the Pakistani people and the world, would be enough to be exploited by the ruling junta of Pakistan to boost the sagging morale of the Pakistani people and the army. This was evident from the remarks that as India was consulting her friends "we are consulting ours."

In the absence of a joint communique, the success or failure of Bhutto's mission to Peking could only be assessed by the statements made by the acting Foreign Minister of China, Chi Peng-fei, and Bhutto. Speaking at an official lunch in honour

of the Pakistani delegation, Chi Peng-fei expressed great concern "over the present tension in the sub-continent," and condemned not only the "domestic secessionists" but also India for her interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and for carrying out subversive activities and military threats against Pakistan. Chi then expressed Chinese support "as always" should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression in the just struggle of Pakistan to defend its sovereignty and national independence. The absence of the words "territorial integrity" and "national unity" as also the use of qualifying words "as always" seemed to signify vagueness as to the extent of Chinese commitment. Judging from hindsight, one Western writer, Robert Jackson, has come to the conclusion that this vagueness was deliberate on the part of Peking, born as it was of the "very accurate reading of the situation" that Pakistan was unable to retain East Bengal. Writing in *International Affairs* (London) in January 1973, he states

The formula being pressed upon China by Pakistan was a commitment to the 'national unity and territorial integrity' of Pakistan—a formula which implied a threat of war against India and defence of Yahya's position in East Pakistan. In the event, the Chinese deliberately decided not to adopt this phraseology, and the formula they chose instead referred to Pakistan's 'independence and state sovereignty'. Obviously this was ambiguous in relation to East Bengal, although it certainly represented a firm commitment to the survival of the nucleus of Pakistan in the West.

This position of course defined very precisely the character of the Chinese stake in Pakistan—deeply committed to the maintenance of a strong and independent West wing, but interested in the East wing only as a means of strengthening Pakistan, and only to the extent that support for Yahya's position in the East was necessary if competition from the Russians for influence in Islamabad was to be beaten off.

While supporting the "reasonable proposal" of Yahya for the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces to a 'reasonable distance' from the borders, Chi, at the same time, observed that "the dispute between the two countries should be settled through consultations and not by resorting to force". He stressed that a "reasonable settlement" should be sought of the problem of unification 'by the Pakistani people themselves'.

i.e. by joint efforts.²⁴

Chi Peng-fei's statement, the first official statement on the part of China on the situation in the sub-continent since the Chinese referred in April 1971 to "Indian expansionists," was not quite different from Chou En-lai's message to Yahya Khan. In Chi Peng-fei's statement India was not accused of expansionism and the Soviet Union was not mentioned by name though a dig at Moscow could be seen in his remarks that "certain persons are truculently exerting pressure on Pakistan by exploiting tensions in the sub-continent in a wild attempt to achieve their ulterior motives"—thus expressing Chinese displeasure for any such move as a "second Tashkent". The subdued approach might have been due partly to Peking's realization of keeping a peaceful image in the UN and partly conditioned by the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. A more bellicose statement in this regard would have been self-defeating as it would not only have exacerbated Sino-Indian relations but also driven India more firmly on the side of the Soviet Union. This was not desirable from Peking's viewpoint, concerned as it was about its border problem with the Soviet Union and the Soviet role in Asian affairs.

In echoing its support for Yahya's proposal about the withdrawal of troops from the border, in emphasizing a reasonable settlement (Peking obviously avoided the words "political settlement" for fear of being put in the same category as the Soviet Union and others) of the East Bengal problem by the Pakistani people themselves and in speaking of Indo-Pakistani talks for the settlement of their dispute without resort to force, the attitude of China was not really very much different from the other super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

No particular importance should be attached to the absence of a joint communique at the end of Bhutto's visit to Peking as after 1966 no joint communique was issued though a number of visits between Pakistan and China took place during 1967 to 1969. Bhutto's claims of a "complete identity of views" and success in his mission seemed to be as exaggerated as speculation about Bhutto having returned empty-handed from Peking. It was true that during the Pakistani Air Force delegation's visit to China in April 1971 it was reported that the Chinese Premier conveyed to Yahya that the latter could safely rely

on the Chinese for military aid. No such report was forthcoming during Bhutto's visit about the supply of military hardware from China. From Chi Peng fei's statement also, it appeared that Peking was not prepared to spoil its image in the world especially on the eve of its entry in the United Nations—an image which it had been trying to build for quite some time and to sabotage its growing rapprochement with India. It was probably that dilemma faced by Peking that accounted for China trying to please Pakistan half-way by announcing verbal support and assuring in private of certain possible supplies of military hardware but at the same time keeping its options, in regard to India as well as Bangladesh, open.

The reproduction in the *Peking Review* of 10 September 1971 of an article in the North Vietnamese journal, the *Hoc Tap*, on "the danger of Japanese imperialism's policies of aggression and expansion in Asia," which spoke of the "heroic revolutionary struggles" being waged by "the people of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, India and Pakistan,"²⁵ is often cited, along with Peking's initial hesitation in using the term 'secessionist' for the freedom fighters, as an evidence of China not taking a rigid stand on Bangladesh. But in the opinion of the present writer not much importance could be attached to that stray reference indirectly made and whose striking out detracted from the faithful reproduction of an article from a friendly fraternal country.

The visit of a 'high powered' 12-member delegation, led by Li Shui ching, Minister in the First Machine-Building Ministry and including military and economic personages was one result of Bhutto's trip to Peking. The fact that the delegation would be visiting Lahore and Karachi, besides Rawalpindi, was an indication that the Chinese would be assessing the situation at first hand in different parts of the country. The delegation, which was said to have come to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Chinese-aided heavy machinery complex at Taxila on 25 November 1971, was not likely to take decisions, such as the conclusion of arms assistance or military defence agreements on the spot. All that it was likely to do was to report the situation to Peking for whatever action it deemed necessary.

In his statements, Li Shui-ching did not say anything new

which had not been said before by the Chinese leaders and merely repeated the usual "as always" support to Pakistan against foreign aggression and in the struggle to defend its state sovereignty and national independence. But the visit of the Chinese delegation was likely to have the effect in assuring the Pakistani populace and instilling some confidence in the morale of the army and the people of Pakistan. Therefore, the visit of the Chinese delegation at the invitation of the Pakistan Government, showed that at the time of a crisis in the Indian sub-continent Pakistan had a greater stake in its friendship with China.

In the Third Committee, the Chinese delegate Fu Hao on 19 November 1971 accused India, though without naming it, for interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs, for creating the "so-called" question of refugees, for rejecting the reasonable proposals of Pakistan about relaxing tension and settling the refugee question, for exploiting the question of refugees in order to carry out "subversive activities" against Pakistan and for obstructing the return of refugees to their homeland. To quote him:

The so-called question of refugees from East Pakistan came into being and developed to its present state due to a certain country's intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs, which has resulted in the present tension on the sub-continent. Recently the Pakistan Government has repeatedly proposed relaxing the tension on the sub-continent and settling the refugee question. But all these proposals have been rejected by the country concerned. It continues to exploit the question of refugees from East Pakistan to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, to carry out subversive activities against her and obstruct the return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homeland, making it impossible to reach a reasonable settlement of the question of the East Pakistan refugees. These tactics of interference in the internal affairs of other countries are well known to the Chinese Government and people. In our experience, a certain neighbouring country plotted a rebellion in the Tibetan region of our country and carried out subversive activities. When the rebellion it plotted was smashed by the Chinese people, it coerced tens of thousands of Chinese inhabitants into going to its country, creating a question of so-called 'Tibetan refugees' in wild opposition to China. We hold that in order to attain a reasonable settlement

of the question of refugees from East Pakistan, interference in Pakistan's internal affairs must first of all be stopped. Only in this way can the East Pakistan refugees truly be assisted in returning to their homeland.²⁶

The NCNA report of 25 November from Rawalpindi headlined "Indian Armed Forces Invade East Pakistan - President Yahya Khan Declares a State of Emergency" said that the Indian armed forces had "launched a large-scale offensive" on 21 November in the Jessore sector and other places in East Bengal. It further stated that General Yahya Khan had declared a state of emergency because "Pakistan is threatened by external aggression." The report, however, merely repeated what had been claimed by the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) and what was contained in the official Pakistani announcement. The NCNA abstained from making any comments of its own.²⁷ According to another Peking report, the Pakistani Ambassador in Peking K M Kaiser had a "cordial and friendly" meeting with Chou En-lai on 24 November when he presented a letter from Yahya and Premier Chou expressed "concern over India's military provocations along the East Pakistan border in the previous few days."²⁸ On 26 November 1971 Chiao Kuan-hua declared in the UN that Peking would "as always" support the Pakistani people in their "just struggle against foreign aggression." He criticized the Indo-Soviet treaty and denounced the USSR for encouraging India to launch "bare-faced armed aggression against Pakistan."²⁹

Speaking at a reception given in Peking on 29 November 1971 by the Albanian Ambassador, the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien observed

In the past few days, because the Indian Government, supported and encouraged by social-imperialism, has been carrying out subversive activities and military provocations against East Pakistan, the tension on the sub-continent has been aggravated. The Chinese Government and people are greatly concerned over the present India-Pakistan situation. We maintain that disputes between States should be settled by the two parties concerned through peaceful consultations and absolutely not by resorting to force, it is all the more impermissible for a country, under any pretext, to employ large numbers of armed troops to wilfully cross its own border and invade and occupy another country's territory. The Chinese Government and

the people resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle against foreign aggression and in defence of their State sovereignty and national independence. In order to ease the present tension, we hold that serious consideration should be given to President Yahya Khan's reasonable proposal for the armed forces of India and Pakistan to withdraw respectively from the border and disengage.³⁰

A commentary in the *People's Daily*, entitled "Indian Ambition to Annex East Pakistan," of 3 December 1971 had this to say about the situation in the sub-continent:

The Indian Government, backed and abetted by social imperialism, is plotting to create a "Bangladesh" in East Pakistan in an attempt to divide Pakistan and realise its expansionist ambitions to annex East Pakistan. In fact, the so-called "Bangladesh" is entirely a sinister means of the Indian Government to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, to divide and subvert Pakistan. The Chinese people are quite familiar with such Indian Government insidious tricks as creating "Bangladesh"...It was precisely the Indian Government which engineered a rebellion in China's Tibet region...created the so-called "Tibetan refugee" issue and energetically antagonised China.³¹

The NCNA release of the same day announced almost simultaneously with Pakistan, the latter's version of the air attack on India while a Peking Radio broadcast of the next day charged that the "Indian Government was attempting to install a Bangladesh Government in Jessore, after Jessore is taken." It repeated the Pakistani charges that India had launched a seven-pronged attack against East Bengal.³²

After the Indo-Pakistan conflict developed into a full-fledged war with effect from 3 December 1971, Peking opted for complete support on the side of Pakistan without caring for its effect on Sino-Indian relations or its future relations with Bangladesh. It realized that it had high stakes in close friendship with Islamabad, developed over the years, which could not be ignored for the sake of dubious friendship with India. The factors weighing in Chinese mind could be summarized as follows:

1. Any success for India in solving the Bangladesh problem to her satisfaction would be regarded as a victory for the Indo-Soviet Treaty that would strengthen the Soviet image and influence which would not be to the liking of the Chinese.

2 Despite a friendly posture by India, which might be regarded as the result of tactical considerations on the part of New Delhi in the context of the explosive and serious Bangladesh problem, the fundamental contradictions and competition with India persisted. As such any increase in India's prestige and strength resulting from Islamabad's defeat was not considered in Peking's interest.

3 The importance of Pakistan as an outlet for Chinese goods to the Indian Ocean remained.

4 Pakistan's value in helping Peking to cultivate friendly relations with the Arab and other Muslim countries of West Asia, with which Pakistan enjoyed good relations, continued and would continue even after the separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan.

Accordingly, the Chinese support for Pakistan in the United Nations was the most direct and the strongest. China was the only country to vote against the Soviet draft resolution. But for China's negative vote, it would have been adopted. Even when voting in favour of the US draft, the Chinese representative expressed his dissatisfaction with it as it failed to condemn "the armed aggression" on Pakistan committed by India with the support of the Soviet Union and also failed to vote support for Pakistan's "just struggle against aggression". Again while voting for the other draft resolution, he disliked the reference to a "political settlement" therein, for he considered it an interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. In the same way, the demand for only a ceasefire without calling for the withdrawal of troops, made in the Belgian-Italian-Japanese resolution was looked upon by the Chinese delegate as "in effect tantamount to conniving at and encouraging aggression and to recognizing the Indian aggressor troops remaining in Pakistan territory as legal". Consequently, he proposed that clauses "strongly condemning Indian armed aggression against Pakistan and demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Indian armed personnel that invaded Pakistan territory" be added to that draft resolution.²⁷

China's own draft resolution, submitted on 5 December 1971, was the strongest on the subject. It accused India of launching "large-scale attacks on Pakistan, thus gravely

undermining the peace in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent," completely ignoring Pakistani air attacks etc. of 3 December 1971. It strongly condemned the Indian Government's "acts of creating a so-called 'Bangladesh' and of subverting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan." India was called upon to withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" its armed forces "and armed personnel sent by it" from Pakistani territory while Pakistan was simply called upon to withdraw its armed forces which it had sent into Indian territory "for counter-attack." A call for the cessation of hostilities came later in the Chinese draft which endorsed the idea of disengagement of troops with a view to create conditions for a peaceful settlement "of the disputes between India and Pakistan" (ignoring completely Yahya's repression and atrocities in East Bengal) and called upon all States "to support the Pakistan people in their just struggle to resist Indian aggression."³⁴ There could hardly be a more one-sided or partial draft resolution in favour of Pakistan.

In the interventions of the Chinese delegate, India was accused of not only committing aggression, subversion etc. but also of creating the refugee situation (the charge was ridiculed by the Soviet Ambassador Malik who questioned "why should India have taken upon itself the tremendous burden of caring for ten million refugees" and stated that the repression in East Pakistan was responsible for the creation of the refugee problem), and the setting up of a "puppet regime" in Bangladesh. He branded India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh as "an invasion of Pakistan" while Islamabad's repression and atrocities were considered as Pakistan's "internal problems" or a "just struggle against the Indian government and aggression." He characterized Bangladesh as "a creation of India" and strongly opposed the Soviet proposal to invite its representatives to participate in the debate as a "glaring interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan as well as a trampling upon the United Nations Charter."³⁵ To invite the so-called representatives of Bangladesh—that is "the representatives of rebellious elements within East Pakistan,"—to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and the distribution of the documents of "this rebellious so-called organization would be tantamount to asking the Security Council to

interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, Pakistan," he added ³⁵

In his statements in the UN, the Chinese representative went all out to denounce India and support Pakistan. He characterized as "sheer fascist nonsense" the Indian assertion that the existence of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan constituted in itself a threat to India and traced India's expansionism to Nehru's *Discovery of India* which openly proclaimed that the South Asian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean was "the sphere of influence of India" ³⁷ He did not hesitate to compare the Government of Bangladesh to the "Manchukuo" Government, thereby dubbing it as "the quisling government" created by India ³⁸

The *People's Daily* commentator, taking his cue from the Chinese delegate, described as a "clumsy farce" the Indian recognition of the "so-called" Bangladesh. He asked "What kind of nonsense is this 'Bangladesh'?" and replied by saying "it is only a gimmick carried in the pocket of the Indian reactionaries." He went to the extent of insulting the leaders of the Bangladesh government by labelling them as "secessionists" and a "handful of Pakistan national outcasts" collected by India and on whom titles of "President", "Prime Minister" etc. had been conferred by the Indian government ³⁹

The commentary in the *People's Daily* of 10 December 1971 described the UN General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal by both India and Pakistan as reflecting "the common desire of the medium and small nations and the people of various countries to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity." It called the USSR as the "protector" of Indian "expansionism" and accused Moscow of the "greed of expanding its sphere of influence in the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean." It sought to comfort Islamabad by saying that although Pakistan had met with "some temporary difficulties," it was winning "more extensive sympathy and support." It assured the military junta of Pakistan of Peking's firm support and of China resolutely carrying out its "duties in and out of the United Nations."⁴⁰

The statement of the Chinese Government dated 16 December 1971, while denouncing the "joint conspiracy" of India and the USSR in intensifying "subversion, interference and

aggression against Pakistan" and condemning India of single-handedly manufacturing a "so-called" Bangladesh, was mainly directed towards exposing the "shameful role" of Moscow—"the backstage manager of the Indian expansionists." It found fault with Soviet leaders for using the veto in the Security Council, for setting "Asians to fight Asians," for fostering India and for turning it into a "sub superpower on the South Asian sub-continent as its assistant and partner in committing aggression against Asia." After recalling the "1968 Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia," the Chinese statement went on to advise "friendly countries on the South Asian sub-continent as well as all the countries in the world which are subjected to injury and threat by superpowers and sub-super powers" not to relax their vigilance and continuously "strengthen their defence capabilities" so that they would at all times be ready to hit back at the enemy.

In referring to China's firm support to Pakistan when the statement remarked that "we not only are doing this politically, but will continue to give them material assistance," Peking admitted that it had not only supplied military hardware to Islamabad but also promised to do that in the future. It then went on to warn India that there would be "no tranquility for it on the South Asian sub-continent" for "its crimes of aggression" would certainly arouse even stronger dissatisfaction and resistance on the part of the Pakistan people and other peoples of the sub-continent. The Chinese statement also criticized the role of Britain and France by saying that there could be "no neutrality on the question of aggression versus anti-aggression, of division versus anti-division and of subversion versus anti-subversion." It observed:

Certain big powers, making no distinction between right and wrong and remaining inactive and silent, have all along condoned and allowed the aggressor to grow through appeasement. The result can only be to tread again on the wrong path of Munich and the former League of Nations.⁴¹

Speaking at the banquet given in honour of the Sudanese delegation in Peking on 17 December 1971, Chou En-lai observed that the Soviet purpose in supporting "Indian aggression and expansion" was "to control India and contend for

hegemony in the South Asian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean ' He warned both India and the USSR that they "better not rejoice too soon for the fall of Dacca was "definitely not a 'so-called' milestone towards victory for the Indian aggressors but the starting point of endless strife on the South Asian sub-continent and of their defeat After describing Pakistan's struggle against foreign aggression and in defence of their state 'sovereignty and territorial integrity as "not isolated" and 'just,' he merely reiterated Peking's "as always' firm support to Islamabad⁴² At a reception in New York, given by Z A Bhutto on 18 December 1971, Chiao Kuan hua condemned the Indian "occupation of East Pakistan" and expressed the hope that Pakistan would be able to eventually tide over the "temporary setback "

In his statement before the Security Council on 15 December 1971, the Chinese representative Huang Hua criticized the Soviet delegate for "three times flagrantly abusing the veto power in disregard of all consequences, with the obvious aim of marking time so as to shield India in its occupation of East Pakistan" In his subsequent statement on 21 December 1971, he regretted that the Security Council had remained helpless and unable to act in face of the "Indian expansionists' aggression against, and trampling upon, Pakistan" Speaking after the adoption of the Security Council resolution 307 (1971), which demanded a durable cease fire and the cessation of all hostilities until withdrawals take place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces and called upon all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection of wounded and sick prisoners of war and civilian population, Huang Hua observed that although he had voted in favour of that draft resolution Peking was "highly dissatisfied" with it It had failed to draw a line of distinction between right and wrong and failed to point out who was the aggressor and who was the victim of aggression It did not contain, he added, a single word of condemnation of 'the open aggression against, and dismemberment of a 'sovereign State by the Indian expansionists with the support of the Soviet Government" He then warned both "the social imperialists and Indian expansionists"

against being over-joyed at their "so-called successes" for he observed:

The fall of Dacca is by no means a so-called milestone of victory for the Indian aggressors, but a starting-point from which they are heading towards defeat. The military occupation of East Pakistan will lead to greater upheaval and intranquility in the South Asian sub-continent. The Pakistan people will not cease their heroic resistance.

The Chinese delegate obviously desired Islamabad not to reconcile itself to the separate existence of Bangladesh and not to normalize its relations with India but to continue its fight against them. This was evident from Huang Hua's remarks that "the people of the world will not pardon the monstrous crimes committed against the Pakistan people," the expression of firm support, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, for the Pakistan people in their "just struggle against aggression, subversion and dismemberment" and his conviction, at the conclusion of his statement, that "no matter what difficulties and hazards may occur, final victory will belong to the great Pakistan people so long as they persevere in unity and struggle."⁴³

Unlike 1965, Peking made no attempt to mount any diversionary action or create tension by massing its troops on the Indo-Chinese border, delivered no stern warnings or ultimatums about serious consequences of Indian actions. There were only two protest notes to India: one against Indian demonstrations outside the Chinese Embassy on 7 April 1971 for having "slandered" China by accusing Peking of helping the Pakistani Government in its war against "the freedom-loving people of East Bengal"⁴⁴ and the other on 16 December complaining against the intrusion of 7 Indian soldiers on a "reconnaissance" mission into the Chumbi valley six days ago—thus delaying the protest by 6 days until the fall of Dacca and the surrender of Pakistani forces in East Bengal was imminent. After New Delhi rejected the charges, nothing was heard from Peking. Though often referring to "secessionists" and constantly repeating charges of Indian "interference," Peking for a long time refrained from denouncing the Awami League movement by name and accusing India of "aggression." It was deliberately vague about the extent or nature of the "support" China would give in case there was "aggression" on

Pakistan This vagueness was reflected in the continuous use by China of the words "as always before expressions of 'support,' in Bhutto's remarks of "more than satisfied" on his return from Peking,⁴⁵ in Chou En lai's belief about Bhutto's talks having achieved "satisfactory results"⁴⁶ and in Yahya's contradictory statements. In his interview with the *Newweek*, he was quoted as saying that China would help Islamabad in every way "short of intervention" but a little later Yahya was quoted by Radio Pakistan as having told CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) that China would certainly "intervene" in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan and help Pakistan in every possible way.⁴⁷

There were several factors which militated against Peking's physical involvement in the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. The internal conditions of China following the purge of top military leaders was such that Peking could hardly mount a large scale offensive against India. Small scale incidents would not have served the purpose of preserving Pakistan's unity or territorial integrity but entailed the risk of Soviet pressure or counter-measures in the wake of the activation of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The snow filled mountain passes blocked the way of Chinese forces. Then there was the problem of non-cooperation of the not so friendly or hostile population in East Bengal even when a few Chinese guerrillas, volunteers or armed contingents dared to come into the eastern wing of Pakistan. Peking's own relations with India, particularly its concern about spoiling its image in the world on the eve of its entry in the United Nations was another factor. Moreover, while New Delhi could count on Moscow's support in the war, because of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, a stage had not reached in Sino-American relations that Peking could be sure of Washington's support on its side against Indo-Soviet thrusts in Tibet and Sinkiang, though, unlike 1965, there was no danger of the USA joining hands with the USSR in support of India and against China. These considerations are to some extent well summarized by Donald Bremner in the *Los Angeles Times* in the following words

China pledged to back the Pakistani Government, faces some hard choices as the fighting grows in East Pakistan. Peking is extremely reluctant to become heavily involved in the conflict.

The difficulties are many and the rewards few for China in siding with the Pakistani Government. Peking's relations with India, just beginning to thaw after years of hostility over their border dispute, will go into deep freeze again. This will be a setback for Chinese diplomacy at a time when Peking is trying to marshal worldwide support against the two super powers. Moreover, continued fighting and the threat of Chinese support for Pakistan will give the Soviet Union an opening to expand its influence in the sub-continent and its forces in the Indian Ocean under the cover of its treaty with India. The prospect of growing Soviet power on her southern flank probably worries China more than anything else in the Indo-Pakistan situation.

Chinese involvement in the conflict, however indirect, will tarnish the image it is trying to create in the United Nations and elsewhere of a peace-loving nation concerned with the rights of the Third World countries, mistreated by the super powers.⁴⁸

Apart from condemning India for its acts of interference, subversion, aggression and expansionism, an important aim of Peking's diplomacy during the Indo-Pakistani crisis and conflict in 1971 had been to portray the Soviet role as out and out in support of India and against the interests of Pakistan, to malign Moscow in the eyes of the Third World and to find justification for its theory and strategy of fighting against the domination by one or the two super Powers. Even when China sought to accuse both the USA and the USSR as "working in close co-ordination with the Indian reactionaries," Moscow remained the prime target of Chinese attack for the Soviet Government was said to have "acted more blatantly" than the US State Department. In describing the "relevant measures taken by President Yahya Khan in connection with the present situation in Pakistan," *i. e.* the atrocities perpetrated by him against the innocent, unarmed people of East Pakistan, as the "internal affairs of Pakistan in which no country should or has the right to interfere," Peking did not obviously lose sight of President Podgorny's letter to Yahya dated 2 April 1971 which "made no mention of the Indian reactionaries threat to Pakistan, but on the contrary impudently criticized the Pakistan Government." Recalling Soviet "military aggression and armed occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968" and Moscow's attempt "to subvert the legal Government of an African country," *i. e.* Sudan in 1971, the *People's Daily* commentator vehemently

criticized the USSR for posing as "friends" and "hypocritically" expressing concern for "the interests of the people of Pakistan" ⁴⁹ Peking branded Podgorny's letter as open interference in Pakistan's internal affairs as it asked Islamabad to seek a 'peaceful political settlement' of the "so called" East Pakistan issue according to "the subversive plan" of the Indian Government Since Yahya, in his reply, expressed his determination 'not to allow any country to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs,'⁵⁰ that reply was published in full in the Chinese press

The NCNA on 30 November reported "In the past week or more, the Indian Government supported and encouraged by social imperialism, has been carrying out repeated subversive activities and military provocations against East Pakistan" Giving the details of fighting quoting mainly the Pakistan Radio and Press, the Agency said that while the USSR was keeping up diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, *Pravda* "turning white into black" had blamed Pakistan for "creating tension in the India-Pakistan sub continent" and was trying to "intimidate Pakistan into accepting a 'political solution' beneficial to India" ⁵¹

In strongly denouncing India for "its flagrant aggression against Pakistan," for supporting "secessionists in Pakistan," for cooking up the "so-called" provisional government of Bangladesh, for sending the "so called" freedom fighters into East Pakistan etc., the *People's Daily* commentator of 6 December 1971 did not forget the crimes of "social imperialism" To quote him

The Indian reactionaries are rampant to such an extent because they have the support of social imperialism in the political, economic and military fields Social imperialism signed a treaty with India a few months ago which is in essence a treaty of military alliance Since India launched her armed aggression against Pakistan, social-imperialism has sided with the Indian aggressors more openly, tried to coerce Pakistan into submission to India and shipped large quantities of arms to India. This has emboldened the Indian Government and increased its arrogance The purpose of social-imperialism's active meddling is to seize this opportunity to strengthen its control over India and to expand its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.⁵²

The successive use of veto by the Soviet Union in the UN

Security Council, the Russian proposal to invite the representatives of Bangladesh to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council, the Soviet counsels to Islamabad about stopping "all acts of violence" and not relying on a military solution and the comments in the Soviet papers *Izvestia* and *Krasnaya Zvezda* were all portrayed by Peking as pro-Indian and anti-Pakistan measures.

Opposing the Soviet proposal in the Security Council to allow the representative of Bangladesh to present his case, the Chinese delegate, Huang Hua, observed on 6 December 1971:

Now after launching an undeclared war of aggression against Pakistan with the incitement and support of the Soviet Union, the Indian expansionists, with the collaboration of the Soviet Government, created a government of the so-called "Bangladesh" for the purpose of dismembering Pakistan and perpetually occupying East Pakistan. That is a neo-quisling government, a neo-"Manchukuo" government. The Indian Government had already openly declared its recognition of that government. Probably, the Soviet Government will also declare its recognition of that government tomorrow or day after tomorrow. Whether recognition or not, what people have now seen is that not only has the Soviet Government failed to condemn this neo-quisling government, neo-"Manchukuo" government, but the Soviet representative has shown most solicitous concern and wanted to invite the representatives of that government to the Security Council as angels and pay homage to the representatives of the so-called "Bangladesh" as "heroes" of a national liberation movement and even wanted the others also to take off their hats and salute them.⁶³

He threatened to use his veto power to defeat the Soviet proposal about inviting a representative of Bangladesh to participate in the meetings of the Security Council in the following words:

The Chinese delegation is of the view that the question of the invitation of the so-called representative of Bangladesh is a substantive and not a procedural question. The representatives of the Soviet Union and India are singing a duet openly trumpeting for the dismemberment of Pakistan in a sinister attempt to impose upon the United Nations the so-called Bangladesh which they have created. This act of

subverting and dismembering a sovereign country runs completely counter to the United Nations Charter and is definitely not permissible⁵⁴

Peking voted against the Soviet draft resolution calling for "a political settlement in East Pakistan" because it was considered as constituting "direct interference in the internal affairs of a Member state." Explaining his vote on that resolution the Chinese representative observed

The present armed aggression by the Indian Government against Pakistan is being carried out with the connivance, support and shielding of the Soviet Union. Countless facts have proved this. Over a long period the Soviet Government has energetically supported India's expansion and has provided the Indian expansionists with large quantities of arms and other war material. It has encouraged India in its scheming activities to subvert and dismember Pakistan, and has at the same time openly exerted all kinds of pressure on the Pakistan Government.⁵⁵

Peking went to the extent of characterizing the Soviet draft as "the sinister draft resolution"⁵⁶. It described as "sheer nonsense" the assertion in the *Tass* statement of 5 December 1971 that the Pakistan Government's actions in East Pakistan were "the main cause of the tension" between India and Pakistan. For China, the main cause of tension was "none other than the support and encouragement given by the Soviet revisionist social imperialism to the Indian reactionaries in their aggression and expansion against Pakistan."⁵⁷

Whether it was the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971 or the rendering of Soviet military aid to India or even the supply of spare parts, the use of the veto in the Security Council or the exchange of visits between Indian and Soviet leaders, e.g. Deputy Foreign Minister N. Firyubin's visit to New Delhi on 22 September 1971 for "bilateral consultations" under Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union from 27 to 29 September 1971 or Soviet Air Force Chief Pavel Kutakhov's visit to India on 30 October—they were all seen in Peking as inciting and encouraging "Indian reactionaries" to launch aggression against Pakistan. Thus, Moscow was continuously denounced for "abetting, encouraging and supporting India in its aggression against Pakistan,"⁵⁸ for being "the supporter, encourager

and protector of the Indian aggression against Pakistan."⁵⁹

The Soviet role in defending the "Indian aggressive acts subverting the Pakistan Government and disrupting the national unity of Pakistan" was seen as part of the "social imperialists" policy of "carrying out aggression, control, subversion and expansion ever ywhere." The Chinese representative went on to assert:

To put it bluntly, in supporting India in its provoking of an armed conflict with Pakistan, the purpose of the Soviet Government is to take advantage of India's inevitable dependence on the Soviet Union in the war and to control the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Indian Ocean and expand its spheres of influence so as to compete with another super-Power for world hegemony.⁶⁰

Commenting on the *Tass* statement of 5 December 1971, which declared "with ulterior motives," as the *People's Daily* commentator put it,⁶¹ that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the developments "considering also the circumstance that they are taking place in direct proximity of the USSR's borders and, therefore, involve the interests of its security," the Chinese delegate in the Security Council remarked.

The "secure boundaries" of the Soviet Union have all of a sudden been extended to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Indian Ocean. The aim of the Soviet leaders is to gain control over the sub-continent, encircle China and strengthen its position in contending with the other super-power for world hegemony. What the Soviet leaders of today are frantically seeking is the establishment of a great empire which the old tsars craved after but were unable to realise, a great empire controlling the whole Eurasian continent.⁶²

In a subsequent statement, the Chinese representative warned the medium-sized Powers—Britain and France—for their assuming a "seemingly impartial" attitude in the Indo-Pakistan conflict by failing to distinguish between right and wrong on the major question concerning the Soviet Government's "support for Indian aggression and dismemberment of Pakistan," thereby inflating "the aggressors' arrogance of the Soviet Union and India" (here the USSR is also accused of aggression and comes before India). He also exhorted the Afro-Asian people and the people of the whole world "to see ever more clearly the true features of social imperialism" with a view

to "further raise their political consciousness" for working for "the doom of the new tsars who stop at nothing in doing evils". An attempt was, thus, made to forge a united front against one or the two super Powers and justify Peking's current strategy in the matter. To quote him

In defiance of world opinion and in disregard of all the consequences, the Soviet leading clique is abetting, encouraging and supporting India in its aggression against Pakistan. Its purpose is to make use of the wild ambitions of the Indian expansionists to control the Indo Pakistan sub-continent and the Indian Ocean and to gain superiority on the sub-continent as a flanking movement to affect the situation in the Middle East, to strengthen its position in its confrontation with another super Power in the Middle East and other parts of the world and to wage an even fiercer struggle for world hegemony with another super-Power.⁶³

An important outcome of Peking's exposures of Moscow's "misdeeds," its outbursts against the Soviet Union and its active support to Islamahad had been that Yahya was prevented from heeding the counsels of restraint or moderation. Had Yahya accepted the advice of Podgorny or the Soviet draft resolution, things might have not gone to the extent of his waging war against India that resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. China was obviously interested in advancing its influence in Pakistan at the cost of the USSR with a view to make Islamahad a subservient tool of its foreign policy, which was directed at that time to push its national interests—its influence and hegemonistic aspirations—under the cover of a struggle against one or the two super Powers and identifying China with the Third World—Afro-Asia-Latin America.

The respective roles of China and the Soviet Union were not without comment from the leaders of Bangladesh. Thus, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, in his statements on 11 and 17 April 1971, spoke highly of the USSR for taking notice of the genocide, for urging Pakistan to desist from its acts of repression and for the support Moscow had given in the freedom struggle, for which he expressed gratitude. He, at the same time, stated that he would welcome similar support from China, as also from the USA, France, the UK and others and expected them to exercise their influence on Yahya.⁶⁴ Maulana Bhashani, in his separate appeals to the Chinese and Soviet leaders on

21 April 1971, drew attention of Peking to the atrocities committed by Yahya's military government "by the help of modern war weapons" supplied by China resulting in the merciless and brutal slaying of "the innocent, unarmed, helpless peasants, labourers, students, intelligentsia, women and children of Bangladesh." He earnestly requested the Mao regime to extend its "support, recognition and all possible help to the Government of Independent People's Republic of Bangladesh." In his appeal to the Soviet leaders, Bhashani demanded "more positive action" to stop "the barbarous massacre"—which was being perpetrated by the West Pakistani army with modern weapons of war supplied by the USA and China. He requested them "to stop this bloody massacre and not supply any aid to the military dictatorship of Pakistan" and give "immediate recognition and all possible help" to the Government of Bangladesh.⁶³

7 China and Bangladesh

IN order to subserve the needs of power-politics in the Indian sub-continent and to give support to Pakistan, Peking had been quite apathetic to the interests of Bangladesh. China ignored the liberation struggle of its people and had been callous to their tragic sufferings. The Chinese leaders remained unmoved by the brutal repression and genocide committed on the people of East Bengal by the Pakistani ruling military junta and failed to recognize the refugee problem for a long time even when it reached the massive proportion of ten million people. Commenting on that problem in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Chinese delegate stated that "the so-called refugee problem," was the result of Indian interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. He likened it to the problem of the Tibetan refugees, thereby accusing India for making use of the refugees for her ulterior motives and expansionist designs. Peking took no notice of the guerrilla movement in East Bengal and gave no credit to the freedom fighters in their struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh. On the contrary, the Mao regime described the provisional government established by the Awami League leaders as a "puppet regime" and did not hesitate to liken it to "Manchukuo."

In the beginning, Peking advised the Yahya regime, though unobtrusively, to find a settlement of its internal problems in order to prevent a split, as was done in Chou's message of 12 April 1971, and refrained for a while from criticizing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other leaders of the Awami League by name. But after the outbreak of the war, China seemed to give up all pretence of keeping its options open towards Bangladesh and went all out in condemning the government of Bangladesh as one in the service of Indian "expansionists" and Soviet

"social-imperialists." Peking remained unconcerned about the fate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was tried by a Pakistani military tribunal with the possible intention of executing the Father of the Bangladesh Nation.

Neither Maulana Bhashani's letters to Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai urging them to recognize Bangladesh nor Sheikh Mujib's appeals in that matter had any effect on the Chinese leaders. In fact, the closure of the Chinese Consulate in Dacca and the recall of Chinese personnel working there, numbering 39 (including 4 diplomats) from Bangladesh signified that Peking did not intend to have any dealings with the Bangladesh Government for the time being. Commenting on the departure of the Chinese consulate staff *via* Rangoon en route to Peking on 24 January 1971, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad observed that he had requested Premier Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei to allow Bengali nationals in Peking to be repatriated to Dacca through Rangoon. He added that his country wished to have good neighbourly relations with China as with all other countries. He also expressed the hope that Peking would reciprocate the "sincere feelings of the people and the Government of Bangladesh."¹

While Peking remained indifferent to the massacre, the loot, arson and rape of the people of East Bengal, it deemed it necessary to criticize "the Indian aggressor forces and the East Pakistan rebels under their command" for the "sanguinary crimes" of "barbarously massacring and cruelly persecuting innocent Pakistan people in all parts of East Pakistan."² The Chinese Red Cross Society, in a communication addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross on 27 December 1971, expressed the utmost indignation and strong opposition to the "monstrous atrocities" perpetrated by the "Indian occupation forces and the local armed forces under their command" against the "innocent inhabitants in the eastern part of Pakistan" and demanded an "impartial investigation" in the matter.³ The Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Huang Hua, also addressed a letter on 24 December 1971 to the President of the Security Council in which he drew attention to the "barbarous persecution and massacre" of the Pakistani people being carried out by "the Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels under their command in many parts of East

Pakistan" In his subsequent letter of 28 December 1971, the "barbarous slaughter and persecution" was said to have been further aggravated and "reached appalling proportions"⁴

In the joint communique issued on President Bhutto's visit on 2 February 1972, Chou En-lai, along with Bhutto, expressed "grave concern over the fate of Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians in East Pakistan" and called upon India to fulfill her obligations under the Geneva Convention and repatriate those persons without further delay They further expressed their earnest hope that "the atrocities being perpetrated against innocent civilians in East Pakistan would cease immediately" Needless to say the Chinese leaders kept silent about the fate and ill-treatment of lakhs of Bangladesh citizens in Pakistan Sheikh Mujib strongly criticized the role of China during the freedom struggle in Bangladesh He wondered how China, a socialist country, which claimed to support all liberation struggles, did not recognize Bangladesh, which was wedded to the establishment of socialism but established friendship with Pakistan, "where there is no trace of socialism," as he put it Sheikh Mujib also found fault with China for supplying General Tikka Khan and General Yahya Khan sophisticated weapons with which the Pakistani hordes killed the innocent and unarmed people of Bangladesh struggling for their emancipation. He considered it a matter of deep regret that 60 per cent of the arms captured from the Pakistani troops bore "Chinese marks" while the remaining 40 per cent had "American marks"⁵ Addressing the National Conference of the pro-Moscow Awami Party in Dacca on 19 May 1972, Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman identified China as one of the countries pumping money into Bangladesh to encourage disruption and impede its economic recovery These countries, he said, were arming Pakistan and did all they could to undermine the liberation war in Bangladesh⁶ Peking's hold over the miscellaneous guerrillas active among disaffected minorities in north-east India and northern Burma and the capture of Chinese-trained guerrillas in Bangladesh suggested that China might have tried to prevent the Awami League from consolidating its position there

When the application of Bangladesh for admission to the United Nations came before the Security Council, the Chinese representative Huang Hua not only voted against the considera-

tion of that application but also vetoed Dacca's entry in the UN. He claimed to take his stand on what he called "in defence of the resolutions" of the UN, "the principles of the Charter" and "in defence of the interests of the people of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent." His main purpose, he said, was "to facilitate reasonable settlement" of the issues between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Bangladesh. What he, in fact, sought was to impress upon Dacca the need to hold negotiations with Pakistan, to desist from proceeding with the trial of Pakistani prisoners of war and to arrive at an amicable settlement with Islamabad, particularly over the question of the release and repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war. He termed the threatened trial of Pakistani prisoners of war as "a gross violation of the relevant resolutions" of the UN. He refused to separate the question of the admission of Bangladesh into the UN from the question of the detention of those prisoners. He pointed out that only when the relevant UN resolutions had been "truly implemented" and "only after a reasonable settlement of the issues" between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Bangladesh had been achieved could Dacca hope to join the United Nations.⁷

China's veto in the Security Council on the question of the admission of Bangladesh to the UN naturally evoked strong indignation and resentment in Bangladesh. Foreign Minister Abdus Samad stated on 27 August 1972 that China was playing the role of a big Power in blocking the entry of Bangladesh into the UN. A massive anti-China rally, sponsored by the ruling Awami League, was organized in Dacca on 10 September 1972 in protest against the use of the Chinese veto. The people gathered at the rally shouted anti-China slogans—"Down with Chinese Imperialism" etc.—and pledged to resist the "Sino American collusion" against the hard-won Bangladesh independence. The Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam, addressing the rally, warned the people against international conspiracies spear-headed by China to undo the freedom of Bangladesh.⁸ Not only the pro-Soviet National Awami Party leader Muzaffar Ahmed denounced the Chinese veto but also Maulana Bhashani, known for his pro-Peking leanings, protested vehemently "in the bitterest language" against the use of the veto by Peking.

Chinese indifference, nay hostility, to the cause of the

freedom struggle of Bangladesh had been considered as a betrayal of the people of Bangladesh. Thus, Soviet commentator V Kudryavtsev, writing in *Izvestia* on 2 January 1972, castigated the Peking leaders for betraying the Bangladesh liberation movement for the sake of their "alliance with the Pakistani militarists and their American patrons." He disagreed with the Chinese view that everything that took place in East Bengal was Pakistan's "domestic affair." Cementing of friendship between India and Bangladesh by a treaty, Moscow's recognition of Bangladesh followed by Mujib's visit to the USSR and the extension of Soviet economic assistance to Dacca could hardly be pleasing to or to the liking of Peking. The strengthening of the Soviet position and influence on China's southern flank could not be viewed with equanimity by the Mao regime so long as Peking's stance towards Russia continued to be one of hostility and confrontation and relations with India remained strained. But that did not mean that friendly relations between India, the USSR and Bangladesh should be the cause of unmitigated hostility towards Bangladesh for all times to come, as one Pakistani writer seemed to make out, assuming the Dacca regime to be a "Soviet protege." To quote her:

The reason for China's opposition to "Bangladesh" was its apprehension that its creation as an independent State near its border under Soviet influence, would weaken its security on its western and southern frontiers. That "Bangladesh" is increasingly becoming a zone of Soviet influence is apparent from the presence of pro Soviet elements in its government, under the pressure of Moscow and its recent agreements—economic and other—with Dacca. In the wake of massive Russian military strength along its northern border, China, logically, cannot be pleased with the existence of a Soviet protege to its south. Moreover, the growing naval presence of the USSR in the Indian Ocean, which is directed mainly against China, has also been a cause of concern to China.⁹

Surely, China would not like to close its options vis à vis India or Bangladesh for all times to come. Continued opposition on the part of Peking would mean the very perpetuation of a situation that it would like to avoid and seek to avert. If China did not want to further consolidate the Indo-Soviet-Bangladesh friendship, in a more enduring anti-China posture

and if Peking desired to activate its diplomacy to sever the strong bonds of amity existing between them, it must not foreclose the possibility of adjustment with India as well as Bangladesh. It was precisely for these reasons that Peking refrained since January 1972 from attacking the Bangladesh leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his government, desisted from endorsing Bhutto's "two parts of Pakistan" thinking in the joint communique issued on his visit to Peking and in May 1972 allowed Pakistan's Ambassador in Peking K.M. Kaiser, who defected to Bangladesh, to return to Bangladesh (before he was permitted to leave Peking he was invited to a friendly dinner by Chou En-lai). Moreover, a Bengali instructor at the Foreign Language Institute in Peking was allowed to enter China on a Bangladesh passport—an indication that Peking was reconciled to the emergence of Bangladesh. In these circumstances, it was not surprising that the softening posture of Peking gave rise to rumours about Peking's early recognition of Dacca. That these hopes could not materialize was due to the absence of Pakistan-Bangladesh reconciliation and in deference to Bhutto's wishes about obtaining a satisfactory solution of the problems with Bangladesh. The Chinese deemed it necessary to avoid making any conciliatory gesture towards Bangladesh for the time being.

Thus, the Chinese delegate Chiao Kuan-hua, speaking in the general debate of the UN General Assembly on 3 October 1972, observed that China was compelled to use the veto on the question of the admission of Bangladesh because what he called "the reasonable demand of many countries" to postpone that question was disregarded. But he took special care to point out that the exercise of the Chinese veto did not mean that Peking was "fundamentally opposed" to the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations. China, on the contrary, he remarked, "cherishes friendly sentiment for the people of East Bengal and has no prejudice against Mr. Mujibur Rahman." The Chinese stand for postponing the consideration of that question, he added, was motivated by its desire "to promote a reconciliation among the parties concerned and the implementation of the United Nations resolutions which are the very immediate concern."¹⁰ From this statement, in which the words East Bengal came to replace "East Pakistan" (though

Bangladesh continued to be mentioned within quotes it ceased to be called East Pakistan) and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was mentioned without any derogatory epithet or qualification, it was quite clear that Peking was not shutting its eyes to the new situation in the Indian sub-continent or to the existence of Bangladesh though for obvious reasons China did not want to admit that fact openly. It was also apparent that Peking's recognition of Bangladesh or its admission into the UN was not ruled out. For the time being, however, China considered it necessary to render diplomatic support to Pakistan with a view to help Bhutto in sorting out his problems with Sheikh Mujib as well as with India, particularly of more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, in his own way and on terms favourable to Islamahad.

When the question of the admission of Bangladesh into the UN came to be debated in the General Assembly, it was quite obvious that the resolution sponsored by Yugoslavia and 22 other countries (A/L 683 and Add 1) expressing the desire that Bangladesh should be admitted to the UN at an early date would be adopted by an overwhelming majority. Therefore, China and other friends of Pakistan, particularly its CENTO partners—Iran and Turkey—and a number of Arab countries, exerted themselves to somehow link the question of the admission of Bangladesh with the implementation of the UN resolutions in the matter and the return of the Pakistani prisoners of war. As a result, a 16-Power draft resolution (A/L. 685) expressing the desire that the parties concerned make all possible efforts, in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, to reach a fair settlement of the issues that were still pending, and calling for the return of the prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolution 307 (1971) was put forward. After extensive consultations, it was decided that the two draft resolutions be adopted together without debate and without a vote. That procedure, the President of the General Assembly observed, gave expression to the consensus of the Assembly which was in favour of the admission of Bangladesh and the Assembly was also in favour of the implementation of the Security Council resolution. It was also the general opinion, he stated, that the admission of Bangladesh

to the UN should be viewed along with the over-all solution of the existing political, legal and humanitarian problems. It was, therefore, essential to view the simultaneous adoption of the two draft resolutions as constituting an interdependence between those two viewpoints. A peaceful solution on the sub-continent should be promoted. In this context the Simla Agreement was to be welcomed, he added.¹¹

Speaking after the adoption of the two resolutions, the Chinese representative Huang Hua referred to what he called "the reasonable proposal" repeatedly put forward by Bhutto for holding meetings "unconditionally" and rejected "all along unwarrantedly," as he put it, by the Bangladesh authorities, who even insisted on bringing the Pakistani prisoners of war to trial. At the same time, he accused Kremlin of doing its utmost to encourage the Indian Government and the Bangladesh authorities to refuse to implement the relevant UN resolutions and of trying by "every possible means" to obstruct "a genuine reconciliation" between Pakistan and Bangladesh in order to aggravate the tension on the South Asian sub-continent and continue to create confusion so as to seek gains therefrom and further the expansion of its sphere of influence in the South Asian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean. Huang Hua went to the extent of saying that Moscow was "by no means concerned" whether or not Bangladesh could be admitted to the UN but was trying to use the question "as a means of political blackmail," using the UN as a tool for practising power politics and hegemony. The Chinese attitude, on the other hand, was described by him as one of "promotion of a reasonable settlement of the issues between the parties concerned through consultations on an equal footing." Huang Hua again repeated, "We are not fundamentally opposed to the admission of 'Bangladesh' to the United Nations" and observed on 29 November 1972:

China has always cherished profound friendly sentiments for the people of East Bengal. We hope that the "Bangladesh" authorities will make their own decisions independently and meet with the Pakistan leaders at an early date so as to reach a reasonable settlement of the issues between Pakistan and "Bangladesh", thus demonstrating that it is a truly independent State. However, China cannot agree to the admission of "Bangladesh" under the present circum-

stances, that is before the important United Nations resolutions are implemented by the parties concerned and a reasonable settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and 'Bangladesh' is reached.¹²

It could be said that the Chinese decision not to recognize Bangladesh and oppose its admission into the United Nations was not irrevocable though it was also evident that Peking assigned greater priority to Pakistan than to Bangladesh and that China would not be inclined to normalize its relations with Bangladesh until Dacca came to terms with Islamabad by settling pending issues, especially the release of POWs. It was Peking's policy to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and not to do anything that would go against the interests of Islamabad—in other words, to facilitate Bhutto's task to arrive at a settlement with India and Bangladesh in a way and on conditions considered suitable or found satisfactory by Pakistan. In this process China would not mind ignoring the reality of Bangladesh and adopting a posture inimical to Dacca in the immediate future.

Peking, however, knows that the phase of non-recognition and non admission to the UN was a temporary phenomenon and for that matter did not want to abandon its well tried ally with all the known advantages accruing to Peking as a result of keeping Islamabad's confidence in China. Any precipitate response to Dacca's overtures might have jeopardized years of goodwill built in Pakistan by political support, economic aid and military assistance. Any moves about cultivating Dacca or exploiting Indo-Bangladesh differences or strains, if and when they developed, could wait for a while till Pakistan had sorted out matters with Dacca in its own way.

A Peking Radio commentary monitored in Dacca on 15 July 1973, which described the Pakistan National Assembly resolution authorizing Bhutto to accord recognition to Bangladesh as a right step towards the normalization of relations in the sub-continent, was given widespread coverage in the Bangladesh press. Considerable satisfaction was expressed that for the first time Peking had mentioned Bangladesh without quotes, thereby accepting the reality of the new nation. It was taken as a hopeful sign signifying the softening of the Chinese attitude towards the new republic.¹³ But two days later, Radio

Peking, while commending Pakistan's efforts to normalize the situation in the South Asian sub-continent, accused India of violating the *Security Council resolution* by detaining over 90,000 Pak POWs and civilian internees as hostages to press Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh and "accept other unreasonable demands of the Indian Government." Commenting on the joint Indo-Bangladesh declaration of 17 April 1973—offering a solution of the humanitarian problem—Peking Radio stated that it was "only natural to repatriate Pows after the war whereas it is obviously unreasonable to put forth various prerequisites." Peking had been critical of the joint Indo-Bangladesh offer of April 1973. Therefore, when Pakistan decided to sign on 28 August 1973 an Agreement with India,¹⁴ based on that offer, the leader of the Pakistan delegation to the talks in New Delhi deemed it necessary to fly to Peking immediately after the conclusion of the Delhi Agreement to brief the Chinese leaders about it. Since Pakistan was a party to the Agreement, which facilitated the repatriation of Pakistani POWs demanded by Peking, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei described that Agreement as creating "favourable conditions" for a detente in the South Asian region and the normalization of relations among the parties concerned. He, however, gave credit for the success of Indo-Pak talks to Pakistan, who, Chi said, "upheld principles in the talks, enabling the talks to yield positive results." He, at the same time, warned against certain people "who do not wish to see a detente in the South Asian region." Those people, he observed, while speaking at a banquet given in honour of the visiting Pakistani Minister Aziz Ahmed, "in order to attain their expansionist ambitions...are continually resorting to interference and subversion in the countries of this region sowing discord among them and trying to create new incidents to fish in troubled waters." Chi also reiterated firm support of China for the Pakistan Government in combatting "foreign interference and defending State sovereignty." Aziz Ahmed, speaking in reply, congratulated China on the successful conclusion of the Tenth Communist Party Congress, thanked Peking for its consistent support to Islamabad and pointed out that there were "certain forces" who did not like the closeness of Sino-Pakistani friendship. He added that if those forces thought

that they could, in any way, affect that friendship, they were "very sadly mistaken." He also expressed the hope that the friendship between the peoples of the two countries would grow stronger every day.¹⁵ As Bhutto continued to hold back the recognition of Bangladesh in order to be able to bargain with Dacca in regard to the trial of the 195 POWs and possibly other matters, China also did not consider it prudent to let down its friend. It assured Pakistan that Peking would not hesitate to use the veto again, if necessary, to block the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations.

Accordingly, Bhutto, in his address to the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1973, not only launched a bitter attack on India by raking up the origin of the unfortunate armed conflict of 1971 accusing India of using POWs as political pawns and even re-agitating about "the unresolved dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir," the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to "self determination" and the implementation of UN resolutions in that regard, but also could confidently speak of blocking the admission of Bangladesh in the UN. So long as the 195 prisoners, whom Dacca proposes to try on charges of genocide and other crimes against humanity were not released and repatriated, observed Bhutto, "the requirements of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly will not have been met." As long as those resolutions remained unimplemented, he added, the question of Pakistan recognizing Bangladesh and the latter's admission to the UN would "remain outstanding." He thus linked the issue of the 195 POWs with Dacca's entry to the UN and asserted that without an agreement for their repatriation the "full normalization of relations between the countries of the sub-continent is not possible."¹⁶ Not long after, the Chinese delegate Chiao Kuan hua, in his statement before the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1973, stated that Peking reserved its right to exercise its veto to bar the admission of Bangladesh to the UN. The Delhi Agreement of August 1973 on the repatriation of the prisoners of war and civilians, he said, had come "much too late." Nevertheless, it had to be welcomed. But the agreement reached was on paper and there "will have to be a process before it can be turned into reality." Complications might yet arise, he added. The Chinese Govern-

ment, therefore, "holds that the question of admitting Bangladesh into the United Nations can be considered once the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council are implemented without qualification" But that could be done "only after the thorough implementation of the United Nations resolutions, and definitely not before," he asserted.¹⁷ The words "without qualification" actually meant that the implementation of those resolutions had to be to the satisfaction of Pakistan.

The Chinese attitude on the admission of Bangladesh into the UN was strongly criticized in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Peace Council, three political parties—the ruling Awami League, National Awami Party (M) and Bangladesh Communist Party—and mass organizations condemned the Chinese stand on Dacca's entry in the world body. Addressing a public meeting in Dacca on 7 October 1973, speakers representing those organizations regretted that Peking had yet to reconcile itself to the reality in the sub-continent and that the Chinese leaders were trying to betray the cause of Bangladesh's war of liberation.¹⁸

The implementation of the Delhi Agreement was not expected to be quite smooth. It experienced certain difficulties because of the Pakistani reluctance to accept all the four categories of non-Bengalis in the list prepared by Dacca as stipulated by Islamabad for repatriation in the first phase under that Agreement. These categories are: (a) Those belonging to divided families, (b) Original residents of Pakistan, (c) Those who had been Central government employees, and (d) Hardship cases. Pakistan, it appears, seeks to limit the number of repatriates to the minimum possible by trying to reduce the categories to only one, *viz.*, hardship cases.¹⁹

The hopes entertained in New Delhi about the softening of Peking's posture towards India or Bangladesh after the August 1973 Delhi Agreement were belied. The threat to use the veto once again to prevent the admission of Bangladesh into the UN showed that China was, even now, more interested in cultivating Pakistan than in improving its relations with other countries in the sub-continent. "It is in this light," observes Dilip Mukerjee, "that New Delhi has to assess whether China's attitude derives from its own geopolitical calculations

about this country or from its antipathy to the Soviet Union which rubs off on India because of its treaty relationship with Moscow.²⁰ The same holds true of Bangladesh, which had strong cultural and economic links and treaty relationships with India as also friendly political dealings with the Soviet Union

8 Conclusion

DURING its chequered history of over 26 years, Pakistan had passed through several phases. Beginning with a neutral stance in the early period, it started tilting towards the USA at about the same time when Mao announced his "lean to one side" policy in favour of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1950s Pakistan was under strong US influence, if not actually a client state or under Washington's tutelage. During the same period, there appeared monolithic solidarity between the USSR and China. Starting with Kennedy's coming into power in the White House, a certain amount of disillusionment set in Ayub's mind which became more pronounced after Washington rushed military assistance to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian war. The factor of hostility towards India, which accounted for Pakistan's alienation with the USA, was also responsible for drawing Islamabad closer to Peking with the result that China came to be rated as the No.1 friend of Pakistan. Thus, during the period from the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, China's prestige was at its height and its influence uppermost, if not predominant, in Pakistan.

After Tashkent in 1966, Kremlin entered into the field in a big way by giving political support, economic aid and even military assistance to the Ayub regime in order to wean Pakistan away from China. During 1966-70 there was an acute competition among the three Powers—the USA, the USSR and China—to preserve or increase their influence in Pakistan. It was in this situation that Ayub came forward with the "Friends, Not Masters" dictum and announced the policy of equi-distance, *i.e.* a shift from exclusive alliance with one Power to bilateral equations or relations with all the three Powers concerned. Bhutto, then in opposition, however, treated China in a special category and propounded his theory of

"normal but qualified" relations with the two super Powers and "normal and unqualified" relations with Peking, meaning that the convergence of fundamental interests of Pakistan with China was greater than that with the other Powers

During the Bangladesh Crisis and the Indo Pakistan War of 1971, Soviet-Pakistan relations came under heavy strain¹ and the two almost fell apart while China and the USA stood by the side of Islamabad. It is rather too early to say how truncated Pakistan's relations with China and other Powers will shape up in the future. For the time being, it appears that both China and the USA, in that order, would have an edge over the Soviet Union in their dealings with Pakistan.

Islamabad's relations were closest with Peking during the Foreign Ministership of Z A Bhutto (1963-66), who assumed the reins of government of defeated and truncated Pakistan on 20 December 1971 as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. It is significant to remember that Bhutto described Podgorny's letter to Yahya as "blatant interference" in the affairs of Pakistan but he eulogized Peking for its "just and correct" stand in the matter. When asked as to whether Chinese support in the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971 fell somewhat short of Pakistani expectations, President Bhutto replied on 18 February 1972 by saying that China did what it could "within the limitations" while "some people think China could have done more". He, however, thought that a number of factors had to be taken into account in assessing the Chinese role in that conflict, including a series of successive blunders committed by the Yahya regime. Bhutto added "Let us not look in the past events we have to look to the future. But whatever has been China's participation we have not lost confidence in China's friendship or in China's word."²

The Karachi unit of the Pakistan People's Party, in a unanimous resolution adopted on 15 December 1971, urged Yahya to "immediately sign a defence pact with China" and asked him to send a delegation to Peking for that purpose under the leadership of Bhutto, Party Chairman and at that time Deputy Premier designate. Commenting on it, Bhutto observed in New York on the same day that he did not rule out an early visit to Peking on his return to Pakistan. He added

"China and Pakistan must continue to exercise their influence for peace and security in Asia and the sub-continent. Anything done to further consolidate the relationship between China and Pakistan is welcome to me." As for the defence pact with China, urged by his Party, Bhutto did raise the matter in Peking during his visit in January-February 1972 but the Chinese leaders did not agree to enter into a written commitment on the subject. Bhutto was told that in view of the failure of their defence pact with the USSR, they were not in favour of a formal alliance—what really mattered was common interest, not pacts.³

After Bhutto assumed power in Islamabad, he broke conventions in calling on the ambassadors of China, the USA and the Soviet Union, in that order, which signified his preference for Peking over others. Obviously he remembered the strong Chinese support both in and out of the United Nations, though it might have fallen far short of his expectations—as Peking did not physically intervene to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Bhutto was also aware that unlike the USSR, China was not likely to recognize the break-away Bangladesh, whose leaders had been denounced by Peking as "puppets" of New Delhi, in the near future. The departure of Chinese consulate personnel from Dacca confirmed that. Bhutto could also look towards China not only for the redemption of aid pledges already made, especially \$200 million promised in November 1970, but also for further necessary economic and military assistance. The US arms aid remained suspended in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 except for some minor supplies of non-lethal military equipment and spares which were resumed in 1966, and Moscow's arms assistance, begun in 1968, had been very limited—only \$10 million upto 1971 according to one American estimate compared with \$730 million worth of arms supplied to India by the USSR and East European nations.⁴ The question of military assistance from China was, therefore, of particular importance to Pakistan. That assistance was many times more than what the Soviets had rendered (while Nixon, in his foreign policy message to the Congress on 9 February 1972, estimated Chinese arms aid to Pakistan at \$133 million from September 1965 to December 1971, other reports indicated that the figure was near \$200

million⁵), it came precisely at a time when the USA had suspended its arms supplies and the Soviets had not begun theirs, and moreover, all the Chinese weapons supplied during 1965-71 were said to have been "given free"⁶ Furthermore, Bhutto could see in Peking a more dependable ally than any one else, in his not-so-easy relations with India

Bhutto was also obliged to Washington for showing muscles in support of Islamabad, by sending its Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal. Unlike the 1960s, he could have no fear of annoying or antagonizing China by cultivating or preserving close friendly relations with the USA or *vice versa* because of growing Sino-US rapprochement in the wake of Nixon's visit to China. It might be recalled that as early as February 1964 Ayub considered Sino-US rapprochement as serving the interests of Asian peace, the interests of world peace and having a bearing on Pakistan's security as well.⁷ The 1971 War between India and Pakistan saw both the United States and China ranged on the side of Pakistan and against India. Even after the war, it was reported that Pakistan had received T-59 tanks, surface-to-air missiles and OSA missile patrol boats from China apart from American built F-5 jet planes from Libya.⁸

The Anderson papers had revealed that like China, the US Government considered India to be the attacker. President Nixon ordered "no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$99 million credit" to India and a hold on further action implementing the \$72 million PL 480 credit.⁹ Like China, the White House took a one sided view of the Indo-Pak war and did not want to be "even-handed".¹⁰ Neither the USA nor China could countenance the possibility of seeing Pakistan defeated, thereby allowing their ally to go down completely. Nixon, therefore, ordered his crisis team, known formally as the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), to find ways short of direct intervention to help Pakistan. The result was a tough stand in the United Nations against India, the despatch on 10 December 1971 of a task force of the Seventh Fleet spearheaded by the aircraft carrier "*Enterprise*" into the Bay of Bengal¹¹ and an exploration of the possibility of sneaking arms to Pakistan through third countries. Peking, on its part, began passing weather data for locations in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border since 8 December 1971—an indication of some

form of an alert posture—and directed its ambassador in Islamabad on 12 December 1971 to assure Yahya Khan that “within 72 hours the Chinese army will move towards the border.”¹² Apart from military consultations between China and Pakistan, increased patrol activity was noticed, according to the Indian Ministry of Defence report, among the 100,000 Chinese troops deployed in Tibet from September 1971 to January 1972.¹³

Commenting on the despatch of the American carrier task force in the Bay of Bengal, Tom Wicker observed that Nixon’s intent really was to solidify an American alignment with China, also a supporter of Pakistan, against the Soviet Union and remarked: “In order to gam face in China, did we really need to lose our shirts in India.”¹⁴ If the joint Sino-US attempt to overawe India did not succeed it was because on 13 December 1971 the Soviet Ambassador Nikolai M. Pegov called on Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and promised that the Soviet Union “would open a diversionary action” in Sinkiang against the Chinese and would not allow the Seventh Fleet, sent by the US, “to bully India to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces,” by its intervention.¹⁵ While it might be too much to assert that there was collusion between Washington and Moscow about preserving their influence with their allies or friends, a tacit US-USSR understanding about the limits and scope of war, preventing the escalation of the conflict resulting in a wider war in which the two super Powers were also drawn, cannot be ruled out. India appreciated the Soviet stand and President Bhutto expressed his gratefulness to the US for its intervention, without which, he said, “India would have moved hard against Azad Kashmir and also on the southern front in Sind.”¹⁶

Even after the separation of Bangladesh, China continued to have an important stake in Pakistan, particularly as an outlet to the Indian Ocean and a bridge to friendship with other Muslim countries. It was true that a truncated Pakistan would be less useful to Peking as a counterweight to India but China’s interest in Pakistan derived from its “basic concern for securing its borders and preventing hostile Powers from dominating the neighbouring States,” as a secret analysis made

by the US State Department experts and quoted by Jack Anderson put it ¹⁷ In view of the deepening Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation, it was quite natural for Peking to continue to cultivate Islamabad, both to counter the combined Soviet and Indian offensive, diplomatic as well as military, against China and to hope to exert influence in the South Asian sub-continent. It was considered in Peking's interest to continue to maintain tension between India and Pakistan and to prevent Islamabad from having cooperative and normal relations with New Delhi by burying its hatchet over Kashmir through accepting the cease-fire line as a permanent frontier and to ensure, for that matter, that Bhutto did not yield to "friendly persuasion by western countries including possibly the United States, and go in for a settlement with India on the basis of the new realities in the sub-continent."¹⁸

The above considerations led China to continue its tirade against both India and the Soviet Union even after the cessation of hostilities. Radio Peking, in its broadcast on 23 December 1971, recalled an interview given on 9 December 1971 by a spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office in which foreign press reports were quoted to the effect that Soviet personnel were manning missile boats and flying Indian air force planes within Indian territory and that Soviet technicians were operating modern weapons provided by the Soviet Union to India in her war of aggression against Pakistan. The *New China News Agency* of 26 December 1971 accused Moscow of pursuing a policy of aggression and expansion in the South Asian sub-continent. It quoted the Japanese paper *Mainichi Shimbun* to the effect that after the all-round enlargement of the Indo-Pakistan War, the Soviet Union airlifted large quantities of weapons to India and at the same time "many Soviet military advisers had arrived in India." Two days later, the *Hsinhua* criticized India of intensifying the military occupation and economic plunder of "East Pakistan." Chou En-lai sent a message to Bhutto extending heartfelt congratulations to him on his assumption of the presidency of Pakistan, pledging firm support in Pakistan's "just struggle against foreign aggression" and expressing deep conviction that "so long as the people of Pakistan uphold unity and persist in struggle, they will certainly be able to overcome

temporary difficulties and final victory will certainly belong to the great people of Pakistan fighting valiantly against aggression." In the end, Chou En-lai expressed the hope that *friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries would "develop and grow stronger daily."*

Premier Chou-En-lai rendered strong support to Pakistan during President Bhutto's brief visit to Peking from 31 January to 2 February 1972. Speaking at a banquet given in honour of Bhutto, Chou En-lai condemned the Indian "aggression" against Pakistan, demanded the withdrawal of Indian forces from the occupied Pakistani territory and announced indefinite postponement of repayment of Chinese loans by Pakistan. Pakistan, he said, could pay back its interest-free loans to China "in 10 years, 10 years more, or even at the beginning of the 21st century." From the fact that none of the Muslim countries had till then recognized "the so-called Bangladesh," Chou En-lai deduced that the Muslim world was one in condemning Indian "aggression". Bhutto, on his part, expressed Pakistan's gratitude for the "heroic and strong support" it had received from China, which had "already done a lot for his country." The purpose of his visit was to acknowledge that great support, he added. He assured Chinese leaders that he had no intention of being "a liability or burden" on China.

The inclusion of the three Service Chiefs and the top Economic Adviser, M.M. Ahmed, in Bhutto's team suggested that he was looking towards Peking to make up the losses suffered in the 14-day war with India (according to the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, Pakistan lost 83 aircraft and 220 tanks) by providing economic and military assistance. As much of the \$200 million aid given by Peking in November 1970 remained unutilized, extensive discussions took place between the economic experts of the two countries in Peking about its utilization. The joint communique issued at the end of Bhutto's mission to China stated that Peking had decided to convert into outright grants the four loans amounting to about \$110 million, which had been provided to Pakistan and were being utilized. The repayment period of the \$200 million loan provided in 1970 was deferred by 20 years and Chou En-lai further expressed Peking's readiness to provide Pakistan fresh

loans on similar terms when the 1970 loan had been fully utilized. Although the communique made no mention of Chinese military assistance, Chou En-lai was reported to have told Bhutto that China would meet Pakistan's defence requirements free of charge. That the Chinese Prime Minister's words were not devoid of meaning came to light when it was reported in the *New York Times* on 3 June 1972 that China delivered in March/April 1972 some 60 MiG-19 jet fighter bombers, 100 tanks of the T-54 and T-59 varieties and an unspecified number of small arms, including automatic rifles and machine guns as part of the \$300 million worth of economic and military aid agreement worked out during Bhutto's visit.

The joint communique referred to the conflict in the Indian sub-continent, bilateral relations between China and Pakistan and major international issues on which an exchange of views took place between Chou En-lai and Bhutto. The two leaders strongly condemned the "naked aggression committed by India against Pakistan and the occupation of Pakistan's territory by her," which was said to be in blatant defiance of international law, the UN Charter and the Bandung Principles. They expressed the view that there could be no tranquility in the sub-continent unless "India vacates territories under her military occupation." The communique also spoke of the two sides' grave concern over the fate of the Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians in "East Pakistan" who were "in the hands of Indian occupation forces" and urged India to fulfil her obligations under the Geneva Conventions and repatriate those persons without further delay. The Pakistani President and the Chinese Prime Minister noted with gratification that "the members of the Third World in general and the Islamic countries in particular" were supporting the Government and people of Pakistan in their struggle to preserve their national independence and territorial integrity against foreign aggression and interference in their internal affairs. They further expressed their earnest hope that "the atrocities being perpetrated against innocent civilians in East Pakistan would cease immediately." Chou En-lai, however, did not endorse but merely "expressed his understanding" in regard to Bhutto's statements that future relations between "the two parts of

Pakistan" should be established through negotiations "between the elected leaders of the people *without foreign intervention or influence*"; that Indian forces should withdraw from Bangladesh to enable the said "negotiations to take place in an atmosphere free from coercion or intimidation", and that all States should refrain from taking any precipitate action which would "legitimise Indian aggression." That meant, in a way, that Peking was not prepared to go whole hog with Islamabad by taking up rigid positions in so far as its future relationship with India or Bangladesh was concerned.

However, in reiterating the Chinese Government's firm support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir "in the just struggle for the right of self-determination" and in telling Bhutto that the people of Pakistan stood for justice and, for that matter, would realize their aspirations, Chou En-lai was evidently expressing his desire to see the Indian sub-continent in a state of flux with tension persisting between India and Pakistan for a long period. He thereby sought to prevent India from occupying its legitimate place in the region and exerting its influence in the Asian continent, and also block the expansion of Soviet influence and power in Asia and the world. On Indo-China, the communique expressed firm support for the just struggle of the Indo-Chinese peoples for national liberation and the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples were firmly supported "in their just struggle against imperialism and for the restoration of their legitimate rights."¹⁹

In spite of the considerations outlined above making for close relations between Pakistan and China, there were certain compulsions which were likely to weigh with Islamabad in not alienating Moscow and with Peking in not completely writing off New Delhi if they did not want to push the Soviet Union and India respectively in a more enduring anti-Pakistani and anti-Chinese postures. It was partly for that reason that the Chinese did not entertain President Bhutto's idea of a formal pact. They preferred "to rely on the bond of common interests with other nations in formulating their foreign policy," as Bhutto put it.²⁰ The other considerations, which must have weighed with Peking in that regard, might be the reluctance to shoulder all of Pakistan's defence burden, keeping its options in regard to Bangladesh open and preserving its flexibility and manoeuvr-

ability in its foreign policy

In trying to be close to Islamabad Peking could not but take into account the new power equation that had emerged in the sub-continent and the existence of a new sovereign democratic People's Republic of Bangladesh. By suitably responding to Indian overtures for improved relations, Peking could not only hope to revive Sino-Soviet competition in New Delhi and create for India a stake in friendly relations with China, but also avoid pushing India too close to the USSR so that in the event of any Sino-Soviet encounter there might be no Indian thrust—say in Tibet—simultaneously with a Soviet thrust—say in Sinkiang. Similarly, by establishing diplomatic relations with Bangladesh and adopting a friendly stance towards Dacca through offers of economic and technical assistance, Peking could hope of disrupting close relations between India and Bangladesh and checkmating the growing influence of India by ushering in India-China competition in Dacca.

However, as a short-term policy, Peking thought it did not matter if it persisted in its attitude of indifference or even hostility towards India and Bangladesh. This was reflected in its posture of belated approval of the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan of 2 July 1972,²¹ presenting it as vindication of President Bhutto's "reasonable position" and thus giving credit to him for the outcome of the Summit talks, the stance of non-recognition of Dacca and the vetoing of the application of Bangladesh for admission into the United Nations. It might be that the Chinese were not quite happy about using their veto, which was likely to cast them in the role of a great Power playing power politics and put them in a minority in the Third World and the UN (in the face of an overwhelming majority of UN members according recognition to Bangladesh). Peking sought to postpone the consideration of Dacca's entry into the UN by submitting a proposal that the admission of Bangladesh be kept in abeyance until there was full implementation of UN resolutions concerning troop withdrawal and the release of prisoners of war. The Chinese resolution in that regard was rejected by a vote of 3 in favour (Guinea, Sudan and China), 3 against (India, USSR and Yugoslavia) with 9 abstentions. Even after the failure of that attempt, China desisted from abandoning its ally and depriving Bhutto of deriving such

political advantage from the delay in Bangladesh's admission as he chose. In this venture, Peking found solace in the fact that it was not alone for apart from some African countries, Washington also favoured the postponement of the decision and voted in favour of the amendment making the admission of Bangladesh conditional on the release of prisoners of war.

The Sino-US communique, issued on President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 recorded the views of the two governments on the Indian sub-continent in two separate paragraphs—the common denominator between them being their call for the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to within "their own territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir." Washington favoured "the continuation of the ceasefire" even when the withdrawal of forces was not forthcoming immediately and did not join Peking in supporting the Pakistan government and people "in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty" (here the words "territorial integrity" were missing and significantly there was no mention of or comment on Bangladesh) and the people of Jammu and Kashmir "in their struggle for the right of self-determination." All this coupled with the Chinese emphasis on "immediate" withdrawal of forces without reference to a cease-fire or its continuation indicated that Peking did not favour the restoration of stable or peaceful conditions in the sub-continent or the absence of tension on the India-Pakistan border²² The reason why it was decided to mention their respective viewpoints on the Indian sub-continent separately was that the two patrons of Islamabad wanted to extend a measure of support to Bhutto in his efforts to find a satisfactory solution of Pakistan's problems.

While Bhutto had been cultivating China for the benefit of Pakistan, Peking had its own aims and objectives in supporting Islamabad. One reason as to why Peking had persisted in its policy of non-recognition of Bangladesh and sought to block Dacca's entry into the UN by the use of the veto might be, as one writer claims, the Chinese concern about Bangladesh setting "a precedent with strong implications" relating to China's hold over Tibet and Sinkiang, which are remote from Peking with acute problems of divergent culture, race etc., and its claim to Taiwan.²³ But that the element of power politics was the real

reason behind the Chinese attitude could not be denied. The hope entertained in India and elsewhere about the Simla Agreement of July 1972 being the harbinger of peace in the Indian sub-continent and signifying the end of confrontation in the region had unfortunately not materialized. Consequently, it appeared that India and Bangladesh would have to live, for a long time to come, with Bhutto's non-cooperation and even political confrontation which is being buttressed by Chinese political support and military assistance. So long as China's relations with the Soviet Union and India did not improve, the Sino-Soviet rivalry would continue and Peking would not give up playing a great Power role in the Indian sub-continent. Thus, speaking at the banquet welcoming Begum Bhutto in Peking on 19 February 1973, Chou En-lai accused "certain foreign forces" of attempting to achieve their expansionist ambitions by stepping up "recently" their "subversive activities in the region, which threaten the security of Pakistan and peace in the south Asian sub-continent"—reminding Islamabad thereby of remaining on guard against the Soviet policies. He also referred to the agony of the Pakistani prisoners of war. Begum Bhutto seemed to assure the Chinese Premier when she stated that 'Pakistan is still faced with the threat to its independence and state sovereignty by subversive forces aided and abetted from outside. But we are vigilant. We shall not relax'.²⁴

The Soviet Union remains the central problem for China just as India has been and continues to be for Pakistan—so much so that K. Subrahmanyam has gone to the extent of remarking that the Sino-Pakistan relationship in the last 18 years "appears to have been a function of the Indo-Soviet relations". He further observes:

As the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, the Chinese commitment to Pakistan became firmer. Even in 1971 the Chinese viewed the developments in the subcontinent in terms of their dispute with the Soviet Union and this attitude has persisted through 1972 when they vetoed the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations. In the whole of the southern Asia from Vietnam to the Mediterranean, there is no other country which lends itself to be such a ready instrument for China in its anti-Soviet policy as Pakistan.²⁵

In view of Peking's intense hostility towards Moscow (A *People's Daily* article of September 1972 has asserted that the

Russians of the 1970s were the Japanese of the 1930s), it is possible to think that the Chinese interests could be better served by the resolution of differences between Pakistan and India and the establishment of peace and stability in the Indian sub-continent. But Peking would think in those terms only if it could have some confidence about its relations with India too serving the Chinese need of countering Soviet influence. That could happen only when there are possibilities of weaning India away from Kremlin. That depends on the Chinese perception of the Indian situation and the nature of New Delhi's relations with Moscow. "If the Chinese happen to rate low the likelihood of the continued unity, integrity and stability" of India, then it would be rational on their part "to sustain Bhutto in a strategy of conflict and confrontation with India rather than in conciliation and conflict resolution".²⁰ Much would, at the same time, depend on Peking's assessment of the extent and nature of Soviet influence over India, the state of their relations, the parallelism in their foreign policies and their perception of world reality as affecting their national interests etc.

But as the USSR and India are important and vital factors in the foreign policies of China and Pakistan respectively so also are China and both China and Pakistan in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and India respectively. For that matter Moscow was not expected to remain a passive spectator in a situation involving its interests. But leaving for the time being Soviet counter moves, even if Peking endeavours to cultivate India for the sake of and in the hope of weaning New Delhi away from Moscow, i.e. not allow the China factor to play a role in consolidating Indo-Soviet amity but rather use it for the opposite purpose, would Islamabad agree to bury its hatchet with New Delhi? Would Pakistan forget India as a factor in its policy-making (hostility towards India has been such a deep-seated element in Pakistan's mind that it had coloured almost all its foreign policy moves, including friendship and close collaboration with China) for the sake of obliging Peking so that China could hope to realize its objectives vis-a-vis Russia. In the event of real and lasting Indo-Pakistan reconciliation, the compulsion for Pakistan to seek Chinese support against India or avail of Peking's counter-voicing help against Soviet assistance

to India would also disappear—for that matter there would be left no justification for Pakistan to appear antagonistic to Moscow and partial to Peking. There is, thus, a certain degree of built-in contradiction between the Soviet factor in Chinese foreign policy and the India factor in that of Pakistan.

If Pakistan refused to accede to Chinese wishes in that regard, would Peking be prepared to abandon Islamabad for New Delhi in that situation, thinking just the same way as Kremlin rates India's importance higher than that of Pakistan? While there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies and any sort of about-turn is possible in international politics, China in the near future, is not likely to discard the known advantages of treating Pakistan as a trusted friend and ally for the unknown and uncertain benefits being derived from cultivating India.

Commenting on the "great significance" of Pakistan's role in the region, one Pakistani writer has observed as follows:

In her bid to neutralise China by creating a sympathetic anti-Chinese bloc along the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union considered Pakistan an important link in this geopolitical unit. Through Pakistan she could gain land access to the Indian Ocean to supply food, naval stores and fuel to her naval units. The strategic four-lane highway running through the mountains of northern Afghanistan and completed by Soviet engineers in July 1970 could link Russia with the Indian Ocean, provided Pakistan granted transit facilities. This strategic location of Pakistan on the littoral of the Indian Ocean encouraged Moscow to take the incentive in normalising its relations with Islamabad in the 1960s. The Brezhnev Plan for a collective security system in Asia is a strategic move on the part of the Soviet Government to contain the Chinese on the Asian mainland and consolidate its own influence in the region.²⁷

What China stands to gain as a result of Sino-Pakistani special relationship—in the context of Sino-Soviet confrontation, strained Sino-Indian relations, Indo-Soviet amity and Soviet attempts to woo Pakistan—has been described by Robert Jackson in the following words:

If Pakistan is for Russia the key to India, for China it is also in a central position—for the reverse of the same reasons. As we have seen, so long as Pakistan refuses to improve its relations with India the land route into India is denied to the Russians, and the prospect of a stronger

Indian competitive position is diminished. The minority nationalities of the remote far western mountain regions of China are exposed to hostile influences; and Pakistan is the vital gap in what would otherwise be a ring of hostile powers encircling China's most vulnerable salient. The relationship with Pakistan has also provided useful support for China in extending its connections into the Indian Ocean and the Near East and especially into the non-Arab Muslim world in which Pakistan is one of the leading powers. It is perhaps in this context that we must view Pakistan's decision to remain in Cento while withdrawing from Seato.²⁸

With the recent revival of Pakistani interest in the anti-Soviet CENTO pact (Peking, had never protested against CENTO as it had done against SEATO because it never considered the former as directed against it), China shares, more openly and firmly than ever before, with the USA a common interest in continued friendship with Pakistan and in the bolstering up of Iran, which is being armed massively by Washington and supported by Peking, with a view to checkmating Russia and countering the combined Soviet-Indian influence in the area. Close relations with Islamahad serve other Chinese interests as well—an outlet to the Indian Ocean, keeping India pre-occupied, undermining her influence, and improving its relations with other Islamic countries through the example, the good offices and intermediacy of Pakistan (the 'Land of the Pure' wields some influence in the recently revived Pan-Islam movement). Not without relevance in that regard is the so-called Chinese objective of encouraging separatist feelings among the Muslim minority groups within the USSR. The Chinese descriptions of the Soviet leadership as the "new Czars" and the Soviet system as 'social imperialism', observes K. Suhrahmanyam, "appear to be indicative of their perception of the relationship among the different ethnic groups in the Soviet Union,"²⁹ but Peking could hardly ignore, except to its own peril, that however much the Soviet Union might be vulnerable in that respect China was not totally immune from that danger. The encouragement of separatist tendencies would thus prove to be a double-edged weapon and the movement of a separate homeland for Muslims, if it once gathered momentum in Central Asia, would not remain confined to the borders of the Soviet Union.

Granting that the prospects of an improvement in Sino-Indian

relations somehow become bright, it could be assumed that Peking would not hesitate to reciprocate. Ever since the activation of its diplomacy in 1970-71, Peking had tried hard to strengthen its position in the world *vis à vis* the two super Powers, particularly the Soviet Union, and had endeavoured to create complications and problems for the USSR, especially on its periphery or flanks. Thus, China was seen establishing broader contacts and close links with Afghanistan, Japan, Iran and particularly West European countries. In 1972 alone, it was reported that as many as 30 Chinese delegations, including the visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua to Paris and London, went to West European countries. Viewing with apprehension this phenomenon, one Soviet writer had accused the Maoists of joining hands with the "reactionary NATO circles" in order "to impede the peace plans of the Soviet Union,"³⁰ especially the concept of European security which would result in the pacification of the situation on the western flank of the USSR and the preservation of the *status quo*, i.e. Soviet influence in East Europe. Likewise, Moscow could not but take note of the remark of the Chinese representative Chiao Kuan-hua that the defence capabilities of Western Europe were "inadequate". His observation, in the course of his statement before the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1973, that "to dismember a sovereign country by armed force and to legalize and perpetuate the division of a country have also become a tendency on the part of the big powers in their attempt to dominate the world"³¹ was similarly aimed really at the Kremlin and not so much against India.

Again it is China's Russophobia, which "continues to be the lodestar of its foreign policy",³² that had impelled Peking to cultivate friendly relations with Iran as well as Pakistan. Like Washington, Peking regards Iran as an essential bulwark against the expansion of Soviet power and influence in West Asia. Accordingly, during his 3-day official visit to Tehran in June 1973, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng fei welcomed Iran's defence build up (the USA will be supplying \$3 billion worth of arms and sophisticated equipment to Iran) as a "necessary measure" against subversion and expansion. He referred to the intense activities of expansionism, infiltration, disputes taking shape among big Powers and supported Tehran

in its handling of the situation. Chi criticized "certain big powers" for their hegemonistic ambitions and division of the world into spheres of influence. He also endorsed the stand taken by the Shah and Bhutto, in their joint communique, on the Indian sub-continent, thereby appearing with the Shah as the joint patrons of Bhutto—just the same way as Peking had done during Nixon's visit to China a year before. It suggested, as the *Christian Science Monitor* put it, "the emergence of a tacit China-Iran-Pakistan alliance to oppose Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian sub-continent."³³

It is worth adding here that the USA is not a less interested partner in that alliance. Despite its detente with the USSR and the fizzling out of the Cold War, Washington remains in competition and rivalry with Moscow and shares with its other friends the need to checkmate growing Soviet influence in the world. Peking had not been tired of reiterating its support for the independence and sovereignty of Pakistan. The Shah of Iran had made a categorical statement that the "integrity of Pakistan, of what remains of Pakistan, is vital to us," that the disintegration of Pakistan could not be tolerated by Iran and that if India attacked Pakistan, she would have to face, either directly or indirectly, the arms Iran was acquiring.³⁴ Washington had, by despatching its task force of the 7th Fleet, the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, in the Bay of Bengal on 10 December 1971 and the continued support to Pakistan, likewise, signified in unmistakable terms that the USA would not tolerate any further dismemberment of Pakistan. "Strong US support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity" was considered a guiding principle and the corner-stone of US foreign policy in the Nixon-Bhutto joint statement of 20 September 1973, issued on Bhutto's visit to the USA.³⁵

Islamabad, thus, can expect to receive sustenance and support from all the three benefactors—the USA, Iran and China. In May 1972, Peking supplied Pakistan 60 MiG-19 fighters and 100 T54/59 tanks, as well as some other weapons, which were all said to be part of a \$300 million economic and military aid agreement Bhutto had worked out with China during his visit in February 1972.³⁶ In the beginning of July 1973, there were reports about the Chinese decision to supply TU-16 jet bombers, complete with maintenance and training

facilities, to augment Pakistan's air capability³⁷ In September 1973, Bhutto's visit to the USA was primarily meant to explore the possibilities of receiving military equipment from Washington It was reported that he was disappointed by the US decision not to lift the embargo on the supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan³⁸ Bhutto, however, would not use the hard word "refusal" in regard to the resumption of arms supply from the USA, which he said, remained an "open question" so far as the future was concerned³⁹ In other words, he had not lost hope of procuring US military assistance at some future date

The intimacy of both Iran and China with Pakistan, the London *Economist* observed, was "another link in the anti-Soviet chain" and therefore Chi, after extending his visit to Iran by a day, flew on 17 June 1973 to Pakistan, where a "complete identity of views" was reported in his discussions with Bhutto about the continuing deadlock in the Indian sub-continent⁴⁰ A few days earlier, the *Peking Review* quoted with approval the *Pakistan Times* editorial of 22 May 1973 which was critical of the Soviet plan of the "Asian Collective Security System". Commenting on the "key principles" of the proposed Asian security system, enunciated by the Soviet Head of State Podgorny during his Kahul visit, the Pakistani paper was quoted in the Chinese news-media as pointing out that in Asia those "principles" were not being honoured Citing the example of the dismemberment of Pakistan and accusing India for "brutally assailing" Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity—"incidentally soon after it [India] signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union"—the Pakistani paper was quoted as remarking "what did the sponsors of Asian security scheme do to protect the inviolability of Pakistan's frontiers and safeguard its territorial integrity?"⁴¹

China would continue to give encouragement to such postures within Pakistan as were likely to serve Peking's anti-Soviet needs and not take steps to improve its relations with India or Bangladesh unless it felt sure that the latter course would help in countering Soviet influence in the area in a more effective way In other words, the idea of peace and stability in the South Asian sub-continent could be entertained by Peking only if China was convinced that it could be brought about under the auspices and influence of China and not under the

ages of the Kremlin, which was using such an attractive cover as Asian collective security. But if the anti-Indian posture is to be removed from the Pakistani frame of mind then it mattered little for Islamabad whether the objective of a peaceful and stable Indian sub continent was ensured with Soviet help or Chinese efforts. In that case, why could Pakistan not avail of the current proposals and avoid antagonizing the USSR—a greater and much stronger power?

So long as Pakistan was not able to get over its anti-Indian stance, there would remain a certain amount of contradiction between the Chinese support for Islamabad and their desire to cultivate relations with India and Bangladesh. However, if some day a rift develops between New Delhi and Dacca (Maoists in Bangladesh, Bhashani and the supporters of the "Muslim Bangla" movement are actively engaged in bringing it about), China was expected to exploit the situation in the same way as it had done between India and Pakistan before the coming into being of the Republic of Bangladesh. It might be recalled that besides "Muslim Bangla" activists and the pro-Chinese Communist Party (in July 1973 a document containing suggestions from the Chinese Communist Party to the so-called East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) was seized in Calcutta⁴²), two other parties of Bangladesh, JSD and NAP (Bhashani group) had continued to take an anti-Indian stance.

In this connection, the following remarks of President Bhutto, the patron and propagator of "Muslim Bangla" movement, are very significant and indeed revealing in so far as they reflect his future strategy of reviving, whenever the time might be considered to be ripe for it, joint Pakistan and Bangladesh moves, possibly in co-operation with friendly China and even the USA, in countering the influence or the primacy of India in the sub continent. He observed:

The separation of two parts of Pakistan has by no means weakened, far less invalidated, the basic premises of Pakistan's ideology...Whether the two Muslim communities decide to combine under a single sovereignty, as they did in 1946-1947 and for 25 years thereafter, or whether they constitute two separate sovereignties as they do now, the basis of their statehood remains as it was established in 1947. Although this separation is a reality, it does not undermine our sense of identity nor does it so alter the

situation in South Asia as to justify a lack of equilibrium or the establishment of a dominance in state relationships within the sub continent ⁴³

Despite Chinese apathy, Dacca continued to express its interest in normalizing relations with China. The Bangladesh Foreign Minister visited Hanoi in July 1973. On 25 July, Dacca announced its recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam—a measure likely to please Peking—and the Bangladesh Ambassador, Kaiser, was said to be in constant touch with the Chinese. These overtures could not be just dismissed as tactical moves on Dacca's part, dictated by the immediate necessity of ensuring that Peking did not use its veto against Dacca's entry into the world organization. So far China had been reluctant to respond to Dacca's overtures or to give up its threat of veto mainly because of not offending the susceptibilities of its friend—Pakistan. In this connection, it might be said that one reason why Pakistan could persuade China about using its veto power in the matter even in 1973, if necessary, was because Islamabad must have convinced Peking that it was only a temporary phase to enable Pakistan to tide over certain difficulties in the special circumstances of the case.

It must, however, be conceded that if China is seen listening to or being guided by Pakistani advice in regard to the non-recognition of Bangladesh or the use of veto about Dacca's entry to the UN, it is because Peking thereby finds itself in a position to exercise a greater amount of leverage over Pakistan, which remains obliged to China for support—that even Washington refuses to give—and because that is thought to serve Chinese interests more. So long as the Sino-Pakistani 'alliance' lasts it has perforce to be an unequal partnership because the Big Powers are seen as having greater capacity in influencing the policies of their weaker partners and the Sino-Pakistani relations are no exception to that. Thus, Pakistan could be said to have played the role of an adjunct in the execution of Chinese policy and not *vice versa*. Similarly, it is often the smaller or weaker partner that suffers from any inhibitions or curbs, because of its close relationship or alliance with another nation. The more powerful a country is, the greater flexibility or manoeuvrability

it has. Pakistan's manoeuvrability is all the more limited because of its fixed, inflexible and rigid stand against New Delhi and the long-standing and deep-seated animosity that it harbours towards India. That factor restricts its choices and alternatives available to it and pre-determines very much the course of its moves and actions.

Because of the sustenance and support which Pakistan has from external Powers, especially China and the USA, it had not been possible, to a certain extent, for Islamabad to come to terms with India or Bangladesh so far. It might be recalled here that US President Nixon's support for Pakistan during the 1971 war, though partly based on his concern for an ally, was to a certain extent influenced or rather reinforced by his attitude towards China. In the early stages of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, Washington made attempts for some sort of a political settlement of the problem. But as international tension mounted and as the long hiatus drew on between President Nixon's China announcement (July 1971) and the actual date of his visit (February 1972), Robert Jackson observes, "the United States moved with increasing determination to the support of Pakistan and China-in-Pakistan"⁴¹ It became necessary for Nixon to demonstrate his support and preference for Peking in the Sino-Soviet contest. It could be said that partly because of China, Pakistan had felt less inclined or had felt no urgency of reconciliation with India. It might be said that this China factor, *i.e.* anxiety for respecting Chinese interests and susceptibilities and thereby feeling inhibited in its dealings with India or the USSR, is the product of Pakistan's own making.

Pakistan reciprocated the Chinese concern for its interests by withdrawing formally from the SEATO on 8 November 1972 and recognizing North Korea, North Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic. Announcing Islamabad's decision to withdraw its membership of the UNCURK (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) on 23 November 1972, the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office disclosed that Pakistan had not taken an active part in the Commission since 1967. The termination of its membership of the Commission was "considered imperative" in view of "Pakistan's new posture of non-alignment." The spokesman

further added that the decision to withdraw from the UNCURK 'marks Pakistan's disengagement from cold war machinery in Asia' and was another step in, what he called, the long line of initiatives which had been taken by the Government to establish "a new image of Pakistan as an independent, sovereign country." All this was noted with satisfaction in the Chinese press.⁴⁵

The above decision was followed on 25 January 1973 by the recognition of the Cambodian Government-in-exile in Peking. Pakistan's announcement in the matter stated that that decision followed a series of actions taken by Islamabad which challenged the legality of the Government of Marshal Lon Nol in Pnom Penh. While alluding to the historic and strong ties of friendship between the people of Pakistan and the people of Cambodia, led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the announcement observed that Pakistan had also taken into consideration the aspirations of the people of Cambodia as well as the growing body of international public opinion (especially the Chinese—it could be added) favouring the restoration of the authority of Prince Sihanouk in Pnom Penh.⁴⁶

In an article entitled "Pakistan Builds Anew", contributed to the *Foreign Affairs* in April 1973, President Bhutto observed, on the basis of "experience over the years," that Peking did not harbour any thoughts of "disruption in the sub continent." On the contrary, it was said to scrupulously adhere to the principle of non intervention. Pakistan's relations with China, he said, "are animated by our common struggle against hegemony and our adherence to the principles of an equitable world order" and that these principles did not operate against the 'legitimate interest of any third country.' Obviously what was "equitable" and "legitimate" was left to be decided by Pakistan and/or China either singly or jointly. Probably as a mark of tribute to China, rather than a criticism by which Pakistan could not gain anything and in order to refurbish the image of China about non-intervention, Bhutto stated that "while standing by us in our severest crises in 1965 and 1971, China has nevertheless refrained from involving herself in the sub-continent in a disruptive manner."

Even when speaking of maintaining "friendly relations with

all the great powers," of avoiding involvement in disputes and struggles between them, and practising "bilateralism, with the greater flexibility it implies" in the future, Bhutto entertained high hopes about Pakistan being closer to the USA and China than to the Soviet Union. He referred to Pakistan as remaining "conscious of our past association" with Washington even in the days when relations with the USA were at a low ebb and to Nixon's message to the Congress dated 9 February 1972 in which the US President reaffirmed American concern for the well-being and security of Pakistan. He then went on to express his conviction that, freed from the incubus of the Vietnam war, the USA could play "a most beneficent role, not only in helping in our economic reconstruction and development but also in safeguarding our security." As for relations with China, Bhutto observed

Our friendship with China has for some years been a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy, based as it is partly on our geographical proximity, partly on the similarity of our ideals and ambitions in relation to the Third World. China's support of Pakistan at crucial points in our history has evoked the spontaneous appreciation of our people. Our association with China, which was misinterpreted in the past, is now being better understood, with the current detente between China and the United States.⁴⁷

In his radio broadcast on 15 September 1973, Prime Minister Bhutto stated that the Pakistan Government was beholden to the People's Republic of China for the strength and support it had given to the Pakistani position of principle regarding India and Bangladesh. This, he observed, had helped Islamabad, to a large extent, to resist an imposed solution and secure a negotiated one. The strength and consistency of the Chinese stand in that respect had further cemented the cordiality and friendship between the two countries, he added.⁴⁸

While addressing the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1973, Bhutto spoke of Pakistan as maintaining "friendly relations with China, the United States and the Soviet Union"—the order in which he mentioned the names of the three great Powers is significant as it shows his preference in the

matter. It is also worth recalling that this address was delivered soon after his attempt to secure the resumption of military supplies from the USA had failed in achieving immediate results. In describing Pakistan's relations with the three Powers he further stated:

Our relations with the People's Republic of China have been marked by mutual understanding and cordiality which has never been impaired by our alliance with the United States. This alliance with the United States has lasted for two decades, and we have never felt embarrassed by it. Indeed we have never felt the need to apologize for it. My Government has renewed efforts to bring about an improvement in the relations with the Soviet Union and I am glad to say that these efforts have met with laudable success.⁴⁹

It appears that Bhutto had slightly revised his earlier idea of "normal and unqualified" relationship with China alone by including the USA also in that category in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and the growing Sino-US rapprochement, though Islamabad's relations with Moscow, it seems, would continue to be cast in the same "normal but qualified" framework.

That Bhutto had not completely given up the idea of some sort of parity with India, even after the separation of East Bengal, or that of balancing close Indo-Soviet relations with greater reliance on his part on China and the USA was evident from his remarks at the Foreign Policy Association on 23 September 1973. He observed:

The consequences of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 cannot be erased from our minds. It is also a patent fact that India spends vast sums on her military apparatus and has acquired a sizeable—for us, formidable—arms production capability. On top of it, there is a continuous flow of Soviet military aid.

Having a negligible arms production capacity itself, Pakistan cannot be blamed if it seeks assistance from others. To remove the startling disparity in the military strengths of India and Pakistan, is not to trigger an arms race. It is to protect the fruits of Pakistan's development. It is to plug a gaping hole in the fabric of peace in the sub-continent. It is needed to ensure the success of negotiations between India and Pakistan for the normali-

sation of their relations. Only the naive can deny that negotiations between the strong and the weak lead to a diktat rather than to an honourable peace.⁵⁰

Peking, on its part, would also continue to assign higher priority to its relations with Pakistan than with India or Bangladesh. For one thing, there are as yet no signs of loosening of Indo-Soviet ties. Secondly, Kremlin has not yet given up its efforts to wean Pakistan away from China. This is evident from the revival of contacts, resumption of economic aid and assistance in facilitating the repatriation of Pakistani POWs etc. China is also anxious not to give any opportunity for loosening its special ties or "unqualified" relationship with Pakistan. It realizes that in the circumstances in which the emergence of Bangladesh took place, it would not be possible for it to gain or exercise any leverage over Mujib in the near future, even if it recognized Dacca. Moreover, without its foothold in Pakistan, Peking would be facing the solid phalanx of the USSR-Afghanistan-India single-handed, without the possibility of making any breach in that not-so-friendly combination through the instrumentality of Pakistan, leave aside other considerations—an outlet to the Arabian Sea and the prospects of better relations with other Muslim countries. In these circumstances, China seems to have come to the conclusion that it stands to lose more by alienating or offending the susceptibilities of Pakistan than it can hope to gain, for the time being at least, by cultivating relations with Dacca or improving relations with India. So long as Peking could not think of the possibilities of exploiting Indo-Soviet or Indo-Bangladesh relations, China would continue to view its relations with Dacca and New Delhi more in the context of rivalry and competition with India and the Soviet Union than that of cooperation and joint efforts and remain aligned with Pakistan.

While the above assessment could be said to hold good in the near future, it is very difficult to predict anything about the distant future. The emerging power structure and pattern of relationship in the long-term must necessarily remain uncertain because the nature and scope of Chinese relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh will depend on so many imponderable and constantly changing factors—

Islamabad's reconciliation or otherwise with India and Bangladesh, the extent of Sino-American rapprochement, the intensity of Sino-Soviet rivalry the Soviet American competition in the world, the improvement in Indo-US relations and the development of relations between India and China.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with the People's Republic of China," *Pakistan Horizon* (1961) 213
2. Ahmed Ali, *Muslim China* (Karachi, 1949) 62-3, 52, 38, 48, 34, 36-7, 44, 52, 64, 60 and 54.
3. *New York Times*, 3 Jun 1946.
4. Rahman Khan, n. 1, 212.
5. *Dawn*, 15 Oct 1949.
6. *Ibid*, 17 Oct 1949.
7. See Rahman Khan, n. 1, 213-4.
8. Shih-chieh Chih-shih Ch'u-p'an-hsie, *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-he-Kuo tai-wai Kuan-hsi Wen-chien Chi, 1949-50* (Peking, 1957) Translation by the author.
9. *Ibid*.
10. Ahmed Ali, n. 2, 49-50, 37 and 44.
11. Howard L. Boorman and others, *Moscow-Peking Axis* (New York, 1957) 177.
12. David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven, 1948) 362.
13. *Ibid*, 362.
14. Ahmed Ali, n. 2, 50 and 37.
15. UN Document A/PV 283, 25 Sep 1950.
16. *Dawn*, 3 Oct 1950.
17. *Ibid*., 8 Dec 1950.
18. UN Document A/PV 283, 25 Sep 1950.
19. *People's China* (16 Oct 1950) 4-7.
20. Shih-Chieh Chih-shih [Ch'u-p'an hsi, *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-he-Kuo tai-wai Kuan-hsi Wen-chien Chi, 1951* (Peking, 1958) Translation by the author.

CHAPTER 2

1. *Times of Karachi*, 26 Jan 1955.
2. Ahmad Mushtaq, *The United Nations and Pakistan* (Karachi, 1955) 86.
3. M A.H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-1964," *Pakistan Horizon* (1964) 238-9 and 248. At the Colombo-Conference of five Asian Prime Ministers in April-May 1954, however, Pakistan went along with others in declaring that Peking's presence in the UN "would help to promote stability in Asia, ease world tension and assist in bringing about a more realistic approach to the problem" of world peace and security.

New York Times, 2 May 1954 Again in July 1956 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Hamidul Haq Chowdhury in a broadcast over BBC expressed the hope that China would be admitted to the UN as that was necessary "to create a stabilising influence" in the area. He observed that once China came in the United Nations she will be a tremendous force and influence to work in cooperation and harmony with the rest of the members of the United Nations." *New China News Agency*, 7 Jul 1956 But when it actually came to voting in the UN, Pakistan supported, as usual, the US resolution and subsequently issued a press communique stating therein that "the present was not the opportune moment to press for the Chinese seat in the UN" and that, in its opinion, the admission of China should be brought about at a time when such action would lessen rather than enhance international tension *Asian Recorder* (1956) 1162

4 *Peking Review* (30 Sep 1958) 26-7

5 Mushtaq, n 2, 85

6 *Dawn*, 16 Aug 1954

7 *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 869, p 21 On 1 Oct 1954, Pakistan's Governor General conveyed his good wishes to Chairman Mao on China's National Day

8 *News Bulletin* of the Chinese Embassy, New Delhi (18 Aug 1954) 5-6

9 *Ibid* (25 Aug 1954) 4-5 Earlier, while replying to Mohammad Ali's congratulations on the successful end of the Geneva Conference, Chou En lai expressed the hope that Pakistan would not join in any US sponsored attempt "to create split and antagonism among the Asian nations" *New China News Agency*, 5 Aug 1954

10 *People's China* (16 Oct 1954) 32-5

11 *News Bulletin* of the Chinese Embassy, New Delhi (9 Mar 1955)

12 George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung* (Ithaca, 1956) 57-8

13 *Dawn*, 11 Apr 1963

14 *News Bulletin* of the Chinese Embassy, New Delhi (20 Jul 1955) 6-7

15 *People's China* (16 Feb 1956) Supplement

16 Government of Pakistan, Department of Publications, *Foreign Relations* (Karachi 1956) 41.

17 *Pakistan News Digest*, 15 Jun 1956

18 *People's China*, (16 Jul 1956) Supplement, 6-7

19 *Pakistan News Digest*, 15 Sep 1958.

20 Mustafa Ali Khan, "Some Aspects of Pakistan's Foreign Trade," *Pakistan Horizon*, (1960) 158.

21. M A H Ispahani, *27 Days in China* (Karachi, 1960)

22 Pakistan's Military alliance with the United States was vigorously opposed in East Pakistan by the United Front, comprising of the Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party and the Nizama-Islam, which won a sweeping victory with 223 members in a house of 310, in the elections held in March 1954, thus defeating the ruling Muslim League Party in a decisive way. This was reflected in the statement, signed by 162 members of the new East Pakistan Assembly, which called upon the people of Pakistan to protest against the military pact with the United States *Pakistan Times*, 22 Apr 1954 The leftist elements inside the Awami League, under the leadership of Maulana Bhashani, demanded changes in foreign policy Suhrawardy, however, continued to support Pakistan's links with the West After his stand came to be endorsed, after much debate for a long time, in June 1957 by the Awami League Council by a majority of 750 votes, Maulana

Bhashani quit the Awami League and formed a new party known as the National Awami Party, which favoured an independent foreign policy. Chaudhury G.W. and Hasan Parvez, *Pakistan's External Relations* (Karachi, 1958) 30.

23. *People's China*, (1956) Supplement 'Also *Pakistan Press Digest* (1 Nov 1956)

24. *Pakistan Press Digest*, 1 Nov 1956.

25. *China Today* of the Chinese Embassy, New Delhi (15 Jan 1957) 6

26. Samin Khan, *Pakistan Ideology—Constitution—Laws—Foreign Policy* (Karachi, 1961)

27. *Indian Express*, 3 Apr 1963.

28. *Times* (London), 17 Dec 1956.

29. UN Document S/PV 761, 16 Jan 1957, p. 20.

30. *Pakistan News Digest*, 1 Oct 1957.

31. *Ibid*, 15 Sep 1958

32. *China Today*, 25 Feb 1957.

33. *Dawn*, 16 Feb 1957.

34. *Ibid*, 6 Feb 1957.

35. *People's China* (1 Apr 1957) Supplement, 14

36. *Dawn*, 7 Feb 1957.

37. *Ibid*, 21 Jul 1957.

38. For the statement of the Pakistani delegate and voting on the resolution, see UN Document A/PV 570 and 571, 9 Nov 1956.

39. *New York Times*, 20 Jan 1957.

40. Samin Khan, n. 26, 103.

41. *Times* (London), 3 Dec 1956.

42. *Peking Review*, 18 Mar 1958, 22-3.

43. *Ibid*, 21 Oct 1958, 19.

44. *Ibid*, 15 Dec 1959, 22-3.

45. *Dawn*, 1 May 1960.

46. *Peking Review* (8 Jul 1958) 19-20.

47. *Jen-min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*), 7 Mar 1959.

48. *Hsinhua News Agency*, 6 Mar 1959

49. *Ibid*, 27 Feb 1959 and 9 Mar 1959.

50. *China Today* (25 Jul 1959) 2.

51. *Peking Review* (28 Jul 1959) 18-19. Ayub's seizure of power by a military coup was likewise considered in Moscow as an attack "against the democratic gains of peoples who have won national independence." Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 21st Party Congress *Pravda*, 23 Jan 1959

52. UN Document, A/PV 832, 20 Oct 1959, p. 433.

53. *Pakistan Horizon* (1960) 269.

54. *Ibid*, (1961) 85-6.

CHAPTER 3

1. *Dawn*, 18 Aug 1959.

2. UN Document S/4242.

3. *Dawn*, 3 Oct 1959.

- 4 Mohammad Ayub Khan *Friends Not Masters* (Karachi, 1967) 161
- 5 *Pakistan Times*, 24 Nov 1959
- 6 *Dawn* 3 Oct 1959
- 7 Khalida Qureshi 'Pakistan and the Sino Indian Dispute', *Pakistan Horizon* (1962) 320-1
- 8 *New York Times* 7 Oct 1959
- 9 *Times of India*, 25 Nov 1959
- 10 Statement on 21 October 1959 *Dawn* 22 Oct 1959 Later the Pakistani Food and Agriculture Minister K M Shaikh said he knew of no Chinese infiltration along the small segment of Pakistan held territory that adjoined Sinkiang *Ibid*, 26 Jan, 1960 In September 1960 the North American News Association published a letter from the Mir of Hunza to its correspondent Frederick Buechner who had visited the State in 1959 'The Mir had said that Peking 'was claiming my state and that of my brother in law, the Mir of Nagar on the grounds that we once paid tribute to the Chinese' This created considerable perturbation in Pakistani official circles which denied in a press note dated 30 September 1960, that Peking had made such a claim.
- 11 *Pakistan News Digest*, 1 Nov 1959
- 12 *Dawn* 28 Nov 1959
- 13 *Pakistan Times* 14 Oct 1959
- 14 *Ibid*, 15 Oct 1959
- 15 Harish Kapur, 'China's Relations with India and Pakistan,' *Current History* (Sep 1969) 160
- 16 *Hindustan Times*, 10 Mar 1961
- 17 Press Release No 5 of the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington (4 Mar 1963)
- 18 Statement in Dacca on 16 February 1961 *Times* (London) 17 Feb 1961
- 19 *Pakistan News Digest*, 1 Feb 1961
- 20 *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 Mar 1961
- 21 *Pakistan Horizon* (1961) 162-4
- 22 Ayub Khan, n 4
- 23 *Round Table* (Sep 1961) 410
- 24 Ayub Khan n 4, 162
- 25 *Ibid*, 163
- 26 Press Release, n 17
- 27 *Pakistan Times*, 23 Mar 1962
- 28 *China Today* (New Delhi) (31 Mar 1962) 4
- 29 *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 2703, pp 32-3
- 30 *Pakistan News Digest*, 15 May 1962
- 31 See S/5263 and India, Ministry of External Affairs *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China (White Paper)* VI, 96-7
- 32 *Ibid* 99-102 For Pakistan's reply to India dated 9 August 1962, see Indian Society of International Law, *Sino-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi, 1963) 35-6
- 33 *Peking Review* (8 Jan 1962) 11-2.
- 34 *White Paper*, VI, 103-5
- 35 *Ibid*, IX, 1-2.
- 36 *Dawn*, 11 May 1962

37. *Hindu*, 12 May 1962.
38. *Dawn*, 13 May 1962.
39. *Pakistan Times*, 27 May 1962.
40. Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, Press Release No. 35 (5 Jul 1962).
41. *New York Times*, 21 Oct 1962.
42. *Survey of China Malabar Press*, No. 2814.
43. *Dawn*, 20 Oct 1962.
44. UN Document S/IV 1221.
45. *Pakistan Times*, 9 Nov 1962.
46. *Ibid.*, 11 Nov 1962.
47. *Asahi Evening News*, 14 Dec 1962. However, S M Burke, who had served as Pakistani High Commissioner in Canada but later joined as Professor of South Asian Studies in the University of Minnesota, spoke of Sino-Pak border talks beginning in Peking on 12 October 1962, "a week prior to the Chinese attack on India." S M Burke, "Sino-Pakistani Relations," *Orbit* (1964) 396.
48. *Dawn*, 6 Jan 1961.
49. Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol. 5, Jul 1962-Jun 1963 (Karachi, undated) 53.
50. *Ibid.*, 57.
51. Ayub Khan, n. 4, 142-3.
52. *Ibid.*, 131.
53. *Pakistan National Assembly Debates*, 22 Nov 1962, pp. 3-6.
54. *Ibid.*, 12 Dec 1966, p. 1235.
55. Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Elephant and the Grass* (New York, 1964) 88-9.
56. *Pakistan National Assembly Debates*, 4 Dec 1962, p. 396.
57. *Dawn*, 29 Nov 1962.
58. *Pakistan Times*, 9 Dec 1962.
59. Letter to the Editor of the *Observer* (London) by John Birchey (16 Jun 1963).
60. *New York Times*, 25 Nov 1962.
61. *Dawn*, 1 Dec 1962.
62. *Hindustan Times*, 12 Nov 1962.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 Dec 1962.
65. *Times* (London), 27 Nov 1962.
66. *Peking Review* (28 Dec 1962) 8.
67. Anwar Syed, "Sino-Pakistan Relations—An Overview," *Pakistan Horizon* (1969) 112-3.
68. C S, "China & the Asian Triangle: An Appraisal [of the Sino-Indian Border War]," *India Quarterly* (Apr-Jun 1967) 95.
69. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, 3 Jan 1963, IIII-9.
70. *White Paper*, VIII, pp. 47-8. A copy of the Indian protest to China was forwarded to Pakistan along with its protest to Islamabad dated 26 January 1963, expressing India's "surprise and concern" at Pakistan being a party to the communique of 26 December 1962. See UN Document S/5263.
71. *White Paper* IX, 1-2.
72. *Ibid.*, 2-3.
73. *Pakistan Trade* (Jan 1963) 77.

- 74 Pakistan National Assembly *Debates*, 17 Jul 1963
- 75 Press Release, n 17
- 76 SIPRI *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Stockholm, 1971) 490
- 77 Press Release n 17
- 78 *Washington Post*, 23 Feb 1963
- 79 *Peking Review* (15 Mar 1963) 67-70
- 80 *Dawn*, 5 Mar 1963
- 81 *Peking Review*, n 79, 66-7
- 82 UN Document S/5263 Pakistan sent a long reply See UN Document S/5280
- 83 Ministry of External Affairs of India, *Sino-Pakistan Agreement Some Facts* (New Delhi, 1963) 32-4
- 84 *White Paper*, IX, 8-10
- 85 *Ibid*, 2A-5
- 86 *Ibid*, X, 7-8
- 87 See UN Documents S/6242 and S/6303
- 88 See UN Documents S/6305 S/6360 and S/6637
- 89 Chinese note dated 25 Mar 1963 See *White Paper* IX, 8-10
- 90 W M Dobell "Ramifications of the China Pakistan Border Treaty," *Pacific Affairs* (Fall 1964) 290
- 91 See Alastair Lamb, "The Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963," *Australian Outlook* (Dec 1964) 310 For refutation of the arguments of the apologists, see G Narayana Rao, *The India China Border A Reappraisal* (Bombay, 1968)
- 92 *Sino-Pakistan Agreement Some Facts*, n 83, 2-5
- 93 Dobell, n 90 288
- 94 *Dawn* 30 Mar 1963
- 95 *Pakistan Times* 20 Mar 1963
- 96 *Ibid*, 1 Aug 1963
- 97 Khalid Bin Sayeed "Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests," *Asian Survey* (Mar 1964) 750
- 98 *Statesman* 21 Mar 1963 R K Nehru (Secretary General) of the Indian External Affairs Ministry, reported in Moscow after an interview with Gromyko that the Russians were just as astonished at the prospect of a Sino-Pakistani alliance as the Indians Cited in Dobell, n 90 294
- 99 Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of the *Peimin Ribao* and the *Hongqi Peking Review* (13 Sep 1963) 18
- 100 Ayub Khan n 49, 102
- 101 *Dawn*, 11 Apr 1963
- 102 *Ibid*
- 103 *Ibid*, 20 Mar 1963
- 104 *Peking Review* (6 Sep 1963) 4-5
- 105 Far Eastern Economic Review, *China Trade Reports* (Sep 1963) 24
- 106 *Dawn*, 1 Aug 1964
- 107 *Pakistan Times*, 28 Jun 1963 and *Dawn*, 30 Jun 1963
- 108 *Times of India*, 31 Aug 1964
- 109 Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly See Pakistan National Assembly *Debates*, 21 Aug 1964, p 1259

110. W. Unna, "Pakistan - A Friend of Our Enemy," *The Atlantic* (Mar 1964)
111. US Senate, Congress 88, Session 2, Sub-committee on Department of Defense of Committee on Appropriations and Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, *Department of Defence Appropriations 1965* (Washington, 1964) 1, 17.
112. Between 1960 and 1965 "the Consortium's aid pledge to Pakistan totaled \$2 103 billion, nearly half of which was from the United States" Qutbuddin Aziz, "Pakistan Seeks Aid from East and West," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 Apr 1966
113. Pakistan National Assembly *Debates*, 17 Jul 1963, p. 1666
114. *Pakistan Times*, 1 Jul 1963
115. Ayub Khan, n. 49, Vol. 6, Jul 1963-Jun 1964, pp 140-2
116. *Hindustan Times*, 25 Feb 1964
117. *China Today*, 5 Mar 1964, 7-10.
118. *News from China* (Chinese Embassy, New Delhi) (27 Feb 1964).
119. *Dawn*, 5 Mar 1963.
120. *Ibid.*, 3 Nov 1968
121. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 2708 (29 Mar 1962).
122. *Times* (London), 28 Nov 1962
123. *Dawn*, 5 Mar 1963.
124. *Ibid.*, 11 Apr 1963
125. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 3067 (25 Sep 1963) 44.
126. *Ibid.*, No. 3359 (17 Dec 1964)
127. *Pakistan Times*, 4 Nov 1963
128. *Dawn*, 13 Dec 1964
129. *Ibid.*, 19 Nov 1964 Speaking at a news conference at Karachi on 19 Feb. 1964, Foreign Minister Bhutto spoke of "some countries" which were "not very keen for obvious reasons to hold a second Afro Asian conference" He added that "we have no cause to see why they are so reluctant," thereby implying that those countries were trying to sabotage that conference without any valid reasons. He considered it necessary "to discuss problems and issues that at present divide us in some form or the other," *Pakistan Affairs* (16 Mar 1964). Addressing a news conference in Rawalpindi two days later, Ayub not only refused to accept India as a non-aligned country but also denigrated the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries by saying "I do not think it was a very great thundering success" *Ibid.*, (5 Mar 1964). It was echoed in China when it was observed in the Chinese press that India had no place in the non-aligned conference because it was "doubly aligned-with both Washington and Moscow." *Peking Review* (23 Oct 1964) 15
130. *Dawn*, 22 Apr 1964.
131. *Ibid.*
132. *Ibid.*, 27 Oct 1964.
133. *Peking Review* (1 Jan 1965) 18 The Chinese press quoted the Pakistani paper, *Dawn*, as saying that "the impulse of Afro-Asian Unity must continue to inspire the thoughts and actions of the new emerging forces of the two continents." *Ibid.* (25 Jun 1965) 6
134. *Dawn*, 4 Mar 1965
135. *Ibid.*, 9 Mar 1965.
136. *Ibid.*, 7 Mar 1965.
137. *Ibid.*, 8 Mar 1965.

- 138 *Ibid*, 27 Mar 1965 The Cultural Agreement was signed during Chen Yi's visit
- 139 *Peking Review* (23 Apr 1965) 16
- 140 *Ibid*, 18
- 141 Statement in Dacca 29 May 1965 *Dawn* 30 May 1965
142. *Ibid*, 14 Jul 1965
- 143 Ayub Khan, n 4, 180-3

CHAPTER 4

- 1 *Times of India* 13 Oct 1964
- 2 *Dawn*, 24 Sep 1964
- 3 *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 3295 (9 Sep 1964)
- 4 *Dawn* 22 Jan 1965
- 5 Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol VII, Jul 1964-Jun 1965 (Karachi, undated) 135
- 6 George J Lerski 'The Pakistan American Alliance A Re-valuation of the Past Decade,' *Asian Survey* (May 1968) 400
- 7 *Dawn*, 15 Nov 1964 and 27 Dec 1964
- 8 See Pakistani Permanent Representative's letter to the United Nations, 20 Apr 1965 (UN Document S/6291)
- 9 *Dawn*, 7 Mar 1965.
- 10 *Ibid*, 4 Mar 1965
- 11 *Peking Review*, (17 Mar 1965) 8-9
12. *Dawn* 3 Apr 1965
- 13 *Statesman* 29 Mar 1965
- 14 *Jenmin Jihpao (People's Daily)*, 5 May 1965
- 15 *Hsinhua News Agency*, 4 May 1965.
- 16 *Pravda*, 9 May 1965 as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (2 Jun 1965) 25
- 17 *New Age* (New Delhi) (Jun 1964) 44
- 18 *Ibid*, 45 Thus, Pakistan's war against India in 1965 came to be described as a "people's war" while the Ayub regime, even though anti-democratic, oppressive and anti-people, had to be defended by Bhashani and his ilk simply because it was pro-Chinese. How Peking utilized the services of Maulana Bhashani are best described in Bhashani's own words. In a tape recorded interview with Tariq Ali in June 1969 he related that Mao told him "You are our friend and if at the present moment you continue your struggle against the Ayub Government it will strengthen only the hands of Russia, America and India. It is against our principles to interfere with your work, but we would advise you to proceed slowly and carefully. Give us a chance to deepen our friendship with your government." Tariq Ali, *Pakistan Military Rule or Peoples' Power?* (London, 1970)
- 19 *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 3535.
- 20 *Peking Review* (10 Sep 1965) 7-8
- 21 *Ibid*, 6-7
22. *Ibid* (17 Sep 1965) 11
- 23 UN Document S/6653
- 24 *Peking Review* (17 Sep 1965) 10

25. *Ibid.*, 12-4.
26. *Ibid.*, 14-5 and 18.
27. S. Mikoyan, "Kashmir - Iabloko Razdora," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow, 28 Oct 1965)—cited in Devendra Kaushik, *Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan* (Delhi, 1971) 94 and R. Vaidyanath, "Some Recent Trends in Soviet Policies Towards India and Pakistan," *International Studies* (Jan 1966) 444-5.
28. *Pravda*, 11 Sep 1965.
29. *Ibid.*, 12 Sep 1965
30. *People's Daily* editorial, 18 Sep 1965 *Peking Review* (24 Sep 1965) 13-6
31. UN Document S/PV 1241
32. *Pakistan Horizon* (1969) 116-7
33. Pakistan National Assembly, *Debates*, 15 Mar 1966, pp. 499-500
34. Broadcast to the Nation, 13 Aug 1965.
35. *New York Times*, 15 Aug 1965.
36. *Statesman*, 23 Sep 1965
37. *Indian Express*, 1 Oct 1965
38. *Peking Review* (8 Oct 1965) 8
39. R. Rama Rao, "Pakistan Re-arms," *India Quarterly* (Apr-Jun 1971) 141 and 144. A \$67 million Peking loan was utilized to rebuild Pakistan's shattered armed forces and it was said that a daily air shuttle from Sinkiang into Pakistan was carrying Chinese small arms to outfit three new Pakistani divisions. *Time*, 7 Jan 1966.
40. *Indiagram* (Ottawa) 28 Mar 1966
41. *Pakistan Times*, 25 Nov 1965.

CHAPTER 5

1. *Peking Review* (4 Feb 1966) 11. It might be recalled here that Peking media ignored the Tashkent meeting till 11 Jan. 1966. On that day, the *Hsinhua* reported the Tashkent accord and Shastri's death. After a brief objective summary of the main points of the Tashkent Agreement, the *Hsinhua* hastened to emphasize the divergent Indian and Pakistani approaches to the Kashmir problem. It quoted a Pakistani spokesman as saying that it was merely a "declaration of intent" which did not "go far enough." An Indian spokesman was quoted to show that the declaration "solved no problems" but only provided "an avenue" for their solution.
2. *New York Times*, 14 Sep 1965.
3. *Baltimore Sun*, 2 Dec 1965.
4. *New York Times*, 23 Feb 1966.
5. *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 May 1963 and *Washington Post*, 26 May 1963.
6. *Times* (London), 7 Mar 1966.
7. *Dawn*, 21 Feb 1966.
8. Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol. VIII, July 1965-June 1966 (Karachi, undated) 113-4, 120-2 and 131.
9. *Pakistan Times*, 21 Feb 1966.
10. Ayub Khan, n. 8, 130.
11. *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) 193.
12. *Hongqi Commentator*, 11 Feb 1966. *Peking Review* (18 Feb 1966) 10.

- 13 *Dawn*, 15 March 1966
- 14 *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) 24
15. *Ayub Khan*, n 8, 159-60
16. *Ibid.*, 164
- 17 *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) 198
18. *Ibid.*, 200-1
- 19 *Peking Review* (22 Apr 1966) 7
20. *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) 285
- 21 *Times* (London), 19 Nov 1966
- 22 *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) 301.
- 23 *Dawn*, 31 Mar 1967
- 24 *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) 287 and 290 A student of Indo Pakistan affairs, in an article "Tashkent and After," wrote "As against the incentive of harming India by becoming friendly with China, there are strong disincentives for a pro-China anti-Soviet, anti-American posture on the part of Pakistan. Her dependence on the Great Powers is admittedly greater; her vulnerability to Great Powers' pressure more, and her domestic political structure less conducive to the growth of radical ideas. Her propensity to depend on allies is greater, but she is likely to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of going too near China, lest she might offend her more powerful benefactors. Alliance with China has been for Pakistan a meaningful instrument to get more out of the old alliances, not to get rid of them. These factors are likely to remain important in Pakistani policy making. What the Indo-Pakistan War has done is to re-determine Pakistan's relations with the West and reassert Pakistan's essential dependence on the western world." *India Quarterly* (Jan-Mar 1966) 12-7.
- 25 *Pakistan Times*, 21 Nov 1968
26. Ayub's interview with BBC *Morning News*, 30 Nov 1967.
27. *Pakistan Times*, 7 Aug 1968.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 18 Oct 1967. Speaking in the National Assembly on 8 March 1966, President Ayub declared "Our relations with different countries are essentially bilateral in character and their direction is determined by mutual interests and common understanding." *Pakistan National Assembly Debates* (8 Mar 1966) 66
29. *Pakistan Times*, 24 Apr 1968.
- 30 Z.A. Suleri, "Pakistan & Big Powers," *Ibid.*, 12 Apr 1967.
31. *Ibid.*, 11 Feb 1968.
32. In his pamphlet, *Political Situation in Pakistan*, written in 1968, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Chairman, Pakistan People's Party, observed "The cumulative effect of all things done by the Government in the past two years has resulted in a decline in Pakistan's relations with the People's Republic of China. Outwardly there is no break in our relations with China. Foreign Policy changes are often imperceptible. It is like a rose bud which opens slowly into a full flower. The lustre of Pakistan-China relations has been lost."
- 33 *Dawn*, 1 Jul 1968. Speaking in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 14 March 1966, Shah Azizur Rahman from East Pakistan observed that while it was said that "in the hour of our trial" China helped Pakistan substantially, "last two months we never heard of China in the Radio broadcast." *Pakistan National Assembly, Debates* (14 Mar 1966) 365. Charging Ayub's administration of effecting a change in Pakistan's foreign policy on 15 March 1966, Mashur Rahman, again from East Pakistan, stated: "Whatever steps you have taken right from 1963 or 1964

upto the Algerian Conference and all that you started there is undone You have started a low-keyed friendship with China I have got proof for that Your President's speech which was delivered here the other day has a portion where you wanted to maintain the friendship with sincerity with China This has been blotted by ink " *Ibid* , 15 Mar 1966, 436

34. Statement at a banquet given in honour of the visiting Pakistani delegation led by Khwaja Shahabuddin on the occasion of China's National Day. *Dawn*, 30 Sep 1967

35. Statement at a banquet given in honour of Pakistan's Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain on 5 August 1968 *Pakistan Times*, 6 Aug 1968

36. *Times* (London), 11 Jul 1967,

37. *Economist* (London), 27 Apr 1968, 32.

38. *Morning News*, 28 Sep 1968.

39. *Pakistan Times*, 2 Oct 1968

40. *Ibid* , 4 Oct 1968.

41. *Ibid* , 14 Oct 1968.

42. Bhutto, n. 32.

43. *Dawn*, 29 Mar 1967.

44. *Ibid.*, 25 Mar 1968.

45. *Dawn*, 30 Sep 1967.

46. *Pakistan Times*, 24 and 27 Oct 1967.

47. *Ibid* , 6 Aug 1968.

48. *Dawn*, 30 Sep and 4 Oct 1968

49. See *Ibid* , 23 Sep and 2 Oct 1967 and *Dawn*, 3 Oct 1967.

50. *Ibid* , 2 Oct 1968.

51. Statement by Chen Yi, *Ibid.*, 29 Mar 1967.

52. Statement by Chen Yi, *Ibid* , 4 Oct 1968 and statement by Chia Shih, *Pakistan Times*, 27 Oct 1968.

53. *Ibid*.

54. *Dawn*, 6 Oct 1967.

55. *Ibid.*, 22 Jan 1968.

56. *Jenmin Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), 23 Jun 1967. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 3968.

57. *Dawn*, 25 Mar 1968.

58. Cited in *Asian Recorder* (1968) 8428.

59. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 3865, 24

60. *Washington Post*, 15 Jan 1967.

61. *Pakistan Times*, 18 Aug 1968.

62. *Dawn*, 27 Jul 1968.

63. *Ibid.*, 11 Aug 1968.

64. *Ibid* , 19 Oct 1968

65. *Pakistan Times*, 28 Feb 1967.

66. *Morning News*, 31 May 1968.

67. *Pakistan Times*, 27 Dec 1967.

68. Saghir Ahmad Khan, "Sino-Pak Relations", *Morning News*, 1 Oct 1968.

69. *Dawn*, 25 Oct 1967.

70. *Ibid*.

71. *Ibid.*, 28 Apr 1968.

72 *Pakistan Times*, 22 Jul 1968

73 *Hindustan Times*, 1 Oct 1964 and *Morning News* 1 Oct 1964

74 *Dawn*, 10 Oct 1964

75 *Ibid*, 22 and 23 Oct 1967

76 *Pakistan Times* 14 Nov 1963

77 Ministry of External Affairs *China Builds Strategic Roads in Kashmir—A Threat to Peace in Asia* (New Delhi undated) 3 4

78 *Ibid*, 5

79 *Ibid*, 1

80 *Patriot* 5 Aug 1971 and *Hindu* 10 May 1971 According to *Dawn*, port authorities in Karachi anticipate at least £150 million (Rs 27 crores) worth of Chinese exports to pass through the port every year *Statesman*, 11 May 1971

81 *Morning News* 6 Feb 1971 While describing the link up at Khunjerab of the Chinese section of 118 miles from Quila Nahi to Khunjerab and the Pakistan section of 70 miles from Moikhun to Khunjerab as "being more or less an accident since both China and Pakistan were trying to improve their own lines of communication and disagreeing with reports about as many as 12 000 Chinese road builders having been inducted on Pakistani side in that remote and bleak area" the British paper *Economist* had this to say "But it plainly suits Pakistan to pretend that it has a grand design for military cooperation with China. The more Pakistan seems to lean towards China, the greater the concern of both the Soviet Union and the United States to build up their own influence. If this is really all it amounts to, the road does not introduce a new element into the confrontation along the 2400 mile border between India and China. There are 150 000 or more Chinese troops in the area, whose job is both to hold down Tibet and to keep India on its toes" *Economist* (London) (28 Jun 1969) 37.

82 *Times of India*, 8 Dec 1969

83 Anwar Syed, "Sino Pakistan Relations—An Overview," *Pakistan Horizon* (1969) 118

84 Z A Suleri "India's Nuclear Threat," *Morning News*, 7 Feb 1967 Writing in the *Pakistan Times* on 30 April 1967, Suleri stated "The only power which may be prepared to provide it (nuclear umbrella) is China. For while it stands four square behind our integrity, it is in conflict with India. Its national interests demand that India should be deterred from exploiting its nuclear superiority over Pakistan in order to bring it to knees."

85 *Morning News* 31 Jul 1968

86 Statement by Foreign Minister Pirzada *Pakistan Times*, 14 Feb 1968

87 *Dawn*, 10 Nov 1968

88 *Ibid*, 15 Apr 1967

89 See UN Document A/6712 and *Pakistan Times* 31 Oct 1967

90 *Ibid*, 12 Jul 1968

91 Arshad Hussain's statement in the National Assembly in June 1968. Cited in V Shyam, "Implications of Soviet Pakistan Arms Deal," *United Asia* (Jul Aug 1968) 230

92 *Ibid*

93 *Pakistan Times* 2 and 3 Sep 1968

94 *Ibid*, 1 Oct 1961

95 *Ibid*

96 *Morning News*, 5 Nov 1968

97. *Pakistan Horizon* (1969) 194.
98. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 4459, p 18.
99. *Ibid*, 19-20.
100. *Pakistan Horizon* (1969) 287-8
101. *Ibid*, 289. Emphasis added.
102. Marghub Siddiqi, "Pak-China Entente," *Pakistan Times*, 10 Nov 1970.
103. Z.A. Suleri, "Visit to China," *Ibid*, 8 Nov 1970
104. Marghub Siddiqi, "A Goodwill Visit & More," *Ibid*, 10 Nov 1970
105. *Pakistan Observer*, 24 Oct 1970
106. H K. Burki, "State Visit Significant," *Pakistan Times*, 10 Nov 1970
107. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 4782, pp 149-50
108. *Ibid*, 151.
109. *Dawn*, 12 Nov 1970.
110. *Ibid*, 15 Nov 1970.
111. *Ibid*, 16 Nov 1970
112. *Ibid*.
113. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 4783, p. 66
114. *Dawn*, 16 Nov 1970 and *Pakistan Times*, 17 Nov 1970
115. *Dawn*, 16 Nov 1970
116. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No 4787, pp 161-2

CHAPTER 6

1. *Dawn*, 13 Apr 1971.
2. A.N. Das, "Chinese Honeycomb East Pakistan", *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 18 Oct 1965.
3. Pradip Bose, *Sino-Pak Collusion & East Pakistan* (Calcutta, 1966) Kamaluddin Ahmed, in his Bengali book *Amader Mukti Sangram* (Our Liberation Struggle) published from Dacca after the 1965 conflict, also asserts that a secret deal about handing over East Bengal to China existed and that Peking's strategy was to create another Vietnam in the Indian sub-continent, which would result in Pak occupation of the Kashmir valley and Chinese annexation of Assam, Nagaland, NE I A, Mizo Hills area and Tripura from India. Speaking about Chinese penetration in East Bengal, Ahmed stated that arrangements were made to broadcast over Dacca Radio political developments in China and propagation of the Chinese language. The controlled press was instructed to publish copious extracts from the Chinese papers and innumerable articles and essays were written on China. Though Marxist-Leninist literature was banned in Pakistan, China was allowed to distribute thousands of *Red Books* containing Mao's thoughts through its several cultural centres and libraries in East Bengal. Chinese consumer goods glutted East Bengal markets and the trade with China was increasing with such a tempo that the latter had to establish their own colonies in various localities of East Bengal. In the name of restructuring and revitalising the defence, the Chinese were allowed to collect valuable data about secret military bases in East Bengal. Ahmed disclosed Tapan Das, *Sino-Pak Collusion and US Policy* (Bombay, 1972) 118-9
4. Richard Harris, "China's Attitude to Bangladeshi Crisis," *Statesman*, 20 Dec 1971.
5. Pradip Bose, n 3. In January 1967, leaflets advocating a "United States of Bengal" comprising West Bengal, East Pakistan, Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim and Bhutan were distributed widely in East

Pakistan. Some considered the CIA of the USA to be responsible for it while others saw China behind it. B L Sharma *The Pakistan China Axis* (Bombay 1968) 177

6 *News Review on China* (New Delhi) (May 1971) 28-9

7 *Ibid*

8 *Pakistan Times* 17 May 1971

9 *Hindu* 16 Oct 1971 Cited in *News Review on China* (Oct 1971) 33-4

10 *Hindu* 19 Apr 1971 Cited in *Ibid* (Apr 1971) 18-23

11 *Statesman* 1 Jun 1971

12 *News Review on China* (Oct 1971) 27-8 and 34

13 *Hindustan Times* 21 Jun 1971

14 *Statesman* 30 Oct 1971 Cited in *News Review on China* (Nov 1971) 45

15 *Statesman* 25 Nov 1971 Cited in *Ibid* Dec 1971, 54. The Commander in Chief of the Bangladesh armed forces Col Osmany told the *Washington Post* (16 Jan 1972) that uniformed Chinese soldiers operated alongside the Pakistani army in training, arming, advisory and engineering roles. Speaking of "positive proof" about the presence of Chinese troops in the then East Pakistan from July 1971 onwards, he observed that he had received three separate reports during the war that an undetermined number of Chinese in "light greenish high buttoned uniforms and wearing soft peaked unformed caps" were working in the Dacca military cantonment. The Chinese were training and arming with a large selection of modern weapons —soldiers and *radars* paid by the Pakistan army. A group of uniformed Chinese army engineers, Col Osmany added, were spotted in August 1971 working alongside Pakistani troops at a river crossing in Comilla replacing a bridge. *Indian Express*, 18 Jan 1972.

16 *Amrita Bazar Patrika* quoted in the *Down* 28 Dec 1971

17 *Times of India* 29 Jan 1972. *Unen* claimed that in 1965, China had given \$250 million worth of military aid to Pakistan and had promised another \$250 million in 1970. *Statesman* 29 Jan 1972. President Nixon in his annual foreign policy address to the Congress on 9 February 1972, stated that the Chinese supply of arms to Pakistan since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 (upto the end of 1971) was worth only \$133 million. *Ibid.*, 10 Feb 1972 and *Indian Express* 10 Feb 1972.

18 *News Review on China* (Apr 1971) 19

19 *Ibid*, 20

20 *Peking Review* (16 Apr 1971) 28

21 *Down* 13 Apr 1971. According to one Indian writer, Chou En lai made the distinction between "the broad masses of the people" and "a handful of persons" with the obvious intention of conveying to the Pakistani military leadership the view of Peking that no useful purpose was likely to be served by the indiscriminate killing of the civilian population in East Bengal. "That is to say in Peking's view Yahya Khan should adopt political means to solve the crisis and moderate his military activity. In a sense it was a clear warning to Islamabad that military measures alone would not pay. This was further highlighted by the next sentence of Chou's message: "As a genuine friend of Pakistan we would like to present these views for your Excellency's reference." K.N Ramachandran, "China's South Asia Policy," *The Institute for Defence Studies And Analyses Journal* (Jul 1971) 47.

22 *Down* 6 Apr 1971

23 *News Review on China* (May 1971) 30

24 *Peking Review* (12 Nov 1971) 6

25. *Ibid.*, (10 Sep 1971) 16.
26. *Ibid.*, (26 Nov 1971) 20.
27. *News Review on China* (Dec 1971) 42.
28. *Peking Review* (3 Dec 1971) 5.
29. *Ibid.*, 18.
30. *Ibid.*, 5.
31. *Hsinhua News Agency*, 3 Dec 1971 BBC *Survey of World Broadcasts*, PE/3856.
32. *Sunday Standard*, 5 Dec 1971 Cited in *China Report* (New Delhi (Nov-Dec 1971) 71.
33. UN Document S/PV 1607, p. 37.
34. *Peking Review* (10 Dec 1971) 10.
35. UN Document S/PV 1607, p. 16
36. UN Document S/PV 1606, pp. 12-5.
37. *Peking Review* (17 Dec 1971) 11-2.
38. *Ibid.*, 15.
39. *Ibid.*, 14.
40. *Ibid.*, 10.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*, (24 Dec 1971) 9.
43. UN Document S/PV 1621, pp. 12-6.
44. *Times of India*, 14 Apr 1971. A comparison and assessment of China's attitudes and comments in 1965 and 1971 is given in Mira Sinha's paper presented at the Seminar on Bangladesh on 3 July 1971 and reproduced in K. Subrahmanyam, *Bangladesh and India's Security* (Dehra Dun, 1972) 113-28. According to her, in 1965 China commented adversely on all aspects of India's domestic and international behaviour and the attitude was in all cases one of acute hostility while in 1971 Peking's comments had been mainly limited to Indo-Pak differences and China desisted from creating an issue of purely Sino-Indian concern with which to aggravate the situation in case of an Indo-Pak war or to embarrass India.
45. *Statesman*, 10 Nov 1971.
46. *Peking Review* (12 Nov 1971) 23.
47. *Times of India*, 9 Nov 1971.
48. *Hong Kong Standard*, 9 Dec 1971, Cited in *News Review on China* (Dec 1971) 53.
49. *Peking Review* (16 Apr 1971) 7-8.
50. *Ibid.*, (10 Dec 1971) 14.
51. *News Review on China* (Dec 1971) 42
52. *Peking Review* (10 Dec 1971) 6-7.
53. UN Document S/PV 1608, pp. 71-2.
54. *Peking Review* (10 Dec 1971) 8.
55. UN Document S/PV 1607, p. 121.
56. *Peking Review* (10 Dec 1971) 10.
57. *People's Daily Commentator*, 7 Dec 1971. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
58. UN Document S/PV 1615, p. 11.
59. UN Document S/PV 1607, p. 122.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Peking Review* (10 Dec 1971) 11.
62. UN Document S/PV 1608, pp. 72-5.

41. *Peking Review* (8 Jun 1973) 20-1.
42. *Hindustan Standard*, 7 Jul 1973.
43. UN Document A/PV 2122.
44. Robert Jackson, n. 28.
45. *Peking Review* (1 Dec 1972) 18.
46. *Asian Recorder*, p. 11278.
47. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds Anew," *Foreign Affairs* (Apr 1973) 551-2.
48. Radio Pakistan, 15 September 1973 as reproduced in *News Review on South Asia* (Sep 1973) 73.
49. UN Document A/PV 2122. In his message to Chou En-lai on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Bhutto extended the "heartiest felicitations and cordial greetings." He stated that he was confident that China would continue to make an "important contribution to the cause of world peace and the advancement of mankind." He expressed his fervent hope that the "ties of close friendship, cooperation and understanding so happily existing between our two countries will grow from strength to strength in the days to come." *Dawn*, 1 Oct 1973.
50. See *Dawn* and *Pakistan Times*, 21 to 24 Sep 1973.

Appendices

Appendix A

Exchange of Visits Between China and Pakistan

1. Soong Ching-ling and Vice-Premier Ho Lung visit Pakistan	—	Jan/Mar 1956
2. Pakistani Prime Minister H S Suhrawardy visits China	—	Oct 1956
3. Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan	—	Dec 1956
4. Bhutto's visit to China	—	Mar 1963
5. Chou En-lai and Chen Yi visit Pakistan	—	Feb 1964
6. Ayub Khan's visit to China	—	Mar 1965
7. Chen Yi's visit to Pakistan	—	Mar 1965
8. Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi visit West and East Pakistan	—	Mar/Apr 1966
9. Chinese cultural delegation visits Pakistan	—	Jun 1966
10. Pakistan's Minister of Commerce Ghulam Farque visits Peking	—	Jul 1966
11. Parliamentary delegation led by Abdul Jaffar Khan, Speaker of Pakistan National Assembly, visits Peking	—	Aug 1966
12. Pakistan's Education Secretary visits China	—	Sep 1966
13. Friendship delegation led by Abdul Monem Khan, Governor of East Pakistan, visits China	—	Oct 1966
14. Visit by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sariffudin Pirzada	—	Oct 1966
15. Pakistan's Defence Minister Vice Admiral A R Khan visits China	—	May 1967
16. Friendship delegation led by Khwaja Shahabuddin, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, visits China	—	Sep 1967

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| 17. Chinese trade delegation visits Pakistan | — | Oct 1967 |
| 18. Economic delegation led by M. M. Ahmed, Vice Chairman of Pakistan's Planning Commission, visits China | — | Dec 1967 |
| 19. Visit of a 54-member Chinese cultural troupe to Peshawar, Lahore and Dacca | — | Jan/Feb 1968 |
| 20. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain visits China | — | Aug 1968 |
| 21. Friendship delegation headed by Fida Hasan, Adviser to Ayub, visits China | — | Sep/Oct 1968 |
| 22. Military delegation headed by General Yahya Khan visits China | — | Nov 1968 |
| 23. Chinese Minister of Trade Lin Hai Yun visits Pakistan | — | Dec 1968 |
| 24. Air Marshal Nur Khan visits China | — | Jul 1969 |
| 25. Three delegations from Pakistan visit China to participate in China's National Day celebrations | | |
| (i) Government goodwill delegation led by Abdual Hamid Khan | | |
| (ii) Mumtaz Ahmad Khan, President of Pak-China Friendship Association | | |
| (iii) Shakir Ullah Durrani, Managing Director of PIA, and his entourage | — | Sep/Oct 1969 |
| 26. Kuo Mo-jo visits Pakistan | — | Mar 1970 |
| 27. Chinese economic and friendship delegation led by Fang Yi, Chairman of the Commission of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, visits Pakistan | — | Apr 1970 |
| 28. Chinese trade delegation headed by Lien Chang-hsien visits Gilgit | — | May 1970 |
| 29. Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan, C-in-C of Pakistan's Air Force, led an Air Force delegation to China | — | May 1970 |
| 30. Naval delegation headed by Vice Admiral Muzaffar Hasan, C-in-C of Pakistan's Navy, visits China | — | Sep 1970 |
| 31. Pakistani Agricultural Delegation visits China | — | Sep 1970 |
| 32. Friendship delegation led by Lt. Gen. M. A. Rehman, Governor of Punjab, visits China | — | Sep/Oct 1970 |

33. President Yahya Khan's visit to China	—	Nov 1970
34. Chinese Communications Minister Yang Chieh visits Pakistan	—	Feb 1971
35. Bhutto's visit to China	—	Nov 1971
36. President Bhutto's visit to China	—	Feb 1972
37. Chinese Minister for Foreign Trade Pai Hsiang-kuo visits Pakistan	—	Jun 1972
38. Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua visits Pakistan	—	Aug/Sep 1972
39. General Tikka Khan's visit to China	—	Jan 1973
40. Begum Bhutto's visit to China	—	Feb 1973
41. A nine-man Chinese team discusses the setting up of a fertilizer factory in NWFP with Chinese assistance	—	Jun 1973
42. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, visits China	—	Aug/Sep 1973

Appendix B

Agreements Between China And Pakistan

1. Agreement about cotton and a contract regarding coal	—	14 Mar 1953
2. Contract to purchase and sell 3 lakhs long tons of Chinese coal	—	19 Mar 1956
3. Contract to purchase and sell 3 lakh long tons of Chinese coal	—	10 May 1956
4. Barter Agreement : Exchange of rice for cotton and jute	—	8 Aug 1958
5. Trade Agreement	—	5 Jan 1963
6. Boundary Agreement	—	2 Mar 1963
7. Air Agreement	—	29 Aug 1963
8. Telecommunications Agreement	—	16 Sep 1963
9. Barter Agreement : Exchange of cement for jute	—	30 Sep 1963
10. Agreement about news agencies	—	23 Jul 1964
11. Grant of a 60 million interest free loan to Pakistan	—	18 Feb 1965
12. Cultural Agreement	—	26 Mar 1965
13. Boundary Protocol	—	26 Mar 1965
14. Shipping Agreement	—	11 Apr 1965
15. Agreement to grant free visas to each other's nationals	—	May 1965
16. Agreement for the establishment of a Heavy Engineering Complex in West Pakistan with Chinese technical and financial aid	—	23 Jun 1966
17. Trade Protocol : Pakistan to export cotton, jute, mica etc. and import machine tools, steel structures etc.	—	4 Jul 1966
18. Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement	—	30 Jul 1966
19. Agreement for one lakh tons of rice from China	—	2 Aug 1966
20. Maritime Agreement	—	4 Oct 1966
21. Agreement for a joint shipping service signed at Rawalpindi	—	21 Oct 1966

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|----|---|---|-------------|
| 22 | Agreement for the supply of one lakh tons of wheat and 50 000 tons of rice by China | — | 27 Jan 1967 |
| 23 | Agreement for the supply of Chinese machinery and equipment worth \$126 000 for a mechanical complex at Taxila | — | 3 Mar 1967 |
| 24 | Announcement about Chinese Airlines starting a weekly air service between Kunming and Dacca | — | 19 Apr 1967 |
| 25 | Agreement for training Pakistani design engineers and technical personnel in China signed by WPIDC | — | 25 Aug 1967 |
| 26 | Agreement to facilitate trade between Gilgit and Sinkiang signed at Islamabad | — | 21 Oct 1967 |
| 27 | Grant of an interest free loan worth \$40 million by China | — | Dec 1967 |
| 28 | Barter Agreement for exchanging goods worth \$23.1 million both ways during 1968 | — | 4 Apr 1968 |
| 29 | Agreement for the supply of building material and erection machinery to Pakistan | — | 1 May 1968 |
| 30 | Barter Agreement for the import of 150 000 tons of cement for East Pakistan and export of raw cotton yarn and jute sacks | — | 17 Jul 1968 |
| 31 | Donation of \$21,000 to flood victims of East Pakistan by the Chinese Red Cross | — | 18 Jul 1968 |
| 32 | Agreement to supply machinery worth \$3 105 million to WPIDC for the mechanical complex at Taxila | — | Jul 1968 |
| 33 | Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, providing for a Chinese loan worth \$200 million, signed during Yahya's visit to China | — | 14 Nov 1970 |
| 34 | Trade Agreement providing for the exchange of goods during 1972-73 | — | 23 Jun 1972 |
| 35 | Agreement for the construction of a 200 kV double circuit Tarbela Wah transmission line to connect Tarbela power station with the national grid | — | 22 May 1973 |

Appendix C
Pakistan's Trade with China
(In millions of US dollars)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports from China</i>	<i>Exports to China</i>
1948	20.8	9.9
1949	28.7	4.2
1950	18.5	7.8
1951	17.0	45.0
1952	2.2	83.8
1953	3.3	77.2
1954	1.6	26.1
1955	0.2	31.7
1956	0.5	15.9
1957	7.8	9.5
1958	10.3	7.6
1959	4.2	0.7
1960	4.0	14.7
1961	3.6	10.0
1962	4.2	1.6
1963	5.9	12.9
1964	16.3	14.8
1965	18.5	43.3
1966	28.3	30.1
1967	29.3	26.4
1968	26.4	29.0
1969	27.6	21.6
1970	27.8	39.3
1971	36.5	29.0

Source : *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *China Trade Reports*; *Quarterly Economic Review : China, North Korea, Hong Kong*; *UN Statistical Yearbook* Supplemented by other sources.

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